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THE JEWISH WAR FRONT



1940

CHAPTER I.



This book, written in January 1940, is intended to press a claim for the inclusion, first, of the Jewish problem into the war-aims of the Allied nations, and secondly - into the scope of any all-round revisionist discussion that may follow the war.

Responsible people, I know, are getting impatient of laymen's insistence on extending the war aims of the Allies so as to include the redress of almost any grievance ever raised anywhere on earth. These responsible people firmly demand that a stop be put to this nonsense; they point out that the proper "aims" of a nation at war ^(a/c) is to remove those factors which have caused that war, and hardly anything else; whereas other grievances, however justified, will have to be settled by some other method.

Those responsible people are perfectly right; nevertheless, and strictly in accordance with their argument just outlined, the removal of the Jewish grievance is a claim most undeniably entitled to a prominent place among the genuine and urgent aims of the war - without prejudice to the place to which it is entitled among the questions to be dealt with in the after-war reconstruction talks.

It is very useful for all of us to realize that there are, among the many questions of reconstruction raised in connection with the war, these two quite distinct categories: "war aims" and "all-round revisionism". Much confusion would be avoided if both were kept rigorously apart. A war aim is something which you actually and obviously fight for, and if you do not obtain it as an outcome of the war it will mean that you have been beaten. For instance, if a repetition of acts of violence such as Poland's invasion will not be rendered impossible, the Allies will have lost the war; crushing the Nazi regime is, therefore, a war aim. But such purposes as, for instance, re-establishing free trade between the nations, excellent as it is, cannot be called a war aim. A peace treaty can be signed without mentioning it and still be considered most satisfactory.

The removal of unreasonable trade barriers belongs to quite a different category of world needs: it is one of those problems that await the great Revision. Revisionism is not by any means unconnected with the war: on the contrary, most of us feel that it would be a criminal waste of a tragic but great opportunity if such a cataclysm were allowed to pass without leading up to some effort of all-round, thorough spring-cleaning. Which does not mean that no peace can be made before it is effected.

War aims are aims for which nations are compelled to fight with steel and gunpowder. Revisionism embraces purposes which can be discussed peacefully and settled without violence (even if not always without the pressure of implied threats). It is to be hoped that, as progress marches on, more and more problems will be solved by peaceful revision instead of by war. For the present it is unfortunately indispensable to distinguish between the two aspects, war aims and revision.

The preceding paragraph is not an academic essay: it has the very practical purpose of doing away with the convention that the Jewish problem, though ripe for "revision", is not to be considered a "war aim". This contention is wrong. The Jewish problem belongs to both categories, and above all to that of war-aims.

Responsible statesmen and press organs have been heard recently betraying some impatience with those voices out of the great public which attempt to bring up every overdue item of world-improvement as one of the sine qua non conditions for an acceptable peace. Those statesmen and newspapers are perfectly right: the circle of proper war-aims should not be extended beyond the really essential and indispensable items.

But the solution of the Jewish tragedy is exactly one of these essential and indispensable items. A peace treaty leaving the Jewish problem unsolved would not ensure anything like a durable peace. Jewish redress is a war aim.

The problem is vast and complicated; it can obviously not be settled in all its details at one single peace conference. Those details will have to be left over for the "revision" period which will follow the end of the war. But complicated problems do not only consist of details: they also have roots. The root of the Jewish tragedy is a matter of terrible urgency; it is actually one of the main factors that brought about this war. This root must be extracted, and this is a war aim.

I wish to add also this to the distinction between "war aims" and "revision":

War aims will be discussed and settled at peace conferences, one or several conferences. Such conferences tend to be short and sharp.

The Revision period, which will follow the signature of the peace treaty or the various peace treaties, will probably take the form of a protracted session, by something like a European parliament or perhaps a world parliament. Its labours may last years, may last even a generation. It may be called a new League of Nations, or a continent's Federation, or any other name. One thing is certain: all humanity feels that it must come and that must carry out the great reconstruction.

It would doubtlessly have come without the pretext or the preface of this war, simply by the pressure of realities; this war is perhaps only a secondary incident. It is not the war that will reconstruct the universe: this will be accomplished by the Revision period. The war will only burn or sweep away a few rocks impeding the reconstruction; cut out a few malignant tumours preventing any recovery.

One of them is the cancer called the Jewish tragedy. Even a beginning of universal reconstruction cannot be made unless this is cut out. A war aim in the fullest sense of the term.

CHAPTER II.

The Jewish tragedy is not the microbe which has caused this war. The Jewish tragedy is "only" that favourable medium or feeding-ground in which the microbe grew to maturity.

Mysteries of mass psychology, when both the author and the reader are laymen, can best be explained, or at least illustrated, by metaphor and analogy. Several such present themselves to our mind in our case, to illuminate the important organic rôle of the Jew-hunting in the growth and progress of the Armageddon monster. It may be compared to the rôle of "spice" or "sauce" which help the masses to swallow a kind of poison-food which would be too unpalatable without it; or of a lubricating oil for speeding down the chute a load which might get stuck otherwise; or of those thin sticks of wood (dry) a housewife lights to get the heavy logs or lumps of coal in the big fireplace catch fire properly. I will have to use all of them, but none of them is quite exactly suitable to fit the case. After all, food can be swallowed even without the spice, the load can be pushed down without the grease, etc.: but Nazism would never have grown to such power without the help of antisemitism. "Feeding ground for the microbe" is the ~~best~~ simile best ~~suiting~~ meeting the case.

The man in the street may not be conscious of this intimate connection between the acute forms of antisemitism and war-danger. He may even think it a monstrous exaggeration

to suggest that Jew-baiting in Nazi Germany, however objectionable, was in any way responsible for, say, Hitler's disregarding the Anglo-French warning which was the direct cause of the conflict. The man in the street can be expected to dismiss such suggestions as a case of megalomania: "Those Jews imagine that everything, weather and climate and earthquakes, depends on what is going to happen to him. Of course the Nazi programme and practice, beside the greed for world power and the cult of violence, also includes persecution of Jews, but the latter is just a concomittant, an accompanying phenomenon, not the essence. Nazism could have been just as bad if there were no Jews on earth".

This is utterly wrong. For destructive movements of the Nazi type, antisemitism is infinitely more than a "concomittant"; and Nazism would probably never have accomplished such rapid and sweeping conquests if it had not been able to ride the anti-Jewish horse.

Everybody knows that, in propoganda, the appeal of love is slow and clumsy in comparison with the appeal of hate. Hate is that piquant sauce which speeds up both the swallowing and the digestion of ideas and schemes. Furthermore, that "sauce" can only be fully effective if the object of the hate is within reach, well-known to all, easy and non-dangerous to attack. Had the Nazi propoganda, from its beginnings, been confined to preaching rebellion against the Versailles peace

terms and English, American or French wickedness, its appeal might have been still powerful theoretically, but its actual progress among the masses would have been so slow that it is doubtful whether it would ever have gathered enough momentum for an explosion. A Versailles treaty is not a tangible object for real ^{palpable} tangible hatred: masses cannot feel concretely emotional towards an object which can only be seen at the public library. On the other hand, hating the English or the Americans or the French is either a torture to the hater himself as long as he dare not express it by deeds, or a very dangerous enterprise if he tries prematurely to translate it into action. There is only one ideal object for mass training in collective hate, and that is the Jew. He is everywhere within reach, he can be pointed out at any street corner; and he can be insulted or assaulted with only the minimum of risk or with none at all. To foster a movement of the Nazi type without the daily use of Jewish targets would be like staging a pageant without rehearsals.

The world outside of Germany does not realise to what an all-prevailing extent the Nazi movement has, through all the years of its existence, been dependant on its Jewish spice for vitality and driving power. Theoretically, a complete gospel of German National Socialism could have been composed without any reference to Jews at all: rearmament, militarisation of the Rhine district, restoration of colonies,

Anschluss of Austria, annexation of the Sudetenland, to say nothing of that childish scheme of social reforms devised in 1923 by an amateur erudite called Feder, and incorporated into the "immutable" programme of the party, and a little later abandoned:- all these could have been preached just as forcibly had their authors never thought of Israel and Judah. But those authors evidently felt, from the very beginning, that nothing of all this would "go down" properly with the masses unless seasoned with the all-powerful spice. The result was that not one spoonful of the dish was served without the spice; not one single ditch crossed but on the "Jewish" stilts.

It is foolish to explain this infatuation by using the term "mania". With a few exceptions, the Nazi chiefs are as sane as any other government or party leaders in any other country. Nor is it "sadism"; nor any other abnormal urge rooted in the morbid subconscious of man almost each one of whom, when defeated and shorn of his war-paint and examined in the ordinary light of drab everyday reality, will probably be found to be just drab average. Some of them (if not most of them) have long, and quite credibly, been reported to confess how endlessly "fed up" they were with the necessity always to talk of Jews, Jews, Jews. One does not do such things for pleasure: one does it only because of necessity. They knew that their propaganda would not win through fast enough and wide enough

without the sauce. It is only thanks to the sauce that it has won through so wide and so fast. The word only has just been italicized with full responsibility: not in the sense (let it be repeated) as though Jew-baiting belonged to the real essence of the Nazi contraband - which it does not: but because Jew-baiting has proved a powerful lubricant without which the load would have crawled instead of sliding down as it did.

(All this is not new, at least not to us Jews. As early as in the eighteenth eighties, after a pogrom in the Ukraine, a Russian Socialist party published a manifesto trying to comfort all friends of liberty by arguing that an anti-Jewish pogrom was, after all, not such a bad thing, being rather in the nature of a rehearsal: the peasants only begin by attacking the K Jews, they will continue by massacring the police and will end by smashing autocracy. - Years later, also in Russia, it was a Jewish revolutionary who chimed in, with the often quoted formula, "Jewish blood is the best for oiling the wheels of progress".).

The success of the Nazi experiment has proved instructive. Now, in the light of the present conflagration, the whole story of the last decade looks very much like a gradual shunting of several nations "falling in" into the one or the other of the two great camps about to clash. And it is really striking and curious to see that, whenever any of those nations thought of

joining the enemy ~~block~~ of the Western block (be it even only a hesitating attempt, soon to be abandoned), it invariably begun by qualifying for admission in the same and only way - through a dose of the "Jewish" spice. That was the meaning of the Goga-intermezzo in Roumania: for a moment, in the autumn of 1936, that country's ruling circle oscillated close on the brink of an anti-Western orientation - and the first visible symptom of it was the application of that same "lubricant", a violently anti-semitic cabinet and a broadside of anti-Jewish legislation. A few weeks later the anti-Western orientation was found undesirable - and Mr. Goga^{was} dismissed and his legislation quashed. This is not the moment to dwell on that short-lived incident longer than strictly necessary for pointing out its moral, but the moral is obvious and should not be forgotten.

Still less opportune would it be just now to emphasise the Italian analogy: yet it is one even more striking than Roumania's example. In Roumania there had always been antisemitic tendencies among the masses: so there was, at least, something (or even much) for a gambler to gamble upon. But Italy! It is not enough to say that its people, for half a century at least, had genuinely forgotten all about discriminating against a Jew: they had actually lost interest (all) in noticing who was a Jew and who wasn't. Yet, when the time came for swinging the country into a certain "orientation", in some mysterious way it was immediately felt that the new course

would not run sufficiently smoothly without a coat of the regulation grease. The lubricant here was applied half-heartedly, with evident repulsion, with countless apologies - as something one does admittedly contre-oeur, and only because one must: because, for that kind of job, this kind of black mass is in-dis-pen-sable.

I am neither a historian nor a sociologist, and raise no claim to being fully able to explain why it is "indispensable". Many a time have I, too, asked myself this question: innumerable wars had been fought in the past, yet never was any such necessity to prepare for it by such especial emphasis on the Jews. Why does it appear so necessary now?

One explanation is perhaps an almost comforting one: progress. The world has been moving on after all despite all our scepticism. Masses can no longer be sent to die simply by order: now they need some ~~xx~~ kind of "religion" to die for. It may not have been a mere word when some observers of, for instance, the Spanish civil war affirmed that the programmatic differences, or the clash of real interests, between Burgos and Madrid were infinitesimally small - it was not a fight over tangible issues but a pure and simple guerre de religion.

But a "religion" to fit Germany's claim to domination must be a formidable one. Populations speaking German dialects and occupying contiguous territories in Europe count close to one hundred million, as against 40 to 45 millions each of Britishers, Frenchmen or Italians. There is an inherent suggestion or temptation of supremacy in these figures: not just of ascendancy or predominance or influence but of actual subjugation, of power such as a slave-owner could wield over his Negroes. That temptation can only be curbed by some extremely powerful spiritual self-discipline: by that combination of countless traditions - ethical, philosophical, religious, cultural, democratic traditions - which we call civilisation or progress. All these had to be swept away before a nation with such a library as the Germans could be made to regress ten centuries back to a creed as primitive and cynical as this: We Germans are the salt of the earth, our neighbours' land is our Lebensraum, their human value can only be acknowledged in so far as it is useful to us; we may impose forced labour on their youths, we may drive them away from their ~~houses~~ towns and villages to make room for Germans - all that will be good and will be right, and any opposition to it will be criminal, and the means to be used in suppressing such opposition need not be weighed in any balance of ethics but only in the balance of efficiency.

In re-reading this paragraph I am conscious that much of this mentality was of course displayed in primitive conquests such as those described in my own Old Testament; also thousands of years later - in Europe's colonial policy since Columbus' day and down to perhaps a couple of generations back. It is a silly pastime to "defend" ancestors: I would not spend one drop of ink on the bestiality of Gideon, nor a minute of my time on reading a justification of the bestiality of Cortez. Yet all this has no bearing on our theme, ~~but~~ for ~~in~~ those ancient or bygone days the mass-mind of humanity was so easily accessible to relapses of bestiality that there was no need for any profound moral revolution before effecting the relapse. But the last century has brought such conceptions as humanity and equality really home to the minds of countless millions: now, to wash all that away in clearing the ground for the return of the beast, a formidable effort is required.

And a formidable amount of training by rehearsal, by cheap and easy experimenting in corpore vili. The dormant brute in German souls seems to have been hibernating very near to the surface, but even so it had to be converted to beastliness and cruelty by gradual drill. Like Voltaire's God, if the Jews had not existed they would have had to be invented for the purpose.

It would be criminal blindness, on the part of western statemanship, to disregard the historical truth of this enquiry. When the Nazis across the frontiers, or their hirelings in Britain and France, yell or whisper that this is a "Jewish War" they are perfectly right: the microbe would have died had it not been allowed to feed and multiply on the Jewish tragedy.

CHAPTER III .

Poland's part in that "Jewish" pre-history of the war is a chapter by itself. I shall have to speak of Poland in this book in other connections: here I only wish to point out the curious and painful of her historical rôle during these twenty years of her renewed existence. It was a period during which the new world war was hatching; during which her government did much to prevent it; but it so happened that, after Germany herself, Poland was, objectively, the main ground where the war-microbes bred.

There is a story about the late Marshal Pilsudski's interview with an important French envoy, soon after the Nazi conquest of the power in Berlin. The Frenchman was trying to persuade him to join France and England (plus, of course, Soviet Russia) against Germany. Pilsudski took his guest to a big wall map, showing Poland squeezed in between the U.S.S.R. and Germany, and said: "If these two clash some day, all their battles will be fought on our soil. Now you just imagine that this soil is not Poland but France, and tell me what would be your policy then".

From the moment Pilsudski took the power in 1926, perhaps even before that, the policy of the Polish Republic

was dictated by this paramount aim: no war on Polish soil. In those days it was, in all minds, tantamount to "no war at all". Of all intensely, inherently, ingrainedly peace-minded countries, Poland was probably the most genuinely anxious: not because of what is called pacifism but because of something much more effective than pacifism - obvious unmistakable interest.

And at the same time, all that East-Central zone of Europe - we call it "Europe, E.C." - stretching from Riga on the Baltic down to Constantza on the Black Sea was uninterruptedly ^(kind of) seething with the most unhealthy social fever: and its centre, and the main focus from which it radiated North and South, was Poland. It was, of course, the same evil again: the "Jewish" fever.

Its source was the statistical fact that the Jews were ten per cent of Poland's total, and about one third of Poland's urban, population. This fact viciated and perverted every civic value. "Democracy" in this atmosphere meant that in the townhalls of Warsaw, Cracow, Lemberg, Lodz, of every important city, Poles would have to share mastery almost evenly with Jews: that was what it meant, or so people thought. "Equality of rights" in this atmosphere meant that in every branch of economy that requires some learning, the long-urbanised Jew will overtake and beat his Polish competitor, son or grandson of slow-witted peasantry: or so people thought

It does not matter how unfair and cruel this rings: in Poland, that was the constant all-deafening din filling the very air of her public life. We shall see in another chapter how true it is that in some countries it is not "antisemitism of men" but "antisemitism of Things" which decides: here we have a convincing illustration of that rule.

The result was that for twenty years Poland was always on the brink of some ugly inner convulsion. This does not by any means suggest that the Jewish question was her only painful spot: neither the only, nor perhaps the main one. Poland's Ukrainian problem, for one, was doubtless of deeper gravity. But this, or any other of her internal difficulties, did not possess that especial and ^cursed peculiarity of antisemitism - the talent never to stop, never to relax, to fester and distill venom day and night and again in the morning: something like a chronic cold in the head, not a grave disease in itself but a constant invitation to all other kinds of disease. Party strife in that "climate" became murderous hate; criticism degenerated into calumny; the whole temperature and temper of all public life reminded one of the atmosphere within a ~~bank~~ besieged fortress. Especially since Pilsudski's death, the government always, to a friendly onlooker, seemed like cheerfully but rather anxiously defending a trench - and that on a volcano.

Yet this was Poland, by size and numbers and prestige the central rock of "Europe, E.C.". Had she been given, by God or fate, a chance of developing calmly and steadily, her influence would have steadied the whole of that zone and would have made of it a real "Third Europe", a cohesive force capable of sobering its German neighbour despite all his numerical strength ("Europe, E.C." has itself a population not far from 100 million). As it was, Poland's unrelaxing feverishness only acted as a constant encouragement for the nest where birds of prey were hatching.

The conclusion is clear: no restoration, in Central or East-Central Europe, will be any use to durable peace if the sarcoma-root from which antisemitism flows is not cut out. Among the factors whose interplay has produced this war, that "Jewish" root - "Jewish" the Jews - was at the root of all. The war will have been fought in vain, the victory worse than a lie if it is left stuck in the ground to poison the future.

news", as they say in the B.B.C.:

It is useless to ask how much of it the reader has seen in the general Allied press. Yet all these are not events of some remote earthquake, or antipode typhoon, "something which after all is no concern of ours" from the standpoint of, say, sacro egoismo: these are the direct results of the conquest of Poland for which the Allies solemnly assume responsibility.

Under these conditions a conspiracy of silence is unforgivably insulting. But its main harm is in the inevitable suggestion that the Allies are ashamed of having Jews as fellow-sufferers. There is, both in England and France, a moral underworld ever trying to "get at" the non-defeatist camp by the taunt of a "Jewish war": which, as we have seen, is in a sense not quite entirely wrong. But polite society evidently shrinks from such "pornography". The result is that the Jewish fellow-sufferer is denied ~~th~~ even the last and most elementary privilege of a sufferer: to have his losses registered in proper and fair perspective, so that he may at least hope, when the day comes for all-round redress, restoration and retribution, to present his claims on equal terms with others. The only explanation of the conspiracy - whether instinctive or planned - is that it is not desirable that the Jewish claim should ever be presented.

This is a foolish policy: if continued, it can only drive all world Jewry to bitter and dangerous conclusions.

CHAPTER V.

Some desultory attempts have, however, been made by best-class British statesmen to include the Jewish question into the scope of the Allied war-aims. The men I am going to quote are worthy of all respect, and their intentions unimpeachably sincere and benevolent. The more disappointing will be the conclusion any Jew will have to draw from their compared utterances.

Should any more pronouncements on the subject have appeared before this book goes into the printing machine, they will be mentioned in the concluding chapter; but there is little hope that they can appreciably change the picture. As it is, the picture is extremely arid. It boils down to "as you were". It is, of course, foreshadowed that Germany, Austria, Czechoslovakia and Poland will once again become liberal Republics, and there will be a reinforced League of

The range of these excellent pledges will be the better appreciated if the reader recalls that equal rights for Jews, even in East-Central Europe, is nothing new. On the contrary, the legal recognition of this principle is almost in every one of these states just as old as the state itself. Only Austria-Hungary was older than its Jewish equality law, set on her statute book in 1867. When the German Empire was formed in 1871, its imperial constitution established equality for all irrespective of creed or origin. When the Berlin treaty (1878) definitely put into shape Roumania, Serbia and Bulgaria, it was guaranteed by the same treaty that in all of them all citizens would enjoy equal rights. When the peace treaties of 1919 created Poland, Czechoslovakia and the Baltic States, special minority clauses were solemnly inserted to ensure equality, and to avoid any evasions the Jewish minority was explicitly named as one of the beneficiaries; to say nothing of the League of Nations which was to supervise and guarantee. To tell once again how all this proved ineffective would be tedious; the only item that may tickle the reader's curiosity is that pre-war Roumania never took the equality clause seriously, openly treated her Jews as "foreigners", and never had any trouble on that account with any of the signatories of the Berlin treaty - one of whom was Great Britain and another France.

Nations to look after the treatment of minorities. On the other hand, Jews are honestly warned by Sir Archibald Sinclair (who ought to be sincerely thanked for saying the only essential word in all this cant) that actual and permanent supervision of internal developments in a sovereign country by outside organs is impracticable; in other words, the reality of any statute or treaty clauses about equal rights will ultimately depend, in Germany on the good will of the Germans, in Poland of the Poles. Roumania and Hungary, being as yet not at war, are not mentioned, but the obvious inference is that in these two countries outside supervision of the Jewish position is also out of question.

This disposes of some 2,000,000 Jews still living in the zone which, for 20 years, has been the main theatre of acute Jewish distress. Apart from cant, what they are really promised is ~~natax~~ status quo ante. This is presumably what is expected to keep the Jew enthusiastic for an Allied victory.

The general public, some Jews probably too, are very far from realising all the positive and hideous horror of the prospect this situation involves. It is worth analysing that prospect's details in the four chapters that follow.

Furthermore, I also believe that all these peoples, restored to safety and sanity, will honestly try to devote themselves to sober restoration. I believe that they will detest war; I hope they will, at least for a generation's life-time, discard all thought of armed "revanches"; I expect them to give much more active support to the new League of Nations, or the European Federation, or whatever else it is to be called, than that which was enjoyed by the old Geneva one. True, one point is not quite clear yet even to a trustful believer, and that is the manner in which they will settle all those spikey questions of ethnically mixed provinces so as to satisfy everybody and stamp out irredentism; but so fervent is my desire to believe that I prefer not to think of the spikes: everything will somehow get adjusted in time, with a great deal of labour but without any more disasters. Some people may find my optimism absurd: I deny it, my cheerful expectations are soberly and moderately realistic. Credo, quia NON absurdum.

There is, however, one aspect of optimism which even the most sanguin among the sober should discard utterly and pitilessly: this is the belief that the anti-Jewish cancer can also be cured by such means as liberal constitutions and League of Nations supervision. No doubt, everything that is suitable to the subject will be duly inserted into those constitutions and into the League's new Covenant, ensuring the inviolability of equal rights for all. But the enforcement of those constitutions will have to be left for every country in the hands of local governments; and democratic elections will mean that those

governments will be as truly representative of the attitudes of the masses as only possible. It is therefore on the mass-attitudes that the actual working of any equal-rights paragraph, so far as Jews' rights are intended, will depend. Not so in the case of other minorities: they mostly live in close territorial clusters, districts or at least cantons, and can more or less look after themselves if left alone. The Jews live scattered throughout predominantly Gentile towns and villages: on every step, in the street or in life, they are exposed to the good will or the ill will of the local majority. To pretend that under conditions such as these any essential results can be ensured by law is a childish idea. NON credo qui absurdum. Nor do I admit that any statesman, even among those who profess to expect such magic effects from legislative incantations, are being really sincere about it.

Germany (Jews) and Austria (Jews).

The present situation in both is so universally known that it needs no further elaboration: what does is the past of German antisemitism, for a myth is being created to the effect

that the evil originated with the advent of a person called Adolf Hitler and born in 1888, so that if he can be removed it will disappear. But the truth is that Hitler has just as much to do with ~~it~~ that evil as Napoleon had with the invention of gunpowder. Napoleon did not invent it, he only made magnificent use of it; and when he went, others came and surpassed him.

Germany - and for this purpose she included Austria long before the Anschluss - has ever been the first and foremost and paramount workshop of modern antisemitism. Here, not anywhere else, was the discovery made, and the principle proclaimed, that the objection to the Jews is not religious but racial, and he must therefore be persecuted even if baptised. Here, not anywhere else, was antisemitism sublimated to the rank of a scientific philosophy. In no other nation was Jew-hatred as a ~~school~~ school of thought openly joined by such a large number of men really prominent, some of them even first-rate, in various walks of spiritual leadership; Schopenhauer, Feuerbach, Dribring, Treitschke; even Houston Stewart Chamberlain, to become a success, had to settle in Germany. Also in Germany, not anywhere else, was the practical aspect of antisemitism modernised and perfected: what had been a mere tendency for desultory street-rioting was, through German initiative, sublimated into a political system. Stoecker and Ahlward founded the movement in Berlin, bringing

into the Reichstag, in about 1893, the first bunch of deputies solemnly and quite democratically elected as Antisemitische Partei; and in Vienna, two years later, Lueger triumphantly conquered the Vienna townhall on a platform whose main, or rather only, "plank" was Jew-hatred, and became burgomaster amid scenes of the wildest mass-enthusiasm, and kept his seat for decades. All this had been happening for three quarters of a century long before a Nazi party was conceived.

It is foolish nonsense to pretend that Germans are only displaying antisemitism by order, so when the order will be withdrawn through liquidation of Nazism they will forget all about it. Germans abroad, who run no risk if they chose to disobey orders from Berlin, have amply and repeatedly shown that Nazism attracts them through its own fascination and not through fear of the Gestapo. The clearest proof was the Saar plebiscite, 1935, held under ideally democratic conditions, with British gendarmes ensuring the fullest freedom of propaganda, conscience and vote: out of 525,000 valid votes, 477,000 were cast for incorporation in Nazi Germany. Perhaps still more significant are, in quite recent days, the very imposing proportions of Germans in Italy, Latvia, Esthonia who accept the call to return to Germany - nearly autochtones all, descendants of conquerors and settlers of God knows how many centuries ago, leaving mostly comfortable homes and respectable social positions for the pleasure of enjoying the Nazi atmosphere. To stop it all,

there is that record of frank, sincere, full-throated, really totalitarian joy displayed by all classes of the Vienna crowd, in the first weeks after the Anschluss, when "Jewish ladies in fur coats" were ordered to scrub pavements and the mob flocked to watch and yell with delight, and mothers lifted babies over neighbours' heads to have a good look at the lovely sight.

"By order"? Of course there must be an order to unleash the innermost brute: but the main point is the presence of the brute underneath, and what a multitude of them!

Antisemitism is traditionally and organically endemic in Germany: not in Germany alone by any means, but in no other country more than in Germany. Here again, being neither a sociologist nor a student of psychology, I will not attempt to explain the phenomenon: but it would take a fool or a liar to deny the phenomenon.

The collapse of Nazism, however, can bring no essential remedy to this endemic poison. I am realist enough to allow for the so-called swing of the pendulum: when Hitler goes there may be some kind of popular scurry to atone for the antisemitic orgy, partly for opportunist reasons but partly also, no doubt, out of genuine disgust at the more nakedly brutal forms the persecution had taken. Then, of course, there will have to be those equality-clauses in the peace treaty and the new constitution. Still more: there is not the slightest doubt that many Jews who were forced to leave Germany since 1933 will then be most ardently willing to return and forgive and forget: some

because of discouraging experiences while in exile, some out of genuine attachment to the German land and civilisation. But all superficial optimist should be warned that the result of all this backwash will be - almost immediately, perhaps only within a few weeks after that new édit de Nantes which will have opened the new era - a venomous recrudescence of the incurable tumor.

One shudders to think how venomous. Apart from racial idiosyncrasies, sheer material interest will provide a formidable dose of high explosives of unparalleled and terrific power. At ~~the moment~~ a conservative estimate, over 300,000 Jewish breadwinners of all kinds have been affected by the regime since 1933 in Germany and since 1938 in Austria: most of them (and the proportion is ever increasing) thrown ~~off~~ out of employment or profession altogether, a dwindling minority still clinging to sorry remnants of enterprise or job. All they have lost has been grabbed by Aryans. That "all" includes myriads of commercial and industrial positions from directors to typists or shop-assistants, heavy thousands of professional jobs from panel doctor to journalist, plus a comparatively important percentage of civil servants from school teacher up to judge and chief constable: middle class, intelligentsia, haute-bourgeoisie jobs all of them - just among the most conspicuous, the most vocal, and the touchiest strata of modern society. To all of them the return of the Jews will mean a flood of extremely dangerous competitors, in many cases better qualified than their present remplacants, in most cases faced

with the alternative "reconquer or starve", and in all cases morally entitled to an admitted grievance, something of an Enoch Arden claim only much more poignant because originating in admitted injustice.

The kind of welcome expecting them is clear. I do not presume to foretell how soon it will rise to the pitch of direct persecution, and how the inevitable de facto denial of "equal rights" will be disguised to suit the constitution and the peace treaty: but it should ever be kept in mind that under a democratic constitution the power is bound to be predominantly influenced, first, by that endemic idiosyncrasy, - secondly, by that menace of competition close and serried as never before. Nor should anybody be misled by the pleasant souvenir that, in the sweet old days of Bismarck and of Wilhelm the Last, anti-Jewish principles used to be put into practice with restraint and moderation, without any ugly and disorderly brutality: so that the new after-war regime, under which all brutality will of course be strictly prohibited by numerous paragraphs, may after all prove "not so bad", at least not so bad for Jews who, after all, must not forget that they cannot really be choosers The souvenir is irrelevant: in the interval the brute had been unleashed and tasted blood.

To make the prospect still clearer, it will perhaps be best to ask the reader - supposing he be a non-Jew - to forget that beggars cannot be choosers, and imagine that a similar prospect is offered not to us but to him and to other Englishmen:

- the prospect of living at the mercy of a one-hundred-to-one majority trained for generations to abhor the English, under the sole protection of paper paragraphs and a supervision by Geneva, or a substitute for Geneva;

- and to wax or keep enthusiastic about the Allied victory when all it promises you is just this prospect.

I am sure that that reader's reply would be: "I'll see you in hell first".

(Insert after p. 35)

Some Jewish readers may find this chapter too lenient with regard to the several Polish governments that succeeded each other from 1920 to 1939 and, between them, should be held responsible for a state of things resulting in the progressive economic degradation of Poland's Jewry, for the systematic stultification of their legal equality guaranteed under both the Versailles treaty and the Polish constitution, and for many recurring and unchecked outbursts of brutal violence. The ~~charge~~ charge will be true: it is the author's considered intention to slide over the ^Ugilt of men in order to concentrate the light of his enquiry on what is much more important, the objective reality whose trend in that zone of Europe is inherently and immanently hostile to a scattered minority. The policy of governments can affect this trend only to a certain extent; or it will perhaps be more exact to ~~say~~ say that any government has it in his power to increase that trend's hardship up to any limit of human endurance or beyond it, but can do very little to soften or diminish the inevitable pressure, and nothing at all to stop it.

It is unfortunately true that some of those Polish governments, especially in the period preceding Pilsudski's coup d'état, had done much to aggravate the pressure; and that none of them, not even the best, can claim having done their duty, or half or one tenth of their duty, to "diminish or soften". Nothing would be easier than now to

denounce them with all the bitterness they deserve, now that they are all beaten and broken and swept away. A chapter of that kind might give a deal of belated satisfaction to pent-up and long outraged feeling. But the author frankly confesses that it would not give any satisfaction to him; profoundly regretful if he disappoints, he will stick to his line of enquiry which deals not with the guilt of men but with the tendencies of an elemental social process.

Those men, ministers and officials, writers and priests, were often unforgivably guilty; long trails of Jewish tears, often tinged by a substance even more salty than tears, lead to their doors. If there is justice beyond this life, they will pay for it; if history will be written by honest hands, they will stand condemned. But this book is written to force Jew and Gentile to realise that the fundamental curse of Jewish existence in that Zone is infinitely deeper than policies or ideologies or propagandas, whether anti or pro; and the author deliberately refuses to allow the attention of his readers to be sidetracked in the direction of easy and cheap emotions, from the stern concentration on the essential and irremediable doom.

The ghetto of East-Central Europe was doomed. No government, no regime, no angel or devil could have transformed it into anything even remotely approaching a normal homeland. It is now still more impossible to restore it as such unless numerical ethnical proportions undergo a drastic change.

Some people are so touchy on the subject that they regard it a disloyalty to the cause of Jewish emancipation if facts are mentioned proving that legal equality alone is by far not sufficient to ensure the Jews even a minimum of normal existence, least of all in "Europe, E.C.". It reminds one of the same kind of ~~political~~ ^{pruderie} political ~~prudence~~ which existed in Czarist Russia: all the Liberals there were so keen on "constitution" and "parliament" that they resented as political treason any hint that life in countries strictly constitutional and parliamentary was by far not immune from injustice, oppression, bribery, antisemitism and all other kinds of trouble. But they at least could claim justifiable ignorance: they had never lived under a constitutional regime. The excuse does not work in the case of the Jews of East-Central Europe: they have all had experience of what legal equality is really worth, those of Germany, Austria, the western half of Poland and the Balkans for three generations, those of eastern Poland and the Baltic countries for twenty years. All these Jews, all without any single individual exception, are fully and absolutely convinced that

legal equality alone is no cure for the disease which has poisoned their existence and will poison it again. It is unforgivably shortsighted now to withhold this experience from the notice of Allied statesmen, some of whom if not all may be genuinely ignorant of it and sincerely deluded into imagining that to restore the equal rights clauses in peace treaties, constitutions and covenants would be an efficient and sufficient solution. On the contrary: it would be a most harmful disservice to Jews and to Europe. The most urgent need of the day is to drive it home to all concerned that in East Central Europe the equality principle alone means no equality but the same old chaos all over again.

To make clear to outside observers, some bitter truths will have to be admitted and stated, however irksome that may seem to people of overdone susceptibility. Those awkward admissions centre around the one essential and dominating feature of East-European reality: there are some inevitable aspects in the normal social evolution of those countries (the words "inevitable" and "normal" should be especially noted) which prove inherently, objectively and organically fatal to the Jews' existence.

The subject will be repeatedly illustrated in the course of chapters that follow: here, as introduction into the subject, let us mention what is held to be the classical example of this incompatibility between a normal evolution

of East-Central Europe's economy and the Jews' foothold within that economy. It is the co-operative movement among the Gentile population, especially in rural districts. In Poland there were some 750,000 Jews living in villages, where they constituted on an average 3.2 percent of the total rural population. These three quarters of a million souls, with a few exceptions, lived by shopkeeping and peddling to the farmer. The co-operative movement began long before the Great war, but its decisive swing was reached during the last decade. In 1938 there were in rural Poland 3207 consumers' cooperatives (membership: 350,000), 1475 for the marketing of dairy produce (membership: 626,000), and 453 for general marketing (membership: 76,000 members). This development was killing the Jewish trader en masse. The effect was, remarkably, most deadly just in the Ukrainian districts where direct antisemitic propaganda was much weaker than among the Poles, and where the government had much less reason to weaken the Jewish influence than in the purely Polish provinces: a proof that the phenomenon has little to do with any conscious will to harm the Jews qua Jews, but is rather embedded in the very nature of the evolution. It would equally oust the rural shopkeeper if he were an Armenian or a Chinaman; only he happens to be a Jew who has nowhere to go.

True, there may have existed in those Ukrainian districts a few Christian shopkeepers, and they of course also

have to surrender before the onslaught of cooperation. But when that happens, the "broken" Christian, trader, as often as not, gets absorbed in the movement's administrative machinery: being a valuable "specialist" among simple peasants, he will be employed by the cooperative. The Jew will not; it is so obvious to all that there can simply be no question of including the displaced Jewish trader into the executive staff of a farmers' cooperative that no Jew would ever dream of asking for such an "absurdity". Is this, too, to be called "antisemitism"? The managers of the cooperative movement, men of advanced views in the great majority, would indignantly deny such a charge. It is "simply" that one has to look after one's own people first, etc.

The same phenomenon, but in a much more solemn form, can be observed in one of the Baltic States (or perhaps in all). Violent antisemitism is not tolerated. What ~~went~~ actually goes on is a social process rather commendable in itself: the State, in one form or another, is gradually taking over the more or less direct administration of all the worth-while industrial or commercial concerns. The owners are paid fair value; at least more or less fair value. If the owners were Gentiles, they mostly remain in charge. If Jews it is different: they are gradually replaced by non-Jews. This, as a rule,

is accomplished without any rude abruptness but nevertheless effectively. As one of the victims put it to the author: "In Poland, when the government takes over a Jewish-owned factory, all the Jews on the staff have to go. Here there is no such indecent haste. 90% of my former staff have been left in employment when it happened, now three years ago. A year later only 70% were left, last year 50%, and the end is in view".

A remarkable dictum is often quoted in that country, supposed to have been pronounced in quite exalted quarters: "Never try to kill the flies: leave no crumbs for them instead". This allegorical aphorism is there interpreted as a crêdo of deliberate if "polite" antisemitism; but there is no proof that it ever was pronounced, and it little matters if it was or not. The crux of the position is the question whether a government, engaged upon such an unquestionably progressive adventure as nationalisation of pivotal industries, would be allowed - in that atmosphere of Europe, E.C. - to act otherwise. The total population of the country is that of a London borough; but there is a university and a school for higher engineering, with several thousands pupils. Every year more and more of "one's own people", fully qualified, line up for jobs - mostly excellent types of young manhood, keen, ~~fig~~ gifted, efficient. How long would a government be tolerated to

govern if it kept them waiting while Jews went on running and manning what now would be state concerns (though created by Jewish enterprise with Jewish capital) - in that peculiar, all-pervading atmosphere of the Zone?

Gross injustice? Of course; but to disapprove of it it is useless. Its root is not hatred of Jews - a feeling which could, if not eradicated, at least be combated - but something much more firm, elemental, primordial: sympathy with "one's own people", an instinct which cannot even be criticised because, after all, it is as natural as preferring one's own children to one's neighbour's child.

X

Antisemitism of Things, at bottom, is also due to a certain attitude of men and women. The line we draw between the two kinds of Judeophobia - that of Men and that of Things - is, however, not artificial. The first kind is active enmity, a constant urge to harm the hated race, to humiliate them, to see them squirming and writhing beneath one's feet. Such an aggressive Sadistic mentality can obviously not be kept for ever on the same boiling level in every average soul of the community: it must have its ups and downs, periods of strain and periods of hibernation, and even at its strongest only a leading minority have it in its really and greedily acute stage - the remainder just follow suit and mildly enjoy the fun. Being thus of a somewhat elastic nature, "antisemitism of Men" can sometimes be fought against with a measure of success; the

Germans, for instance, a nation endowed with remarkable genius for collective obedience, may be expected to tone it down by order.

There seems to be something pathological in such volcanic heat of hatred. However strong the genuine racial repulsion, however appalling the sins of Israel, the subject obviously does not justify even a fraction of such fuss. A suspicion inevitably arises that this attitude is subconsciously composed not only of repulsion but also of attraction: as all Sadism. A remarkable political feature of volcanic antisemitism is its inability to appreciate Zionist or similar aspirations. Logically, Nazis ought to be inclined to encourage movements tending towards the evacuation of Jews from Germany: in practice, they have done more than any other government to stir up anti-Jewish trouble in Palestine though it could only hamper the exodus. Should Uganda or Angola or Mindanao be declared a national home for the Jews instead of Palestine, the Nazi attitude would evidently be the same. Sadism does not want to loose its victim; the Biblical story was the first to record this curious interplay of two opposite tendencies, one to exterminate the hated breed and the other to stop them leaving.

Other curious hypotheses have been suggested by observers of this morbid phenomenon. The most popular one has been re-launched, years ago, by Henri Bernstein in a

show entitled "Israel": a story of a young French aristocrat most virulently incensed against the Jews, until he learns that his real father was not son cher papa but a smart Jewish banker. The obvious surmise is that all "volcanic" antisemitism is an abnormal infatuation which must have some physiological reasons, most likely racial. Baron ~~XXXXXXXX~~ Eötvös (pronounced approximately, "Etvesh"), a great Hungarian statesman, wrote almost a century ago: "An antisemite is a man who dislikes the Jews more than he should". Why more? Why the fuss? The easiest explanation is that he "has Jews on the brain", and that that is due to the presence of a drop of Jewish blood working some mysterious atavistic reactions upon the hybrid psyche. From this point of view, any "volcanic" Jew-hater - i.e. one who not just dislikes them "as he should" but makes a fuss about it - probably has Jewish ancestors; they may be very remote, or hidden by bar sinister so that no written record can reveal the fact; they may have left no trace on the shape of his nose or even the cut of his eyes, but all that is not essential: the "Jew-complex" itself is a sufficient proof of racial atavism, - etc. etc.

All this may or may not be a true guess; some day an investigator of collective psychopathology might devote to this matter a volume which will be of considerable interest to science. To the Jews it will make no difference, as they are not likely to be flattered nor need they be downcast by the revelation of Dr. Goebbels' Rabbinical descent, nor

can the discovery in any way diminish or increase their trouble. The author's intention in allowing this digression is to underline the morbid, hectic, fluctuating character of what he calls antisemitism of Men - as against "antisemitism of Things" which is quiet, solid, and immutable, and therefore much more formidable.

This is that distinction every normal person makes between his or her "own kind" and all outsiders. It need not be hatred, it need ^{not} even be always connected with instinctive repulsion. It may be dormant under normal conditions, and stay dormant for generations, to awaken only when there is a bog competition for some essential boon, and the choice is between one's own kin and the outsider, and self-defensive alertness goes to the front. Even then it need not (though it may) flare up in angry tongues of fire: it may remain correctly polite while mercilessly stiff inwardly - as in that Baltic example; or it may run amock, as sometimes in Poland. Forms do not matter so much as the essence. That essence is the inextinguishable awareness of every Gentile that his Jewish neighbour is not "his own kind", and of every Jew that neither his Aryan friends are. There is no per se harm in this awareness, it is no obstacle to decent neighbourly intercourse, mutual help, even friendship as long as the social "climate" is favourable. In the "climate" of East-Central Europe, it becomes the Jew's death sentence.

CHAPTER VII.

There is also Roumania (Jews), there is Hungary (Jews). At the moment of writing, both are not at war, so that formally the Allies cannot be saddled with any responsibility for what is to happen to the Jews in the Danubian valley. In this book, dealing chiefly with the Allies' war aim, closer enquiry into this sector of the diaspora had better be left out. But no one can deny, no one should forget, that both Roumania and Hungary belong to the zone where the Jewish problem has long reached the stage of acute and painful incompatibility between the "equal rights" principle and the real situation. In both countries, with Jews forming about 6% of the total population, that reality is somewhat alike the Polish picture; but only "somewhat" alike, for both are incomparably richer than Poland with regard to agricultural possibilities, so that the pressure on city-jobs is by far not so intense. In Roumania, however, what we call "antisemitism" of men has been ~~been~~ conspicuously endemic since at least the middle of last century. In Hungary its acute form is of recent growth, but now very intense. In both, the role of the governments in fostering the anti-Jewish trend of economic life seems to be secondary: the main driving force in the process, tending to oust the Jew from all such positions as he still retains, is rather the unanimous pressure of all those social classes which come in any economic contact with

the Jew. Whether or not these two countries, in the end, will also be invited to reconfirm their adherence to the principle of equal rights for all (it has never been absent from their constitutions) is immaterial: "Things" will decide, and only fools or hypocrites can doubt what the tenor of the decision will be.

The writer~~y~~ was born in Russia, in a generation that knew what Jewish inequality tasted like, and his youth was spent in the atmosphere of constant struggle for equal rights. In 1906, at Helsinki, at a conference of Jewish nationalists who came from all corners of the Russian empire, he was co-editor of what is known as The Helsingfors Programme - a demand for perfect and absolute equality of civic rights: every Jew to be a citizen of Russia equal to all others, Russian Jewry as a whole to be recognised as a nationality equal to all others within the empire, its language equal to all languages, its religion equal to all other churches. To-day, he is prepared to sign that programme again. But he is not prepared to condone policies bound to make of that programme, or even of much less ambitious conceptions of equal rights for the Jew, a doomed matter of cant and bunk.

I warn my fellow-Jews (if they still need the warning, which I doubt.....) that equal rights are, at best, an extremely perishable piece of goods, infinitely touchy, to be handled and

(Insert on p.61^a)

There are two possible ways of envisaging a non-exodus solution of the Jewish problem, i.e. a solution founded on the assumption that equality can "work": the one called "assimilation", the other "Diaspora nationalism".

The first is an elastic idea, its adherents have been known to give it interpretations extremely different from one another. Some favour assimilation in language and manners, but no religious apostasy and no mixed marriages: which, after all and despite all rhetorics to the contrary, means the perpetuation of some kind of separate racial community held together by a collective ideology. Others, more radical, foresee or even desire mixed marriages so that both the race and the religion might gradually disappear; the comforting feature of this creed is the "proud" assurance that both will prove an excellent manure for enriching the physical and spiritual soil of humanity. -

"Diaspora nationalism" is based on the theory that all the essence of nationality is just language, literature, music, philosophy, religion and ~~xxx~~ suchlike, and these can be preserved and cultivated without any territorial segregation. "Nationalities", according to this doctrine, are very much like churches, in that they can perfectly well carry on their separate worships though their adherents live intermingled not only in the same district but in the same street. What is needed to save them from the drabness of

mutual assimilation is not separate homelands But a Law called "national-personal autonomy". All Jews who so will be registered as members of thier own national community, will have their own schools, use their own language in public life and feel equal to anyone else.

This is not the place to debate the practical worth of any of these two solutions; for argument's sake let us assume that both are excellent. Let us go a step farther and agree in advance that , should a third or a fourth non-exodus solution of the Jewish problem be invented to-morrow, they will all be excellent. But their efficiency will always depend on one condition: the equality of individual civic rights (which they all presuppose as the fundamental condition of normal existence) must be real and keep real. Yet we just have seen that in Europe, E.C., it cannot be made real without a great exodus.

Assimilation is especially conditioned by exodus. Only when the bulk will be gone, the diminishing remainder may perhaps find a favourable atmosphere for trying to solve its problem by/ "merger": not illusory merging as in the past but ~~this time~~ perhaps, this time, effective.

For the assimilation of Jews in the past has proved illusory throughout the whole of Europe, E.C. Real assimilation is not a solo: it is a duet, it takes two to complete it. It is not enough for the Jew to feel convinced that he

has become absolutely like his Gentile neighbour: what is more decisive is whether the Gentile neighbour also has the same impression. Joining a new community of nation or class or set is not only a question of genuine endeavour but above all of reception. Jewish assimilation in East-Central Europe, from this point of view, has obviously failed; ~~by~~ by bringing Jew and Gentile nearer each other, by making them rub shoulders in many walks of life where they never met before, it only extended the area of possible friction. If assimilation as an escape from Jewish distress is at all worth trying again, the attempt will have to start afresh from the very beginning. But its enthusiasts themselves, if there still are any such in existence, must have by now realised that they stand no chance of success unless racial percentages in that part of Europe undergo staggering change.

A "successful" assimilation may or may not be worth while, may or may not be objectively possible: but if it is, the preliminary condition is the exodus of the bulk.

Mutatis mutandis the same judgment applies to Diaspora-nationalism: whether practicable or not, the preliminary condition for its success is the exodus of the bulk.

It is by far not the intention of this author to suggest giving up all hope of ever securing a decent and normal existence for the Jews in this part of the Diaspora. On the contrary, he still believes that this can be done. But the preliminary condition for any such hope is the exodus of the

bulk.

The matter is so close to some intimate susceptibilities that the author must take leave for himself to add a few remarks speaking in the first person.

I warn my fellow-Jews (if they still need the warning, which I doubt) that equal rights are, at best, a very perishable piece of goods, infinitely touchy, to be handled and used with caution, moderation and tact. In

~~used with caution, moderation and tact.~~ In Paris, for some ten years and more, I enjoyed the friendly acquaintance of a Jewish gentleman whose French ancestry went back into the 17th century, and whose heart's Ten Commandments consisted of the word "France" ten times repeated. He never said "Juif" but only "Israelite"; he firmly believed in what was known, two "Israelite" generations ago, as "the mission" theory - the Jews' sacred "mission" to live scattered among the Gentiles and help them to reach ever loftier ethical summits. But I never met another Jew who so genuinely disliked any manifestation of Jewish prominence. When there were "too many" Jewish names at the head of what they call le Palmarès (list of successful candidates to one of the Grandes Ecoles), he frowned. Somebody mentioned in his presence the remarkable fact that the three most original thinkers of that period were Jews - Bergson, Einstein, Freud; he said - "I regret to have to add one more name - the late Hermann Cohen; and the coincidence is extremely unfortunate". On another occasion, years before the Nazis' triumph, he called my attention to the pleiade of Germany's foremost novelists, pre-war and post-war: "but for the two brothers Mann, all that count are israélites - Schnitzler, Wassermann, Zweig, Werfel, mais ça finira mal." He was hurt and shocked when Léon Blum became premier.

I asked him: is it fear? He denied it. "It is, my friend, a question of tact. It is too conspicuous for good taste. I should equally disapprove it on the part of Protestants."

But of course it was fear; and of course it was by far not unfounded. The German economist Werner Sombatt, who after all was neither a fool nor a sworn enemy of the Jews, gave them this advice at the beginning of the century: "Our German laws and our ethical outlook admit Jewish equality - but if you Jews want to preserve it, do not take it too seriously. Always stick to the second place." It would be childish to deny that 99% of Jews (and particularly the non-Zionist, "assimilationist" Jews to whom equality is alpha and ~~alpha~~ omega) think that a very wise maxim, and feel very sorry they did not follow it themselves, and would at least be very glad if their children would.

But their children will not follow the wise maxim, for it is humanly impossible. Life is competition; equality of rights has only one concrete meaning - equal chance in every aspect of life's competition, the right to win if you are better equipped. Twenty centuries of lopsided urbanism have made the Jew, in the average though not on the summits where genius dwells, better equipped for most ^{ordinary} competitions of modern life; there is no pride in stating it, for the advantage has long become a curse to us, a curse and a nuisance.

Nor can the Jew help it : as well advise a red-haired fellow not to be "conspicuous", or a tall man, or a fat man. It is beyond human forces to compel oneself, for the good of the community, to withhold the best that is in him, to write or speak worse than he could if he let himself go, or to plead, to build, to diagnose, to act on the stage worse than he really can. Jewish statesmen, though they are legitimately as ambitious as their Christian colleagues, have actually been known to decline high office so as not to stir up ^{semitic} antix~~ewish~~ complications, but then their Christian party-comrades often insisted that it was their patriotic duty to accept; and none but a Simson the Stylite type can withstand this kind of pressure. So it is in every branch of civic, cultural, economic, social life: ordinary human beings are organically unable to reject chances of success and advancement unimpeachably fair and legitimate. The result is, inevitably, "conspicuousness", jealousy, resentment, and the rise or increase of what we have termed "antisemitism of men": and that even in rich countries, where conditions are not strained enough to produce the other kind of antisemitism, the one inherent in the objective force of Things.

This is the fateful inner antinomy of civic equality for Jews: it can only be durable if not used to the full; yet it is impossible to prevent or avoid its being used to the full.

There is no remedy. True, various remedies have beenⁿ tried, to keep the Jewish advance within "moderate" limits: attempts mostly in the form called numerus clausus. It consists in limiting the number of Jews which may be admitted into a certain profession (or school^f or enterprise or institute) to a fixed percentage of the total personnel. In Czarist Russia, since 1828, it was the rule with regard to all universities and secondary schools: Jewish pupils were to be not more than 10% of the total in the western part of the empire (the "Pale of Settlement"), 5 or 3% in other provinces. The most modern experiment on the same lines is the Hungarian law limiting the number of Jews in certain professions to six per cent. - which is exactly the proportion of Jews to the total population of Hungary.

The idea seems to catch on even in some democratic milieux. Some years ago there^f was a newspaper report, not denied so far as the author can trace, that in one of the famous North-American "colleges" a numerus clausus for Jews had been introduced without any legislation, simply by agreement between the learned governing body. Naked open affirmation of the racial criterium as such was, "of course", politely avoided, and the reply to any enquiry or complaint as to the reasons for the choice of A and the rejection of B was always to the effect that only intellectual or "social"

criteria had been applied: but in substance it was a case of "you know that we know that you know", and (most remarkable) Jewish Society itself preferred to accept the fait accompli and not to raise any storms. In England, the author can vouch at least for one analogous case, and this is quite placidly outspoken. In a North-West district of London, a favourite residential quarter of the better-off middle class Jews, a refugee lady asked some Jewish friends to recommend a good private school for her little daughter. She was given an address, telephoned for an interview and took the child to the headmistress. The headmistress was genuinely cordial and charming, said she like the girl awfully, and promised to place her first on the waiting list - "for, you know (she added sweetly) we have ten per cent. Jewish children". The mother, being a Continental to whom numerus clausus is anathema, almost a pogrom in thin disguise, was horrified and refused the honour of having her child's name on the waiting list; but the headmistress, quite unruffled and still very nice about it, simply could not understand why should anyone object to such a reasonable arrangement. "I assure you," she added, "we have never heard of any mother of your persuasion feeling shocked about it."

In Eastern Europe eloquent attempts have been made to justify the numerus clausus scheme as something not only not contrary to the equal rights principle but directly based upon it. Why call it numerus clausus? Call it proportional representation of races (or "nationalities" as they prefer to say east of the Rhine) in all sectors of the state's economy. If a given race forms 6 per cent. of the total population, the soundest and the fairest arrangement (so it is argued) would be for the members of that race to form 6 per cent. of the peasantry, 6 per cent. of the industrial proletariat, 6 per cent. among doctors and lawyers and journalists. It is argued that this would be the surest means against anti-semitism; also, the only way really to straighten and normalise the social structure of the Jewish people itself. German Zionists, by the way, had been preaching for a ~~many~~ generation the "reshuffling of classes" ("Umschichtung der Schichten") as the main ideal of Zionism, meaning under that formula the formation of a Jewish social organism subdivided in a way parallel to that of the Aryan environment. In Germany, for instance, it would mean 20 per cent. of all the Jews engaged in agriculture, 35 per cent. in industry and agriculture, less than 10 per cent. in trade, and still less in the professions. It is argued that this is absolutely the same as proportional representation in the country's economy; alias, numerus clausus.

We are not here concerned with deciding whether this argument be right or wrong: what matters is that it is sure to prove "catching". The example of that New England University and of that Golders Green school (hardly unique) sufficiently show that the west is also not at all deaf to the advantages of numerus clausus from the viewpoint of social congeniality, a term much more pleasant than racial purity. When the western promoters of this device, will, as they are bound to, get hold of that "proportional representation" or "~~Umschichtung~~" argument, they may be expected to venture into the open and proclaim it as a dogma claimed to be perfectly liberal and equally fair to Jew and Gentile. The English-speaking reader must not pretend to be shocked by this forecast. The Anglo-Saxon mind is very pragmatic, not so easily scared away by ideological fetishes, and in particular never afraid to discriminate between races whenever there is ^a reasonable justification for doing so. Smart hotels in some American health-resorts have long been known to refuse Jewish guests; not because of any antisemitism of the management, but simply - it is argued - because their Gentile guests do not seem to enjoy the amalgamation. In Britain there are insurance companies which do not insure motorcars owned by Jews: no anti-Jewish feeling - it is argued - but merely the statistical fact that Jews are more negligent and reckless in driving. All this indicates that the western world, too, may not prove immune from the contagion of that "proportional equality" rule on a larger scale.

This book, however, is not concerned with the western world: the digression just briefly made is only here to throw into better relief the chances for a triumphant progress of the numerus clausus policy in East-Central Europe. Its harm will be in its insidious plausibility: it lends itself so fittingly to be disguised as a system in full accordance with liberal treaties and democratic constitutions. At the same time, in the case of the Jewish minorities at any rate, a real introduction of "proportional representation" in the State's economy" is absolutely impossible; should even all the Jews beg for it and all the governments order it. To be real, such a redistribution ought to begin at the base of the State's economy, which is agriculture. In Hungary, where one half of the population work in cornfields and pastures, six per cent. of all available land would have to be cleared of the present occupants (about 250,000 souls) to make room for the Jewish settlers; or some other way of general squeezing out would have to be devised so that one half of the Jewish population could be duly normalised as plough-boys and shepherds. A similar operation would be needed in mining and industry to force in the 125,000 Jewish factory hands implied in the scheme. Only after that could the numerus clausus in the professions and the commerce be justified as a step towards social normalcy. All this is so obviously and preposterously impossible that nobody thinks

of proposing it. Yet all talk of eliminating the Jewish tragedy by "re-instatating" civic equality in East-Central Europe can only imply this; unless it implies nothing but lip-service and twaddle.

Which is what the author respectfully affirms: any assertion that the cancer of antisemitism in its principal breeding zone, "Europe, E.C.", can be cured by the ointment called equal rights is empty, thoughtless and harmful twaddle. Real civic equality for the Jews in those countries cannot be enforced, no matter what is said in charters and covenants. The Jews, if they are worth their ancestry, must fight to the last ditch for having that equality principle, though unreal, solemnly proclaimed on every country's statute book: this is a question of human dignity, something without which life would be morally despicable, something the refusal of which would justify, to my mind, any form of retaliation - none excluded - against the offending state. But one thing is to fight for ~~your~~ your dignity, quite another to pretend that dignity will feed you. It is utterly dishonest to pretend that legal equality, re-proclaimed under the impact of Allied victories, can stop or slow down in the ⁺immense distressed area the progress of objective realities tending to push the Jew off every economic foothold.

To say that all the Allies aim to win for us is a guarantee of civic equality, would mean that to us the cause of the Allies is not worth fighting for. No greater service can be rendered the Allies than by insisting that their aim go much farther than that.

At this stage of our enquiry a question will probably arise in readers' minds: In how far can this aspect of the solution here proposed be regarded as a "war aim of the Allies"? The war is against Germany. Wherever the area for a Jewish State may be reserved, in Palestine or elsewhere, it certainly will not be on any soil now held by Germany. What has this whole matter to do with a peace conference where demands can be presented only to Germany?

But the forecast contained in this last sentence is an error. The Versailles treaty (the author, by the way, refuses to join in the great choir of that document's detractors: it was, with all its defects, quite a fine piece of statesmanship for its time) - even the Versailles treaty covered much more than just settling accounts with the beaten foe: for instance, it established the League of Nations. What had that to do with that war? Everything to do. It was universally realised that some kind of permanent association between sovereign peoples might help to prevent further wars. It has failed: this time, therefore all the world is even more acutely aware that the only justification of the present conflict is to find some better safeguards against eruptions of the spirit of violence.

Everything which has value as such a safeguard is a proper war aim. Hardly anybody will maintain that the uprooting of antisemitism, at least of its acute form, in East-Central Europe would be an essential safeguard against the further boom of cratolatric movements.

CHAPTER VIII.

In 1936 the writer, assisted by two friends, published in a Warsaw daily a pronouncement to the effect that the only reasonable thing for the Polish Jews to do would be to evacuate all those economic positions which could evidently not be maintained. As it was even by then a matter of common conviction that no less than one third of Poland's 3,300,000 Jews had already lost their "positions" beyond any hope of recovery (while another million, paupers hereditary, never had possessed any before.....), the solution was mass exodus.

The term "evacuation" hurt many susceptibilities, seemed offensive and humiliating. I cannot see what is wrong with it. In September and October 1939, both in England and France, children were "evacuated" from the areas of danger; apart from war, when a dam threatens to burst or a house to fall in, the inhabitants are invited to "evacuate" the spot; the same happens when a plague breaks out in a set of premises. This was exactly what the Jewish situation was in 1936: crumbling walls, bursting dams, all forms of "plague" at every corner, not one single hand to defend the victims and no plan

for adequate self-defence even among the victims themselves. At a conservative estimate, two thirds of them at least ought to have been, if not evacuated, at least effectively marked down for evacuation before any sensible scheme of salvaging the balance could have been only conceived. But that was in 1936, halcyon days compared with the present.

The great advantage of the word "evacuation" is its implied suggestion of organised orderliness. No other word conveys that important quality: "emigration" has always meant a haphazard tumble (except when stopped), "exodus" inevitably recalls the pursuing enemy host, and a risky fording enterprise where, but for a miracle, not only the wrong 'uns but some of the right people too might get drowned. "Evacuation", in modern times and under decent governments, has always been associated with forethought, careful planning and decent accomodation at the end of the journey prepared beforehand.

Mass evacuation is the only remedy for the cancer of Jewish distress. However superhumanly difficult, however atrociously costly, - as it is the only way to save Europe from being soon poisoned into another catastrophe, obstacles and expense will have to be faced: whereupon it will, of course, be discovered that the operation, at its maximum, is infinitely easier and cheaper than a modern war, besides being a profitable investment which a war is not claimed to be.

How many will have to be evacuated? The question is important but cannot be answered. To begin with, Heaven only knows how many Jews in the Zone will survive; nor, for that matter, how far south, north, east and perhaps even westwards that zone may expand before the crisis ends.

Secondly: there probably exists, even in the countries of acute antisemitism objective or subjective or both, a certain floor-level, or low ebb line, where peaceful symbiosis becomes normally possible between the Gentile majority and a Jewish minority reduced to a proportion small enough not to irk. To foretell exactly how deep on the scale that happy level lies is impossible. It will depend upon a myriad of conditions: the character of the majority people, the natural resources of the soil, the up- or downward trend of its trade, are only the most obvious ones, not necessarily the most essential. The truth will only become apparent in the process of the migration, and it will probably conform to a kind of relativity rule: or, in other words, the area to be evacuated, and the reception area will act as two communicating vessels, each one with its own amount of atmospheric pressure. The outflow will not only depend on the anti-Jewish factors in Europe but also on the attractiveness of the new homestead. Theoretically, the outflow will stop when a state of equilibrium has been reached, e.g. when the Polish or the Hungarian or the Roumanian state and society begin to feel that the Jewish evacuation has reached its "useful" limit and its

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continuation would be what they call in America a total loss; whereupon they presumably might begin to offer the not yet evacuated Jews some kind of enticement or premium for staying on (history remembers even more incredible cases - when Jews had been offered premiums for coming in). On the other hand, it is also theoretically possible that, in spite of such commendable change of hearts, the evacuation would still continue on account of the greater appeal, material or ideological, of the reception area. The only positive thing that can be said with certainty is that calculations, to be sober, should be made for the maximum. I hope to get somewhat nearer to figures in the Chapter on the "Max Nordau Plan"; here it will be enough to say that a solid evacuation policy should reckon with an eventual "ceiling" of some five million Jewish evacuees during the decade following the war: and that the first million, taken from all the countries of the Zone, will have to be evacuated at once, at what the Germans would call lightning speed, applying the same methods and same tempo as a modern army does to transport fifty divisions to a remote theatre of war.

Twaddle again will it be, on the part of opponent or critic, to raise an outcry that the suggested evacuation would have to be "compulsory". It will, on the contrary, be extremely difficult to enforce the proper order in the queues lining up for places on the waiting list, some of them forgetting even to ask what is the name of the "reception area"

(Ch.X)

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Some critics of evacuation fear that it would have to be "compulsory". This is hardly likely: it will, on the contrary, prove extremely difficult to keep proper order in the queues lining up for places on the waiting list. - Others, more sophisticated, only demand that the mass-emigration of Jews should be treated as something concerning the Jews alone, no business of any government Polish or Roumanian or Hungarian. Not only should there be no hint of compulsory evacuation, but even not of mere pressure in any form; and if a country's government openly cooperated in organising emigration that would be practically tantamount to pressure. The correct attitude for such a government would therefore be to pretend to ignore the fact that Jewish emigration exists, especially that it is necessary, etc. etc.

All this is foolish. There is no reason why citizenry government and parliament, in a state where emigration is a necessity, should feel bashful about it. On the contrary, it is the state's duty to help the emigrant by every means at its power. Italy before the Great war was an excellent example of such sound, sober and perfectly patriotic treatment of its emigration problem. Italy had no ethnical minorities to get rid of, all her emigrants were of pure Italian breed: but her government was always busy devising shipping facilities,

(Ch.X)

credit facilities, training facilities for the emigrants, and negotiating with the Argentine and other overseas countries for their admission. Whenever it was felt that an Italian cabinet was not exerting its efforts in these directions properly and to the full, the Radical and the Socialist opposition ~~always~~ criticised it most severely for such dereliction of true democratic duty. They were quite right: it is a decent government's duty to look after all the needs of all its citizens, and if among such needs there is also that of moving en masse somewhere else in search of conditions which cannot be provided at home, a decent government must help, no matter whether those migrants be Gentile or Jewish. As ~~may~~ a matter of fact, Gentiles will probably also have to migrate from East-Central Europe after the war, and in no small numbers, though it is of course to be expected that paramount phenomenon in the field of mass migration will have to be the Jewish exodus. But the touchy inferiority complex of the non-Zionist Jew should really not be pushed so excessively far as to take offence at his government's solicitude in acknowledging the existence of a social problem just because the problem happens to be predominantly Jewish.

Neither success nor order can be ensured in the exodus unless it is an international enterprise assisted by every government concerned. The bashful Jewish politicians, just mentioned, probably know it themselves, for one cannot imagine them imagining that, for instance, arrangements about the

transfer of capital or liquidation of property can be made privately while ministers are requested not to look. The exodus will have to be a most solemnly official performance with banners flying; it will require not only administrative measures but also special legislation and, above all, great international treaties; all this cannot be helped and need not be shrunk from.

One understands, however, the reasons of that bashful shrinking. A and B have been room-mates for centuries; there have been quarrels; now it is finally agreed that peace should be restored, but B has decided to move to other quarters; a voluntary decision, absolutely voluntary and all that, but there is nevertheless something in the very fact that it is B and not A who has decided to move away. Under these conditions B may prefer that A should leave him alone to do his house-hunting and packing; should A prove solicitous to help, it might look like eagerness for the good riddance ...

The brittle delicacy of the dainty little drama is obvious, nor do we underrate its size if multiplied by the difference between two room-mates and two races; but it still remains too slender to count where issues of world-danger are involved. Yet the main thing about that awkward feeling of being too anxiously assisted to pack is that it only applies ~~as~~ if Mr. B. is moving to another set of hired rooms. Imagine for a moment (always in the framework of the little domestic drama) that Mr. B. has inherited a house, real freehold

)CH.X)

property, and one long-dreamed of: the whole psychological atmosphere would change, all complexes and awkwardness disappear ...

This parable is no idle literary aside, but a vital part of the argument. When people who admit the inevitable necessity of "evacuating lost positions" still feel the urge to spend so much heat on insisting that the process must be absolutely voluntary without a shadow of pressure, etc. - which is true - they only beat about the bush. The most absolutely voluntary emigration may contain some aspects of compulsion: it depends on where the emigrant goes to. Imagine any Italian emigrant of fifty years ago leaving Genova for Buenos Ayres: was he moving of his free will or under pressure? If he felt he was going into gloomy exile he was an exile; if he felt he was going to meet friends and get-rich-quick, he was a free sportsman climbing glorious summits. An exodus of Jews towards a new Dispersion would be the same thing as forcible mass expulsion, no matter how scrupulously the "voluntary" principle be heeded and safeguarded. Exodus to a Jewish State will be spontaneous in the purest sense of the word under all conditions. Not only will those queues be difficult to keep from tumbling, but their eagerness will hardly be in any measure affected by the new constitutions promising civic equality.

provided there is one set aside for them; and their eagerness will hardly be noticeably affected by the new constitutions promising civic equality.

It is, on the contrary, the prospect of civic equality which will be affected by the fact of evacuation, and very noticeably and very favourably affected. The man in the street, except a few, is never altogether beastly. The importance attributed in this book to the objective "anti-semitism of Things" should help us not to overestimate the malignancy of "men": men may vote for anti-Jewish measures, men may boycott Jewish shops, and still be decent kind-hearted people otherwise. It would do ~~some~~ Jewish leaders an enormous amount of good if they realised this truth once for all, and tried not to forget it next minute, and draw some conclusions from it. The average biped in the Zone does not enjoy downing and harming the Jew; he is only quite willing to do it again and again if he fears that the Jew may crowd him out economically, socially or politically. Give that average a concrete and tangible proof that an earnest endeavour has actually started to thin out the ranks of Jewish competition, and many among them will relax their belligerency. This is not optimism, just as refusal to believe in the efficiency of equal rights under the climate of the Zone is not pessimism: it is just impartial realism, scornful but benevolent, taking Jew and Gentile at their value terre-à-terre, both amounting to no more than they should, nor to less.

Is Man essentially good or essentially bad? Here is a parable that settles the foolish and idle question. There was a town of 500 houses, and one day the sultan sent them fifty orphans and appealed to the citizens' mercy ~~is~~ to give these unfortunates a home. So the town carefully selected fifty of the most affluent and virtuous families, and placed one orphan in each. A month later the whole town was aflame with irritation; mothers complained that the orphans were lousy, bad-mannered and generally horrid. Then the town councillors got together again and decided to raise a subscription from every one to build an orphanage; and the people subscribed twice the amount, and built a wonderful home for the orphans, and lived happily ever after.-

Mass evacuation applied to the Jewish problem is not alternative to civic equality: it is corollary to equality, the indispensable condition and the only way to make of the latter something of a durable reality for those, no matter how few or how many, who will stay.

But this is a side-issue. The essential role and value of the evacuation principle is that it is the only cure for an evil which, if not removed, will go on perverting humanity to more outrages: a cure final, thorough and clean.

Also, a popular cure, an idea which the overwhelming majority of men of all creeds like and respect, an idea sanctified by the Bible and ennobled by the tradition of Zionism, an idea whose consummation would be greeted universally, by all countries inside the zone of distress and outside of it, and by all Jews - those who want to go and those who want to stay.

What is lacking is the "reception area": to fix and reserve it, is the demand which the Allies will have to include in their war aims.

CHAPTER ~~III~~ IX

This chapter, dealing with the Soviet portion of Europe's East-Central ghetto, will be short and deliberately inconclusive. I dislike Communism and do not believe either in its value as a solution of the social problem, nor in its efficiency, nor in its durability; on the other hand, as all people outside the USSR, I have no exact information on what is happening there. Dislike plus lack of information are not a sufficient equipment for drawing conclusions. I should prefer to leave this chapter out altogether, but there is of course one aspect in the situation which has a direct bearing, and may yet have a decisive influence, on the Jews' final orientation with regard to the war scene.

There is a tacit agreement between all those interested in the outcome of this war: not to speak of Russia, not at all or as little as possible. Some probably prefer it so because they do not believe that the "giant" can be forced to give back what he has snatched; others may think that to a large portion of what he has snatched, for instance Volhynia and Polessia, the "giant" may possess a better title than the former owners; others again may, perhaps, harbour

the hope that the loot will be recaptured in due course, but it would be undiplomatic to declare it aloud just now. However that may be, the tacit agreement seems to cover those Jews of Eastern Poland, between 1,500,000 and 2,000,000, who have now become Soviet citizens. Their geographical future is very seldom discussed. It seems everybody takes it for granted that for them there is no way out of the Soviet fatherland; some take it for granted that they have no need for any "way out", being quite happy where they are.

Such a thickness of fog surrounds the U.S.S.R. that nothing about its inner life is clear and certain: there are rumours, but it is safe to discount them, no matter whether favourable to the Soviet regime or not. What cannot and must not be "discounted" is when there is no rumour even to register: for the last ten years we have heard no report whatever of any symptoms of antisemitism in any Soviet territory, and we assume this to mean that there are no such symptoms there. Ten years is too short a period for any final conclusions to be formed, the cancer may only be dormant. But no Jew can underestimate the fact that it is dormant in Russia while everywhere else, just during this last decade, the evil has been prominent in varying but always very noticeable degrees.

This of course is by far not enough to be happy. Though there is a cheap and widespread assumption among our wellwishers that Jews, being only Jews, ought to be and probably are asking for no more than not to be persecuted, and if that is granted they feel perfectly contented whatever the other conditions of their existence, - in reality it is not so. A totalitarian regime must be more unbearable to Jews than to any other human species, for no other race has so far disputed the Jews' title to priority in individualism and rebelliousness (in the civic, not in the religious sphere). Of all totalitarian systems, Communism to them must be the most hateful because it fetters not only intellectual or political initiative but also, and especially, economic initiative - the Jews' favourite pony in life's polo-play. There must be some reason why Jewish names are so conspicuous among the victims of all recent "purgings": at Kamenev's trial, out of the sixteen accused ten were Jews: surely this is far in excess of the proportion of Jews among the upper 400 of Bolshevism? The author has also been told on good authority, though he has not seen any relevant statistics himself, that in the total of ordinary, non-"political" population of Soviet prisons the percentage of Jews is 5 times higher than what would be a fair "proportional representation": not unexpectedly, too, as in Russia one often gets jailed for a crime they call "speculation" and all other peoples call "trade".

As these symptoms of a kind of permanent, above-the-average conflict between the Jews and the Soviet regime cannot be explained by the antisemitism of the Guépéon (O.G.P.U.) or the courts - of "men", in short - there is evidently something of incompatibility between the nature of "Things" and Soviet Russia and the nature of the Jews in Soviet Russia.

Where the conflict is open without any disguise is in the Soviet regime's treatment of Zionism and the Hebrew language. In the early twenties there were numerous mass-trials and Siberia sentences against young Jews accused of Zionist affiliation, which was considered a crime both on account of that creed's own demerits and on account of the pro-British orientation it implied. What was wrong with the Hebrew tongue is not quite clear, but the fact is that, while the study of Yiddish was encouraged, teaching children in Hebrew was forbidden. Lately nothing more has been heard of this curious form of ethnical oppression (for that is what it certainly was), which appeasement is being officially explained as a proof that the Soviet Jews have lost all interest both in the land and in the tongue of their obsolete Bible. One wonders if the same inner transformation will so easily be produced also in the new Soviet Jews, annexed since October 1959. These have had 22 years of intensive Zionist training under the Balfour declaration, have given Palestine at least a hundred thousand Haluzim, while as many or more

of their children have had all their school curriculum taught them in Hebrew. This nut will be much tougher/than the generation of 1918; one expects soon to hear of a new, and a heavier, offensive against Jewish "imperialism"

Yet all this is only a surmise, made en passant, and the reader has been warned at the beginning of this chapter that the author does not claim to speak of Russian conditions with any competence whatever. What is certain is that so far the Soviet regime has proved a very efficient preservative against all the conscious form of antisemitism. Jews under Soviet rule fear neither "ousting" nor pogroms, and the principle of equal rights and equal opportunity seems there to be applied without any trace of racial discrimination. At the same time, west of the Soviet frontier antisemitism rules supreme, and just how, and for God knows how long, in forms of ~~my~~ exquisite bestiality.

This places every Jew on earth - every Jew without exception, Polish or British or Chilean - before a difficult moral problem: and the problem has a most unpleasant direct bearing on his "orientation" with regard to this war. To put it bluntly: Russian conquest means the actual end to concrete antisemitism; where the Soviet rule is established, pogroms are impossible and all forms of Jew-baiting disappear. This is an undeniable empirical fact. In such cases of divided loyalty it is best to experiment with oneself: ¶

I have been doing it uninterruptedly during the weeks when it was still a riddle how far Russia would advance into conquered Poland. My basic attitude to Soviet Russia is both rationally and emotionally negative; exalting one class over another is to me anathema, a crime against equality which is the base and the crown of all social decency; a regime without freedom of the press, to me who am by God's grace a scribe and nothing else, means starvation; I like the State to have as little to say as possible, I admit compulsion only as one admits quinine - when absolutely inevitable - I detest obedience and think friendly anarchy the ideal regime for all nations in the luminous future. A land where everything is organised just the way I hate is to me a nightmare. In addition, the Soviets are enemies of Zionism, whereas to me the restoration of a Jewish Palestine is the only theodicy and cosmodicy there is; they want to stifle the rebirth of Hebrew whereas I, who know half Pushkin by heart, am willing any day to trade the whole of Russian poetry for seven letters of the square alphabet; which is very narrow-minded but incurably true. To top it all, the Soviets' action in making friends with Nazism and in stabbing Poland in the back placed them, in my judgement, beyond the pale of biped zoology. I could add another page of invective, all genuinely felt and meant. - With this attitude in my heart, during those weeks I opened my paper with eager hands hoping to read that the Soviets had annexed more and more and more territory: for in

each one of those border towns I have friends to whom that Red Fiend's advance meant escape from torture.

The implications of this story of one puzzled anti-Communist go much farther than choosing between Russia and Germany, a rather obvious choice not likely to hurt anyone's susceptibilities. That dilemma still stands, not between Russia and Germany but between sooty-faced Russia and their holy Cleanliness the western democracies. On a broad, sweeping issue, the present conflict looks almost as much a contest between the latter and the Soviets as between them and the Nazis. Should Russia profit, should her world-power increase, the influence of the western Allies will be eclipsed; a triumph of the Allies will mean a tremendous setback for Russia. What should I pray for? An Allied victory, for the Jews of Eastern and Central Europe, means what we have seen in a preceding chapter - "as you were", with a supervision which Sir Archibald Sinclair honestly advises us not to overrate. But a new province snatched by the Soviets means, at least, no torture. Whom should I help, rebus eic stantibus?

The author has taken ~~for~~ as object for his observation himself, but this was only a manoeuvre. Sixteen million Jews are watching, two thirds of them not as victims but as members of the Allied and neutral universe. Most of them, one or two generations ago, came from the Zone: everybody has a cousin in the eastern ghetto between the devil and the deep sea.

"Threatening" Europe that unless this or that is done at once, A. or B. will turn pro-Moscow is an old device of political pressure; it is especially popular when A. and B. are Jews. It has been used so often that it no longer frightens anyone. Yet there is a fund of bitter and dangerous truth in it all the same; and wise men know that many a menace, even if it never materialises, turns to venom and miasms. It is foolish to allow it to fester and mature in war time.

CHAPTER ~~XX~~ X

The official Allied attitude to the Jewish evacuation problem (in so far as the official Allied view admits the existence of such a thing, under the euphemist name of the "refugee" problem) is in contradiction with all our essential and vital interests.

The essential and vital interests of the Jewish masses in the Zone of distress, even considered apart from spiritual aspects such as the appeal of religion or Zionism, demand the recognition of two principles:

a) That there is no probability whatever that the need for mass emigration will cease after an Allied victory: that, on the contrary, the balance of probability points to an increased evacuation urge after the war; and that all international policy plans with regard to the future of the "Jewish refugee" problem must, therefore, discard the cheap optimism justifying neglect and adopt the "greater need" forecast as their only base.

This "greater need" forecast has been dealt with in several of the preceding chapters and need not be dwelt upon again.

b) The second principle is: territorial concentration of Jewish immigrants, and especially, no encouragement for their further dispersion as minorities among other peoples.

Probably no "plain man" with an ordinary brain needs any explanation with regard to this second principle. It is by now clear to all that the formation of new Jewish minorities in countries or districts or towns where there are as yet no Jewish communities is bound to spread the microbes of the cancer for the future, perhaps for a very near future. To any sound mind, whether friendly or indifferent or even unsympathetic to Jews, the only sound policy is to look for some way of letting those emigrants form a homeland of their own. Theoretically speaking, it might be one homeland for all of them, or several homelands: though the author does not believe in the possibility of the latter alternative, this is not the place to analyse it - the main point is the homeland principle. A homeland for Jews means a land where they would dwell only among Jews, or at least form there a majority sufficiently superior in numbers not to fear either pogroms, economic ousting, or even the uneasy feeling of the undesirable lodger. This does ~~not~~ perhaps not necessarily imply full political independence; it certainly implies a very considerable extent of internal sovereignty; it implies above all a sufficiently vast area (or several vast areas, if we speak theoretically) reserved for the purpose. That the task of finding such areas is not an easy one is obvious;

but to look for "easy" ways out of a problem of such magnitude would be childish. When the plain man hears that inter-government conferences are being called and committees set up to devise schemes for settling "refugees", mainly if not wholly Jews, he expects the statesmen thus engaged to apply their efforts, first of all, in the direction not of scattered but of concentrated settlement.

The official Allied attitude, so far as can be ascertained, favours the scattering of the "refugees", and the view that after the Allied victory there will be no need even for that.

The Evian Conference (1938), convened to

was the outcome of President Roosevelt's initiative. His original intention was a sweeping and far-reaching one: he wanted the civilised governments to provide an adequate solution for the plight of all refugees; by "all" he explicitly meant both those who geographically were already out of the trouble and those who might reasonably be expected to get

out of it in the immediate future. Also, he did not intend to limit the scope of help to German and Austrian refugees only: he meant that the claims of those who were being daily squeezed out of Poland should also be weighed. There are some indications that Mr. Roosevelt's initial plan went even further than that: relief should be provided not only for those actually expelled or fled but also for those left behind to their agony: in other words, not only refugee relief but also preventive evacuation. It is of course unlikely that Mr. Roosevelt expected a first conference to solve these problems in their immense entirety: what he intended was probably a full-sized beginning plus a complete and courageous outline of the tasks ahead.

When his envoy, Mr. Taylor, began to go round the European capitals sounding their attitudes to the President's initiative, it became at once evident that he met heavy obstacles on his way - that there were powerful influences alarmed and displeased by the sweep of Roosevelt's plan and bent upon narrowing it to as little as possible. The main centre of that obstruction was official London.

The spring of 1938, when Mr. Taylor was travelling on his exploratory ^lspade-work mission, was the time when Foreign Office and Colonial Office circles were busy looking for some way to reduce Great Britain's Zionist obligations.

It was the same resolve which a year later found its expression in Mr. MacDonald's White Paper on Palestine. The resolve could not possibly have reached full precision so early in 1938, but the trend was perfectly clear: England's pledge to the Jews must be so interpreted as to leave her free to buy Arab goodwill by stopping immigration to Palestine. Mr. Roosevelt's project was a most inopportune check to that tendency. An international body summoned to solve the refugee problem would inevitably begin by a quest for a suitable territory or territories, and the first object of their investigation would be naturally Palestine. This danger was to be averted at all costs. How? It would of course not do to offend Mr. Roosevelt by anything like an abrupt refusal to hold such a conference. Mr. Roosevelt was to be let down softly and gently. The scope of the problem was first to be drastically cut: not all the refugees from all the countries, both already escaped or likely to escape in the future, but only those actual fugitives from Germany and Austria who are already out and already such a burden for Germany's hospitable neighbours. In other words, a problem of some souls and not of God knows how many eventual myriads. Secondly, the problem thus limited would have to be treated as a question of international charity, not of international politics; no Jewish state proposals and such-like were to be put on the agenda; and to drag in Palestine in this connection would mean embarrassing Great Britain and even making it impossible to take part in the gathering.

Thirdly, there was obviously no need to invite to the assembly countries, like Poland and Roumania, which could obviously offer no assistance by agreeing to absorb refugees: the only contributions these countries were likely to make offer the conference would obviously be a demand of an outlet for their own prospective emigrants. Before Mr. Taylor finished his visiting round, the conference was already doomed to become a mockery and a failure.

Symbolically, the man chosen as chief British delegate to the conference was Lord Winterton, then Minister for in the Cabinet. The Jewish comment was:

"Here There is only one convinced antisemite in this government, and it is he who has been selected to represent England at a conference dealing mainly with Jews." This is probably an overstatement: Lord Winterton hardly deserves to be described as enemy of the Jews. My brethren in Israel are notoriously too touchy on this subject. There are Jewish peculiarities which they themselves dislike, but a Gentile who would admit that he too dislikes them would risk being branded an antisemite. He may occasionally swear at the French, he may even express a doubt whether France really needs holding Djibouti, without being called Francophobe: but to swear at Jews, or to doubt that in any quarrel between them and, say, the Poles, it is the Jews who are wrong and the Poles right, classes a Gentile with Haman. All this is very foolish on the part of my brethren in Israel.

But not half so foolish as it would be to appoint that critic of the French people and of their Djibouti rights to represent you at an international conference which is to deal with the situation in the Red Sea - unless you mean harm to the French. Lord Winterton's antecedents with regard to Jewish interests were well-known and very significant: on many occasions, in the House of Commons and outside of it, he spoke as a convinced opponent of Zionism and a convinced supporter of the most virulent section of Arab nationalism (whose propaganda committee in London he joined); and the way he treated the problem always showed, with irreproachable sincerity, that Lord Winterton did not feel at all impressed with the alleged tragedy of Jewish existence and did not think that it was anyhow the Gentile world's business to bother about it. All of which is not enough to condemn him to the Zoo by stamping him an antisemite: I am prepared to ~~say the~~ ^{say the} same things, mutatis mutandis, of the Portuguese and yet anyone calling me their enemy would be a liar. But Lord Winterton had no business to go to such a conference, nor the British government to send him there. It was a deliberate manifestation of a deliberate intention to sabotage a good thing.

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The topedding of the Evmian conference, morally, the ugliest action one can remember on the scene of international contacts for a generation at least. The full depth of its ethical level was only revealed quite recently,

when a Blue Book on Nazi atrocities in concentration camps was published in London. The Blue Book is immensely effective in proving that the Nazis are scoundrels; the atrocities are horrid, and ~~x~~ nine tenths of them - according to the official reports of British diplomatic and consular observers collected in that publication - were perpetrated on Jews. But most of them were made before the Evian conference, some at dates very close to that conference. The Foreign Office knew what was happening to the Jews in Germany and Austria, when they dispatched Lord Winterton to Evian. He was not instructed to tell the conference what British consuls had reported, or to warn it that the fugitives already fled were obviously only a fringe of the hordes of misery earmarked to perish or to escape to-morrow. He was instructed, on the contrary, to minimise the tragedy and, above all, to prevent the conference from looking ahead.

So far as known, the same tactics were adopted at the second "refugee" conference - at Washington in October 1939. Here again Mr. Roosevelt was initiator, and Lord Winterton British delegate. Here again Mr. Roosevelt is

reported to have expressed the apprehension that after the war there will be many more refugees than before; according to some of the reports the American delegation went so far as to forecast a human flood amounting perhaps to twenty million homeless ~~people~~ people of all races. Yet here again "some European delegates" firmly disagreed, and assured the gathering that, on the contrary, no refugee problem would be left in Europe after the Allied victory. Another report states, besides, that it was decided to start a systematic enquiry into the absorptive possibilities of a number of countries, but Palestine (at the demand of "some European delegates") was excluded from the scope of such enquiry.

All this is no small matter. This is a deliberate policy of scuttling the chances of Jewish salvation; of discouraging our well-wishers and paralysing their attempts to help us. I want to choose my words very carefully, but this is a line of action more than just unfriendly - this is an action of wreckers. Moreover, even a wrecker does not always act so wantonly as to rob a neighbour of a pound in order to save for himself a penny. Half a century of Jewish endeavour, since Theodore Herzl's day and before, had been devoted to the one supreme purpose: to make the civilised governments realise that the Jewish migration hunger is a world-problem and agree on an international effort to solve it in all its magnitude. At long last, a powerful initiative has begun to move in this direction, at a period

when the sympathy of all nations with the Jews' agony of homelessness can (so we thought) be considered unanimous. All the future of the race depends on the success of this step; and it is not only the Jews' chance of salvation - it is also Europe's chance to get cured. All these are prospects of profound and durable, perhaps of eternal, international and humanitarian value. As against this, there is the petty apprehension that a British Cabinet may be put in an awkward position if the Palestine question is reopened; a policy which British leaders dislike, and which nine tenths even of its reluctant supporters accept only as provisional. There is something repellent in this disproportion between the enormity of the harm and the puny cheapness of the advantage; stories of the middle ages, read in early boyhood, return to memory - "yes, the village is burning, but do not sound the alarm lest you wake his Lordship".

CHAPTER XI

The Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees, set up by the Evian Conference, has so far (February 1940) published no results of its investigation. This is not a reproach: a geo-political enquiry spread over half the globe must be slow work under the best of conditions, and this particular work has been lately handicapped by the war. The result is that no proper review can be offered of the settlement possibilities discovered by the Committee, for the refugees generally and the Jewish refugees in particular. In the mean time the press, general and Jewish, has every week to report some rumour about some new outlet. Collected and printed, these rumours would present a maddening jumble of names and figures. The following countries have been mentioned as fit and willing (or ~~vice~~ vice versa) to absorb a certain number of refugees: Abyssinia, Alaska, Australia, Bolivia, Brasil, British Guiana, British Honduras, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Kenya, Madagascar, Mindanao of the Philippine Islands, New Caledonia, Northern Rhodesia, Tanganyika - ~~xxxx~~

Jeannette, Nine,
 Alice, Aline,
 Zelma, Julie -
 Et j'en oublie

The numbers of refugees which can, according to these press reports, be accepted by each of these countries are another jumble. The figures vary from "100,000 and more" to "a few qualified specialists", both sometimes with reference to the same land, the larger figure looming on

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Two distinct lines of thought are traceable ... chaos: infiltration of individuals and group settlement. Sometimes, instead of "group settlement", the term "colonisation" is used. The difference is double. Infiltration is what overseas migration (except in Palestine) has been throughout the last 50 years: "immigrants" have no ambition to create a new social organism, they find one ready-made and look for some unoccupied spots within it where they could find or build a foothold for themselves. On the contrary, "colonisers" in this terminology are people going in bunches to large empty areas in order to erect a new body social where there was none before. - The second difference, more to the point in our case, is this: infiltration means new ghettos, colonisation or group settlement is a conception more or less (only more or less) related to the "territorialist" idea of a Jewish state, or a Jewish province, or several Jewish provinces.

It is not clear whether the Intergovernmental Committee is prepared to support this "territorialist" idea, but any public spirit there is behind such schemes as Alaska, British Guiana, especially Australia, is definitely "territorialist".

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The one item that never varies is, of course, finance. Whenever that is mentioned, all reports frankly state that very big sums will be necessary if more than the "infiltra-

tion" of these few qualified specialists is required. To "colonise" (outside of Palestine) one million people would probably cost between 300 and 400 million pounds. This is just to give the reader an idea: nobody really means to ask for such amounts. All the schemes more or less reliably rumoured so far seem to be on a far less ambitious scale. This, however, only increases the impression of fantastic unreality. 400 million may be a monstrous lot of money, but in connection with so grandiose a vision as a million colonists it somehow sounds, at least adequate. Quite a different matter is to realise that settling on the land 500 families would, at the same rate, cost one million pounds. A million pounds is what the Zionist movement, with a driving power not easily to be equalled, collects in about two years: a sum very, very hard to achieve. 500 refugee families, or about 2000 souls, are a pebble out of an avalanche. Mr. Roosevelt, at the Washington Conference in October 1939, was reported to anticipate some 20 million homeless people after the war. If so, 5 million among them will be Jews. Both figures are only estimates, but the second is incomparably more certain than the first. The bulk of these 5 million will have to go; the process will involve astronomical figures of expenditure - for an accomplishment of equal grandeur. The figures mentioned in connection with the innumerable schemes for scattering the "refugees"

through all the latitudes of the earth also run into astronomical totals in costs, but as to quantities of people to be saved, the results they promise are frankly microscopic.

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The "infiltration" schemes need not be discussed: they are all above board, in the sense that their fundamental rottenness is obvious to all and by no one disputed.

The following string of news-items has been leisurely gleaned from the London "Jewish Chronicle" files of 1938 and 1939:

According to a statement issued by the Government of Northern Rhodesia the elected members of the Legislative Council have unanimously opposed any immigration of Jewish refugees. The acting Governor, therefore, felt unable to advise the Secretary of State that the matter would be proceeded with further at the present time. (August 19, 1938)

It is stated that mass immigration into the Portuguese colonies is strictly forbidden. (August 19, 1938)

President Vargas of Brazil has issued a decree prohibiting the establishment of communities of one nationality, fixing the annual quota of immigration at two per cent of the total number of immigrants of the same nationality during the last fifty years and establishing an immigration council. (September 2, 1938)

A memorandum urging the prohibition of foreign immigrants into Cyprus has been submitted to the Municipal Council by local professional corporations (September 16, 1938)

Refugees from European countries will not be encouraged to emigrate to New Zealand, according to a statement made last week by Mr. Nash, the Minister of Finance (September 16, 1938)

It is understood that the Government of South Africa is unwilling to contemplate any modification in the stringent ~~provisions~~ provisions of the Aliens Act, which makes Jewish immigration virtually impossible. (Dec.2, 1938)

It is reported that the Uruguay Government has instructed its consuls to refuse visas to Jews who are emigrating for racial or political reasons (December 23, 1938)

The Foreign Office of Ecuador advised consuls and agents in foreign countries not to issue permanent visas to aliens (July 14, 1939)

Twenty more geographical names could be added to this list. The Jewish refugee is not wanted. When he is admitted, it is by mercy, cajolery, or ~~friendly~~ friendly pressure: precarious visas all of them. Here again, the author means no reproach either to hospitable Governments or to humanitarian intermediaries: they deserve endless gratitude. Also, from the point of view of shipwrecked individuals anything is better than drowning. But as a considered intergovernmental policy infiltration, in this case, is an all-round waste of mission and opportunity, sowing inevitable harm for to-morrow, harm to the refugees, to the hospitable countries, to the world at large. Its only redeeming feature is its narrow range - it cannot overspread as the peoples are ever more unwilling to grant hospitality which they will be unable decently to sustain.

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The only proper task for an Intergovernmental Committee of this kind, so far as the Jewish "refugee" phenomenon is concerned, would be to discard infiltration (delegating it

to private institutions) and concentrate upon inquiry into the possibilities of the "territorial solution. There are so far no indications whether the Committee is thinking in that direction. At Evian, where it was formed, it certainly received no such commission; it may have got it from the Washington Conference whose resolutions have not been published, or were perhaps so insignificant as to get lost in the noise of the war; or the Committee may have set out along this high road, the only road, on its own initiative and responsibility. It is to be hoped it has. If not, it will have to; or some other body will be formed for the purpose, inevitably.

Nothing can be more deplorable than the strange passivity of Jewish public opinion in this regard. Since Leo Pinsker wrote "Auto-emancipation" 60 years ago, since Theodor Herzl founded political Zionism, it has been all Jews' hope that some day the civilised world would realise the international character of the problem of our migrations, and an intergovernmental organ would be established to study and solve it. Here is that organ now before their eyes, seemingly wasting time, the most tragic time of all times, on stop-gap futilities. It is no secret that its leading workers are themselves convinced of the damnable uselessness of patchwork: their legitimate ambition is to produce something really adequate; it is only the ungenerous

wilful shortsightedness of one bureaucracy that is supposed to hinder them. A few months of concerted counter-attack by public opinion, overwhelmingly backed by the tragedy going on before the world's eye in the East, would sweep away that obstruction and force the Intergovernmental Committee, to the Committee's own rejoicing and pride, to concentrate on the Jewish State question.

To avoid misunderstandings, it is useful here to state that the Intergovernmental Committee as at present constituted is by far not adequately manned for the great purpose. It includes excellent brains but has no real contact with the main forces of organised Jewish democracy. The defect is largely due to a Jewish weakness which is partly their misfortune and partly their own fault: there is no united organ claiming the title of an Exilarchate, a "government" of the Jewish people in dispersion. This gap will be discussed in our concluding chapter; here it is only mentioned to explain that a committee of eminent Gentile well-wishers is not the competent authority for solving problems of Jewish history. When Pinsker and Herzl spoke of "international" efforts to solve these problems what they meant was: the Gentile nations together with the Jewish nation. This, however, is also bound to come. As soon as the present "Evian"

Committee will force its bounds and start on its high road, it will itself realise the inadequacy of its composition and demand to be enlarged. Perhaps even then it will only be a forerunner, not the final assembly to pronounce the final decision; nor does the author forget that the really "final" decision on a people's fate can only be pronounced, in deeds not in formulas, by the people itself. - But with all that the "Evian" Committee to-day is an important factor, a lever that can open many impasses: and it is deplorable that Jewish public opinion neglects the lever.

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Such Jewish bodies as seem already to enjoy the Intergovernmental Committee's recognition prefer to follow the Evian lead and concentrate on palliatives. The biggest, at least the most conspicuous, departure on this path of smaller mercies which leads hardly anywhere has been, up to date, the solemn signature of a contract between the Dominican Government and an American Jewish corporation known as the Agro-Joint. The newspapers' report mentioned that the agreement was concluded "with the blessing of the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees". Very little is known about its contents at the moment of writing, but it certainly promises relief to several thousands German-Jewish refugees who will be selected for agricultural settlement, mainly, it appears,

on a vast area of land generously donated for this purpose by Senor Trujillo, a former President of Santo Domingo. It would be churlish not to acknowledge all this with respect and gratitude, or to look for defects where the chief thing is the achievement itself, doubtlessly valuable and handsome. The Dominican republic is reported to have agreed to admit up to 100,000 Jewish refugees, so that these 5 thousand settlers on Senor Trujillo's land (another report speaks of "500 families") are only a beginning; the Agro-Joint is a colonising body of great efficiency, with a first rate record of similar work done in Soviet Russia; both parties to the agreement are to be sincerely congratulated, admired, and wished the best of success.

But when that success will be attained, and not only the first 500 or 5000 but all the 100,000 settled in Santo Domingo, the problem of the exodus of several million souls will stand before us just as big as if the whole Dominican episode were an illusion: as some ungracious sceptics think it is and will prove.

CHAPTER XII

Apart from Palestine, few schemes of a "territorialist" nature - schemes intended to produce a Jewish State or province - have emerged into prominence recently. Such an one seems to be the British Guiana project. Mr. Neville Chamberlain said in the House of Commons, on November 21st, 1938: "I turn now to British Guiana. It is not possible at this stage to give exact figures of the total area which could be made available to be leased for this purpose, but it would certainly not be less than 10,000 square miles, and probably more". Sir Samuel Hoare, on the same day, "admitted that the territory envisaged included that which had proved unsuitable for the settlement of 5000 Assyrians a few years ago". (Sir John Hope Simpson, in his monumental "Refugee Problem" report to the Royal Institute of International Affairs, in a chapter dealing with the Assyrian tragedy, devotes only two lines to that little disappointment: "Search was made in many quarters of the globe, among others in Brazil and in ^{Guiana} British ~~Guiana~~, but no suitable site for settlement could be found").

The Advisory Committee on Political Refugees appointed by President Roosevelt dispatched a commission of experts to investigate British Guiana. They spent a few weeks in touring various sections of the country and produced a

report. The British Colonial Office hastened to publish it as a White Paper in May 1939, obviously to offset or soften the blow to the Jews dealt by the other White Paper, the Palestine one, which appeared in the same month. One home-land is closed, but here is another on the horizon.

The Commission's conclusions are moderately optimistic but cautious. The territory "is not an ideal place for refugees from middle European countries" and "could not be considered for ^{scale} "immediate" large ~~scale~~ settlement", but it is worth "a trial settlement". The trial should involve 5000 pioneers, three million dollar costs (only that?) and two years time (only?). The points to be clarified during the trial are - all points: everything is under a question mark at present - whether the actual area of fertile soils is as extensive as assumed, whether forests and savannahs (which undoubtedly are extensive) can be utilised, whether there is room for industries heavy and light, whether a road, ~~for instance~~ be it only a rough one, could be built at reasonable costs to make the settlement accessible, and whether Europeans can stand the task despite the fact that other Europeans tried and failed. The query number last but one can perhaps be illustrated by a story told of another South American country: "you can reach our interior from our sea

shore either by 'plane or on mule back: the second way is of course more expensive, but faster". A reply to query number last seems to be indirectly suggested by the commission in another connection - in explaining why the fact that the same colony was found unsuitable for Assyrians need not imply its unsuitability for middle European refugees. The reason is that the refugee problem presents "a number of special features", of which the first is "the extreme urgency and necessity with which the refugees are being forced to find new homes". Must needs where devil drives. A useful additional query, omitted by the good commissioners, would be whether the devil can be persuaded to wait till all the other queries will be answered by experiment, in an equatorial country of hills and primeval forests with no roads to speak of. The sum of the queries as seen above, represents a total survey which it will take not two years but a generation to perform.

This should not be taken as criticism of British Guiana's fitness for close settlement. The Colonial Secretary said in September last year that some "voluntary organisations in Great Britain had been on the point of establishing a corporation to carry out the (British Guiana) scheme, but owing to the outbreak of the war action had been suspended for the time being". "Action", we assume,

means both the small experimental settlement to begin with and investigation of vaster possibilities ahead: some day "action" in this sense may be resumed, and may produce, after all, quite favourable constatactions, even if not Jews but other colonisers will ultimately make use of them. Speaking generally and theoretically, it is unlikely that any spot on God's earth is destined to remain unused in eternity. With the progress of technique, in a hundred years or less, perhaps even the Sahara désert will be colonised, with the help of water brought from the Niger in pipelines fivehundred mile long, or from underground sources five thousand feet deep. Countries like the Guianas, where the obstacle is rather superabundance of nature's vitality than the opposite, will probably all have found their masters even before that. Humanity is too crowded, space too valuable: it will not long yet be allowed to lie waste. Aeroplanes will annihilate distance, radio and television will permit a dweller of Central Africa to attend first nights of the New York Metropolitan opera, some other invention will perhaps enable a worker, lounging before a screen and a switchboard at his cottage a hundred miles away from his factory, to do his work the same as if he stood two steps from the big wheel. All reasons for herding together will disappear; hereditary townsmen will long for the luxury

of that Boer ~~wastrekker~~ voortrekker who felt crowded when he saw his neighbour's smoke; people will migrate overseas not because of hunger and persecution but just for the fun of space, which is perhaps as vital in all of us as the fun of speed. The all the waste places around the globe will be planted, including the Guianas, including even Biro-Bidjan. The only link with the huddled past will be the jealousy of nationality: men still will insist, then and for ever in eternity, that the next door fellow, no matter how far the next door, should be his own kith and kin.

All this is said to prove that the author does not disparage either British Guiana or any other place any sensible people may suggest for mass-settlement by Jews. Some day all these places will be happily settled by some people or other. But mass-settlement by Jews is not a vision of the radiant future when water, soil and climate will obey man's order, and a magic wand weighing two ounces will replace not only spades and axes but even tractors. The Jewish exodus is a need of tomorrow, literal tomorrow; it has its inherent conditions and limitations, due partly to the nature of the Jew such as he is to-day, partly to the nature of other peoples such as they are to-day, and partly on the technique of mass settlement such as it is to-day - still an extremely hard up-hill enterprise.

The most interesting of all "territorial" projects is not British Guiana but Western Australia. One of its most remarkable features is that its advancement is due to the lone effort of one single man, and the man is neither young nor rich. Nor does he excel in the kind of nuisance they call propaganda. His "trick" or secret seems to be just that calm obstinacy which always wants to-day what it wanted yesterday. His name is Dr. I. Steinberg. In Russia, long ago, he was a prominent member of a party with a thundering name - Socialist-Revolutionary, S.R. for short. It was the non-Marxist wing of Russian Socialism. The Bolsheviks wiped them out. Before that happened, Dr. Steinberg managed to hold a ministerial post in one of the transition governments. Now he lives in London. At some time in the course of the last decade he formed, or perhaps only joined, a group called the "Freeland League" for Jewish Territorial Colonisation". Last year he went to Australia and actually converted a State of the Commonwealth entirely to his views. The story is a striking lesson that very big political actions can be accomplished single-handed by one person, perfectly unofficial, with hardly much even in the way of popular backing or other credentials, without any of that medicine-witch stuff known as personal magnetism or "appeal", simply by talking timely sense.

That Dr. Steinberg has converted practically the whole of West-Australia is undeniable. There is a vast waste territory along the northernmost half of the continent's north-western sea shore, known as "the Kimberleys". The districts the Freeland League has under consideration are Ivanhoe and Argyle in the Ord River region which belongs to West Australia, and Newry and Auvergne in the North Australian Territory, but this is probably not the final limit of the scheme. The whole area which could be claimed for colonisation is probably larger than England and Wales. It is practically uninhabited. The "West Australian", Perth's leading daily, voiced what seems to be general opinion in admitting, in a lengthy editorial, that neither Australians nor British immigrants - judging by all experience of the last decades - could be expected to make a success of opening up that part of the continent; and as Australia, for various reasons including that of safety, ought not to tolerate any longer an unpopulated North, Jews were preferable by far to any other non-British stock. This view was supported by representative men and women of all classes, a resolution was passed in the State's Legislative Assembly endorsing the scheme and asking the Commonwealth authorities to consider it favourably.

The full range of the scheme was not stated in precise figures, either of square miles which would be needed ultimately nor of immigrants ultimately to be brought in. Before the Berth Chamber of Commerce Dr. Steinberg said that "if six to seven million acres could be obtained on Ord River, it would be possible there to establish a Jewish settlement backed with pastoral and agricultural activities". As to numbers of immigrants, he was always careful to underline that at first only some five to six hundred young pioneers, men and women, would be sent to test possibilities and try out the methods. Later on he envisaged a settlement of about ten thousand. In another address, he mentioned 75,000 and 100,000 as a more remote aim, but did not say that was the final limit. In an interview "he visualised a new British province well established in ten to fifteen years". The goal of the Fraeland League is, of course, a Jewish State roomy enough to absorb a real exodus. The Australian sympathisers, intelligent people and descendants of colonisers themselves, obviously understand all this; moreover, as one of the grounds for their sympathy is their fear of a Japanese invasion, it is clear that in considering colonisation schemes they think not in terms of thousands but rather - at least - of hundreds of thousands..

What is not so clear as that wave of sympathy is the question whether the area is suitable for European pioneers. The "West Australian's" friendly editorial just mentioned, in enumerating the causes of previous failures, refers to "isolation, transport difficulties, stock pests and diseases, and an unfriendly climate". But in the same article that half of the Kimberley division of the State is described as a "well-watered area of large rivers and fertile valleys, almost unknown and completely unpopulated except by natives". On the other hand, Dr. Steinberg himself admitted in a speech to the Perth Labour Women Organisation that "the site picked was not exactly a pleasant place, and he was sure that Australians would never go there in effective number to work... Regarding whether the new settlers could stand the climate, it was explained that there are 5 winter months which are quite pleasant; two are extremely hot and dry, and five months are hot and humid". (The area is situated, roughly, between 12° and 20° south). In an interview with the Melbourne "Age", Dr. Steinberg, referring to water supply, somewhat qualified the "West Australian's" optimism stating that "in the wet season there were good streams and lakes in evidence, and water conservation would not be a difficult project". Mr. A.C. Angelo, of Carnarvon, an enthusiastic supporter of the scheme, speaks also guardedly of that aspect of the site's nature:

"there are miles of good water in the Ord River above the tidal limit, and thousands of acres fertile and easy to irrigate".

All this would, of course, be taken fully into account if the scheme ever came to be finally entertained as officially practicable and accepted. There is no doubt that it would be found bristling with enormous difficulties and demanding as "astronomical" an outlay as any other similar project; but such obstacles cannot be helped as long as the suitable territory is being looked for outside of Palestine; and all such obstacles to colonisation, as said before, are sure to be conquered by some people some day in the future.

The real obstacle to the "Freeland League's" Australian scheme lies elsewhere. It was mentioned, without exception, in every favourable comment printed or spoken throughout Dr. Steinberg's campaign - not as an unsurmountable hindrance ~~it~~ but simply as a secondary reservation; and the Freeland League's delegate, in his replies, also treated it as such - as an apprehension which can easily be removed. In this, it is to be feared, both sides were mistaken. The obstacle will most probably prove not secondary but of dominating and overwhelming importance; and of the only two means by which it can be

removed, Jews are not likely to accept the first and the Australian Commonwealth the second.

The nature of that obstacle had better be illustrated by a few quotations:

The "West Australian's" editorial asks "whether the Jewish ~~xxxx~~ colonists, once admitted, will be content to stay on the settlement; whether there would be a serious risk of their migrating South in large numbers and attacking Australian industrial standards from the sheer necessity of earning a livelihood".

Mr. A. Thompson, member of the Legislative Council, an expert on the Kimberleys, and a sympathiser of the scheme: "It may be argued that the Jews might tend to drift southwards after experiencing the hard work of development. I think that could be regulated easily by agreement and the issue of permits from the State or Commonwealth authorities".

Mr. Latham, also a sympathiser, leader of the opposition in the State's Legislative ~~XXXXXX~~ Assembly, during the Address-in-Reply debate: "The Government must be careful, however, that those people did not come South and provide additional labour for a market which did not want them. Some agreement should be entered into with these people, by which - if they left the settlement - they would have to go overseas".

And so on without one single exception.

Dr. Steinberg seems to have fully realized the paramount importance of this apprehension, and the necessity to allay it. Whether the solution he proposed was a happy one remains to be seen. In addressing those Labour Women at Perth, he "spoke of the suggested possibility that these new settlers might compete in the Southern areas for work... He said that, first of all, this settlement would not be a separate section but would be incorporated in the Australian Commonwealth; and guarantees would be given to the Government that they would remain there for at least five years".

The solution is anything but a happy one. The promise that the settlement area will be "incorporated in the Commonwealth" can only intensify the fear: that can only make it easier for disappointed settlers to move to Perth or Melbourne or Sydney. Dr. Steinberg's corrective is, if we put it plainly, to prohibit those settlers from travelling outside of their reservation, at least during the first five years. They would have to be issued special passports for the purpose; the reservation's boundary would have to be watched; and police in the Southern cities would have the right to track offenders and send them back to the reservation, or - as Mr. Latham suggested - make them "go overseas". There is nothing new in such an arrangement: essentially, it is the same as that applied to Negroes in the Union of South Africa, or mutatis mutandis - to Jews in Czarist Russia where they had to stay in

the Pale of Settlement and were forbidden entering the central provinces of the empire.

There is no doubt that Dr. Steinberg and all his colleagues on the Freeland League's executive, when they realise all the implications of such a "guarantee", will themselves reject such a solution. Nor is any Australian government, in view of the country's fine Liberal traditions, likely to agree to an experiment of so shady a kind.

The only other solution would be to promote the settlement area from the start to the dignity of an independent state, properly cut off from the Commonwealth by an international frontier with a proper visa control on both sides. In this way there would be for the settlers no stigma of civic inferiority; but the other drawbacks would be so serious that no dreamer could be so dreamy as to lay this solution before an Australian government.

This is no doubt the main reason why, last January, an official answer to an M.P.'s question was given in the Commonwealth Parliament to the effect that the Government rejected the Kimberley scheme.

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Readers should not be surprised at so much attention given to this particular project. It deserves attention not only because of the honest great devotion behind it, but also

and especially on account of its lesson which ought to be read as referring not only to Australia but to all "territorialist" schemes outside of Palestine.

Chapter XIIIThe Fate Morgana Land

The title is meant to cover all the projects, present and future, of finding a "suitable territory" - but not Palestine - where a Jewish State or province could be established. This chapter will not take us out of our way in dealing with war aims. At the end of the war the Jewish state must be established by international decision: the state itself, not a commission for geographical research. Research must precede the end of the war; one may add, with grim satisfaction, that there seems to be plenty of time for it ahead of us. The "Evian" Committee is tout indiqué to carry out such a preliminary geographical quest, and it could do worse than justify its existence by preparing the solution of the only "refugee" problem that historically matters.

The author, of course, does not believe in the reality of any ~~"territorialist"~~ "territorialist" projects outside of Palestine; in this sense he considers all search for other suitable areas hopeless. But the quest should nevertheless be treated with fullest respect: even by the most zealous and jealous of uncompromising Zionists. Logically, it is in their interest to encourage the closest scrutiny of all non-Palestinian schemes.

There is the well-known Anglo-Saxon prejudice against logic in politics, but that is an error. Life is always

infallibly logical. Logic, however, is a complicated concept, as tortuous as the concept "arithmetic". There is a story about the Russian peasant who once propounded this mathematical theory: "Four and four make eight, with this I can agree; some say that five and three also make eight - but that's a Jewish trick". He would be astounded to learn that $613 \text{ minus } 1000 \text{ plus the square root of } 625 \text{ plus } 64 \text{ minus } 30 \text{ times nine}$ also makes eight.

Still more involved are the methods of political logic. In this problem of a "suitable territory", in particular, one should be warned against lapses into simplified bucolic arithmetics. The chain of ideas with which life's logic is bound in this case to operate is composed of three main links:

- a) Inevitability of exodus
- b) No exodus possible except to a Jewish State
- c) No suitable site for the Jewish State but one.

In this chain every link is of equal importance; should one of them break, it is the end of the chain. This is why it would not be wise to imagine that point "c" can be smothered in silence; it will have to be threshed out very thoroughly. Even Herzl and Nordau, founders of modern Zionism, had to pass inwardly through the phase of looking for the Fata Morgana Land before they realised the objective inevitability of the one and only "site". To-day many Christian minds are going through

the same process, and it would be a great mistake to betray irritation or impatience because they have not yet reached the final stage. Let them learn our alphabet letter by letter; not only "let them" - help them learn, help them concentrate, one after another, on the Fata Morganas. Every schoolboy, after his third lesson of geometry, knows how a theorem can be proved by the method called a contrarie: assume that black is white and see to what impasse it will lead you. In the realm of statesmanship this is perhaps the paramount method of reasoning: what the English call "learning by trial and error", only their great mistake is in insisting that every trial should be performed empirically, alias "muddled through", at the cost of sometimes terrific wear and tear, whereas Continental minds prefer to do their muddling by means of dialectic argument. Thou believest there is a Fata Morgana Land? Very well, here is thy globe; search one; we may even light a lamp for thee to see better; only, for everything's and everybody's sake, see that the quest is finished before the Peace conference.

As to the outcome of the search, provided it be conducted in good faith, there is no need to fret: the outcome is preordained.

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Has it ever occurred to the reader, now that he hears that so many territories are being mentioned as suitable, why is it

that no single government ever thought of proposing one of them through all the years since the Great war?

Jews as country-builders weremost prominently "in the market" throughout the period; and not a bad "proposition" either. All the governments, and all the newspaper readers in their countries, could not help being aware at least of two facts about Palestine: first - that Jewish colonisation was bringing that country an unheard-of rain of gold, every year in and out of season; second - that all the time these very Jews were having there trouble with the Arabs and friction with the British administration. In homely parlance, it was a case of a bride with quite an appetising dot who, judging by all one heard, could safely be assumed to feel disappointed in her fiancé. This is a situation which invariably stirs up attention in the "market" and produces other tentative offers. Why has nothing of the kind ever occurred in our case?

The first fact - the golden rain - was widely known throughout the world, especially to governments. Between 1922 and 1936, especially since 1925, consuls, bankers, reporters, travellers emphasised and exaggerated it in every language of the printing press. The second fact - trouble - was even better known the world throughout, having been everywhere lavishly headlined, with sensational embellishments, in 1920, 1921, 1929 and almost daily since April 1936. Why was there never a competing offer: here is another territory, every bit as good or better (certainly not worse) - change over and bring your gold and have no trouble?

The only explanation, purely deductive but difficult to evade, is that there are no such "suitable" territories in the market: no territory combining in itself all those characteristics which are necessary to make it "suitable". This brings us to the question: what are those characteristics?

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A territory (outside of Palestine) suitable for the establishment of the Jewish State must satisfy, at least from the Gentile's point of view, three essential requirements. From the point of view of the Jew there may be more; but here, in this chapter, the problem is examined in pragmatic sobriety, under strictest elimination of sentimental idiosyncrasies. The three requirements, short and sharp, are these:

- a) the territory must be empty;
- b) it must be good
- c) it must be of no value to its present owners.

The first condition must not be taken literally - no land is absolutely "empty": but the population on the spot must be less than insignificant, otherwise there would be no change. Where there is a noticeable established population, the same trouble is bound to arise as with the Arabs in Palestine. It would not matter who those natives might be even if they were Basques or Berreros, trouble would come all the same. If they were themselves unable to write in newspapers, they would find white-skinned protectors (English, most probably) who would take up the cudgels on their behalf and - quite justly - pose to the government a difficult ethical

question: "If it is unfair to give the Jews a country underpopulated by Arabs, why is it right to give them a country underpopulated by Negroes?".

The second requisite, translated into moderate terminology, means that the territory should be colonisable by average Europeans. Greenland is empty, but so far, than God, it has not been offered. An honest Christian soul, Mrs. Franklin Roosevelt, recently said: "If a land is to be found for the Jews, it must be a land fit for white men to live in". Where other white pioneers have failed utterly (and that, generations ago when ~~white~~ man was much less of a tenderfoot than now), Jewish colonisation would obviously stand little chance, even from that sober and pragmatic point of view which discards all sentimental nonsense.. There may be quite a flood of preliminary twaddle about equatorial valleys and arctic ridges, but after a serious scrutiny no government and no commission will sponsor such an offer simply because serious people hate making fools of themselves. Their belief in the Jews' genius for really rough pioneering should not be overrated, and one may be sure that neither in Labrador nor in the forests between the Orinoco and the Amazon will they look for the suitable territory. They will look for something really "good".

But the third condition - a territory of no value to its present owners - can be taken literally. The Australian example is conclusive. The same apprehension is bound to arise wherever there is a common frontier between the owners' country and the Jewish province. This is probably why the Guiana proposal is so popular: the colony is entirely isolated so the danger of the settlers invading any British territory would be nil. But in every other case the state that offers the Jews a "territory" must begin by renouncing it completely - must make it an independent country from the start, not just virtually but formally. The Australians' fear of "failures coming South" is hard sound experience. The surest of prospects in modern agricultural colonisation is the inevitably large proportion of failures, and these must inevitably float away towards the big towns. In Australia this has been the case over and over again: her cities are full of such deserters from "stations" in the "bush". One of the latest disappointments was the settlement of Theodore on the Dawson River. It was started by the government in 1927. It had many advantages over the Kimberley project: out of the tropics, total rainfall of 28 inches, water from the Dawson provided for nine irrigations a year; and the expenditure was £8000 (eight thousand pounds) per settler, which is a lavish lot, but must have been very helpful to the settlers. Yet more than a half of them proved quick failures: out of 264 farms occupied in 1927, only 124 settlers still lived there in 1935 ("many of them in a state

of poverty and discontent", says Prof. Griffith Taylor in Mr. Isaiah Bowman's report on "Limits of Land Settlement", published by the American Council on Foreign Relations). The quitters are, of course, in Brisbane, Newcastle, Adelaide if not in Sydney and Melbourne. So long, however, as they were Anglo-Saxons it was not terribly serious. Having their towns flooded by Jews would be quite a different prospect; for Australians and for any other nation (for the Jews, too, if Tel Aviv were similarly threatened by an Aryan wave).

With the best will in the world, no friendly government is likely to grant the Jews a territory unless it can be cut off from that nation's mainland - cut off so sharply and clearly that the boundary should be actually impenetrable except with a special passport, in special cases, and for a limited period. As the Russian method is evidently out of question, there remains only the other way, cession of sovereignty. The Jewish territory must become, at least formally, a separate independent state from the outset of the colonisation. Not an "autonomous" province, not a "canton" in a federated commonwealth: for between the provinces of the same state, between the cantons of the same federation, the free intermigration of citizens cannot be prohibited without establishing a pariah class, introducing internal passports, and poisoning

and degrading the whole civic atmosphere. Entry can be forbidden, in a decent modern community, only to "aliens", people who come from "abroad". The Jewish territory must be full-pledgedly "abroad".

There is nothing impossible in such a cutting-off operation - provided the territory has no value in the eyes of the nation that owns it. But that would be very strange in the case of a piece of land fulfilling the first two requirements. "Uninhabited" plus "habitable" is a value, and rather an enviable one. To look for a land combining such three mutually incompatible attributes as "uninhabited", "habitable", and "valueless" is not a hopeful quest. In the author's opinion there is only one answer to it, the Bata Morgans Land.

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"But does Palestine answer any of those three criteria?", is what one expects to hear asked at this stage. "Why should Palestine be preferred?"

The "choice" of Palestine has nothing to do with any criteria at all. It is the same difference as between one's fiancée and one's mother: in one's attitude to the latter the question of criterias simply does not arise, nor is it a matter of "choice". Zionists freely joke about Palestine's natural drawbacks as a country ~~far~~ for pioneers: they readily confess that it is by far not a "good proposition" for colonising, that there are lands much more suitable for the purpose - and that all this does not matter in the least and has no bearing on the question. Still more readily do they admit that the local Arabs' unwillingness to welcome the transformation is a very regrettable fact and that it would be much better if it did not ~~exist~~ exist; but since it exists it will have to be taken into account, and overcome however costly that may prove. This is an attitude essentially different from anything that may be called search or question or choice: to "find" or "select", one compares values, advantages, obstacles, and concludes without any part pris by preferring the greatest attraction and the least resistance: and it is perhaps inevitable that the thing that most attracts and does not resist cannot be but - a mirage. Palestine is a

(Ch. XIII)

matter of partition which does not even pretend to compete with any other country's possible attractions, or ease of access, or cheapness of conquest. The author fully shares his generation's dislike of totalitarian patriotism, but there are desperate situations where no "choice" is left and the only attitude for a decent man to take is, right or wrong - any country. With ^{greater} ~~such great~~ justification, a people foundering in chaos is entitled to say: good or bad, easy or hard, cheap or costly - my country.

Incidentally, it will prove not so costly, not so hard and even not so bad.

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Chapter XIVThe White Paper Policy

It would be empty hypocrisy to pretend that there is a truce in the debate on the proper interpretation of the Palestine mandate. There ought to be one till the common danger is over; there ought to be a firm attitude of respect for the legal status quo, bad as it is, without attempts to steal a march on one another; there ought to but there is not.

At the outbreak of the war, a moment when even experienced people cannot help getting sentimentally trustful, the writer and his friends frankly expected a truce to begin at once. True, they spoke of Palestine as the Jewish State in that appeal to world Jewry quoted at the beginning of this book's Foreword: but that war different - that was a war-call; it is usual, it is the tradition that one recites one's utmost ideal in calling out for the utmost effort and sacrifice. We expected that that call would be, so to speak, the last exercise in verbal warfare for the duration; that soon the real business of effort and sacrifice would begin for the Jews as one of the Allied nations; above all, that Jewish troops would be raised on the precedent of the Great war. That - so we thought - would make all verbal claims superfluous; a much stronger claim to a place "on the map" would be staked out in the actual firing lines. A nation with soldiers at the front can afford to leave argument alone till settlement negotiations begin; in

the mean time, the less her spokesmen say the clearer her soldiers speak up for her. In September we were quite ready to plunge into war work and switch off the political battering machine: assuming, of course, that the battering would also be switched off on the other side, and that our war work was wanted.

In both these assumptions we were mistaken. The Jews' war effort is not wanted, there is no desire to treat them as an Allied nation, or just a nation, or as any kind of entity at all; and the battering at the status quo in Palestine from the opposite side goes on crescendo. For, even if there is quibbling over what a "status quo" does or does not include under circumstances complicated by three years' rioting, one thing is beyond doubt: legal status quo ante in Palestine cannot include active encroachments by a White Paper which has never been ratified, never even discussed by the Council of the League of Nations.

This primary condition of truce has been authoritatively discarded from the very outset. The writer and his friends, as early as one week after the outbreak of the war, put the question to highest authority and received a clear answer.

The question, dated September the 10th, 1939, was addressed to the War Cabinet. This was its substance:

This Presidency^{x)} have the honour of calling the attention of H.H. Government to the fact that, the September session of the League of Nations Council having been postponed since die, no legal validity can now even provisionally be attached to last May's White Paper on Palestine.

This view has already been submitted to the Colonial Secretary; but this matter, especially under war time conditions, obviously transcends the competence of one single department and should be brought to the notice of the Government as a whole.

... The Permanent Mandates Commission was unanimous in recognising that that policy was not in accordance with the interpretation of the Palestine Mandate hitherto adopted by the Council of the League of Nations. Even that minority of three, who felt that the Council might perhaps not refuse, at its impending session, to change its former view and adopt the White Paper's interpretation, also agreed that that would mean a change.

x) Of the New Zionist Organisation

It is obvious, now that the Council's meeting has been postponed, that the Mandatory Government has no authority whatever to make changes of such a sweep in the interpretation of a Mandate whose only authoritative interpreter (and the British Government admits it) is the Council.

... The only correct way is to treat the White Paper as in English law one would treat a bill approved by Ministers but not yet granted assent by King in Parliament; and, in the mean time, it is obviously the former interpretation which should form the basis of legality."

The Whitehall view on this question came in a communication dated September 21st and written on behalf of the Prime Minister, to the effect

"that the policy of the White Paper still holds the field".

This brief correspondence is worth the reader's attention quite apart from the Palestine issue: such a strange little dissonance in the great solemn oratorio about all the mighty ones' duty to respect the Covenant and the supreme authority of the League, always to await Geneva's verdict and never to use the fait accompli trick by ~~unilateral~~ unilateral action, least of all against the weak... The dissonance could not be noticed in the noise of great

events excepting the small corner where the weak dwell. Yet it is like one of those tiny squeaks which prove that something is wrong somewhere in the big machinery.

X

It is no secret that great efforts are being made to translate this policy, which "holds the field", though it has no passport even to enter "the field", into decisive legislative acts. It has taken a serious intervention of opposition leaders with the Prime Minister to avert the issue of a Palestine ordinance prohibiting the sale of land to Jews in certain districts. For how long this breach of the Mandate has been averted no one can foretell. Strong influences are at work in Palestine, and in London at the Colonial Office, to create the fait accompli, the legal precedent proving that the White Paper is valid and has superseded the original Mandate.

In administrative practice there are many disquieting signs that the Palestine bureaucracy already feels inspired, even without waiting for the legal precedent, to treat the White Paper as its only guide book. This trend is especially prominent in two directions. The first is that of immigration. In all negotiations about the numbers to be admitted or refused, officials in Jerusalem and London openly quote the White Paper as their authority: the White

Paper has established that 25,000 refugees can be allowed to enter provided this and that: the White Paper definitely prohibits increasing such and such quota... The moral result of this conscious, deliberate, calmly ~~xxxxx~~ assertive disregard of legality in exalted quarters will be what it always must be - lawlessness underneath and all round, at the first opportunity. Some other practical results can already be seen, results which, despite the reticence of the British press, have become known and produced a painful impression: but the experience itself has been unfortunately thousandfold more painful. Between October 1939 and February 1940, over 2000 Jewish refugees were kept on the Danube "marooned" on four old barges. None of the four was fit to hold even 50 human passengers: they had to hold five to six ~~hundreds~~ each, with women and children. Before these people boarded the barges, probably at Bratislava, steamers had been chartered to take them on board at the estuary and convey them "illegally" to Palestine; so the barge trip was only meant to last a few days, downstream along the Danube from Bratislava to the Black Sea shore, in the mild autumn weather of the Balkan plains. But "official influences", ~~interruption~~ the source of which is more than easy to identify, intervened at Ankara and

Athens - and the chartered steamers, owned by Turkish and Hellenic subjects, were forced to denounce the contracts and withdraw. To replace them proved impossible, for - in addition to the same official pressure from the same easily indetifiable source- freights were mounting day by day to fabulous heights owing to the privileged position of the Mediterranean in the war. What especially drives the freight charges upward in the "illegal" immigration business is its own peculiar "war risk": if such a ship is caught in Palestine's territorial waters, the captain and crew will go to jail and the vessel will be confiscated. So those two thousand got stuck at the Danube estuary, permitted neither to land, nor to sail on, nor to sail back. In the meantime winter came and the river froze. The author, being a Dante fan, may be forgiven for recollecting that in that poets hiearchy of tortures Ice, landscape of Hell's ninth circle, is classed the most effective of all. People who were allowed to bring food to the barges earnestly and soberly report that some features of that plight were decidedly worse than anything experienced in Nazi concentration camps: no exercise, no room properly to stretch, for weeks and weeks in that horrible cold of this memorable winter. One at least of the brages was a disused oil tanker,

with unpanelled iron walls inside sweating cold moisture until the moisture froze. Two babies were born on that tanker...

A significant feature is the action of some ladies of the Bucarest British colony, headed by Miss Boyd (head-mistress of the English high school), Miss Gadge and Mrs. Wallie: they collected donations from among members of the colony and sent 100 beds for the babies and the old people, beside warm clothing and 75,000 lei. A stream of donations came from Balkanic Jewish communities, from Jews of America and Paris and South Africa. At the time of writing this chapter, early in February, the marooned refugees have been enabled to leave: by how many steamers, of what tonnage how many heads per ton, at what cost - all these details, probably as Dantesque in their way as the Danubian stage of their adventure, will only be told when it is over.

The closed door policy which is the cause of all this misery has no justification either in moral conscience or in law.

From the moral point of view, Palestine should be the last country to reject war fugitives. So far she has been spared by the war, in comparison not only with the countries from which those refugees fled but even with many a neutral land. She would only "do her bit" if she served as a refugee camp: apart from all National Home quibble, it

would be a great service to the Allies and to Europe. Lithuania, with not one tenth of the financial resources Palestine can summon for the purpose from all the world over, opens her gates almost daily to runaways crowding at her so-called "green bounday" near Vilna. Why is Palestine exempted?

From the view point of law - if the Mandate is the law - that Mandate prescribes that immigration of Jews be encouraged "under suitable conditions". What conditions can ever be more "suitable" than these: people driven by disaster, all humanity sympathising with their agony, half the world's governments on the search for lands where refugees could be absorbed, half a million Jews in 300 settlements promising to look after the newcomers, all the funds of Jewish charity ready to help? - But the Mandate has been superseded - by an illegal document.

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The other direction in which the new trend seems to point is even more disturbing: it is the tendency to suppress the Jewish self-defence organisation. There is unfortunately no other explanation for two recent events: 42 Jews were sentenced to long terms of imprisonment for armed drilling in November, 38 more in January. There is no precedent for this action in the history of Palestine under British rule since 1920. In that year, twenty one Jews were sentenced to penal servitude by a military court on a charge of preparing for armed self-defence; but the proceedings of that court were subsequently

(CH. XIV)

and mercilessly quashed by the Army Council. Since then never an attempt was made, either by civil or by military authorities in Palestine, to hamper the development of the force. Its existence was known to the authorities; during the anti-Jewish riots of 1921 and 1929 British police and military actually collaborated with what Tommies called "Jewish patrols"; during the 1936-1939 trouble this Jewish militia rendered invaluable service to the government and the troops, both by providing trained men for the official auxiliary police and by autonomous action. Cases can be ~~quoted~~ quoted when Jewish leaders were cordially thanked for it by British military chiefs. What happened since to cause a hunt after "Jewish illegal drilling"?

The only new thing that happened since the outbreak of the war ought to have produced quite the opposite result, an increase of mutual confidence between the government and the Jewish self-defence. One section of the latter, the "Irgun" (its full title is "the National Military Organisation"), had been responsible for active mass reprisals against the Arab terror in 1937-1939; it was the only part of the Jewish self-defence forces which could really be called "clandestine", not just unofficial as the remainder; and it possessed a secret broadcasting station in the country which was used for warnings, announcements and propaganda. A few days after the

outbreak of the war, the "Irgun" broadcasted a declaration of loyalty to the Allies, of willingness to cooperate with the government for the defence of Palestine and on any other front, and of resolve to "cease fire" and call a truce with the Arabs. In official circles this change of heart was acknowledged, one might even say that in some respects it was handsomely acknowledged. What happened since that, a few weeks later, it should be rewarded by what looks like a minor crusade?

The thing is without precedent even in a wider sense. The only other country where Jewish self-defence has ever functioned as a permanent institution, beside Palestine, was Czarist Russia. In 1905, in Odessa, the author was present when the Oxford-blue uniformed gendarmerie, the Czar's equivalent of the present OGPU, invaded a Jewish family's flat at night in search of revolutionary literature. Of that they found none, but they found a parcel of freshly-printed manifesto, bearing the name of a Jewish self-defence organisation - a perfectly illegal body - and urging the Jews to arm and drill and resist pogroms. "This is none of my business", said the officer in charge waving the parcel away, "this has nothing to do with subversive political activity".

This seemed to be the rule throughout the period, till the fall of the Romanoffs. One does not recollect one single instance of serious police attack on Jewish self-defence bodies or their modest arms stores. There was some queer strain of brigands fair play in the psychological make up of that police system: they neve stopped a pogrom, they were often suspected of staging pogroms, but at least they felt the Jews ought to be given a chance to fight pogroms.

After the Czar'd downfall, Odessa - the largest Jewish community in the Ukraine - for two years of the civil war (1918-19) was garrisoned by a volunteer body called the Jewish Fighting Company. It was uniformed, barracked, and rather well armed. It was of course entirely illegal; but the thirteen governments that followed one another in occupying the city (the French, the Greeks, the White Russians, the Bolsheviks, the Ukrainians, et j'en oublie) all respected the illegal Jewish self-defence. - Its organiser, S.Y. Jacobi, then a boy of twenty, settled subsequently in England dreaming, some day, to repeat the experience on a much larger scale, under the British aegis; but he died last November, and the British aegis does not seem to be available for the purpose anyhow.

Neither the author nor anyone else suggest that the regimes can be compared. But the fact remains that in Palestine anti-Jewish terror had been allowed to drag on for years; there is no doubt that the government genuinely wanted to stop it, some may even admit that they "did all they could" to stop it. - but apparently what they "could" was not enough. Why, then, should a decent administration fail to observe an unwritten law which even Czarism, even chaos, respected?

The question was recently put, in formal writing, to the proper authority in London. The official reply, dated November 29th, was that the Colonial Secretary

"is unable to admit that any justification exists for the illegal arming and military training of Jews in Palestine".

"No justification"; written ~~very recently~~ in the winter of 1939, so soon after three years' experience of how little official protection can actually be given to Jewish settlements even in peace time; a fortiori now, perhaps on the threshold of unforeseeable complications. More than ever, preparadness for self-^{protection}~~protection~~ should be "justified" now. There is no logic, no justice, no elementary care for the safety of an exposed minority in this attitude; but there is method - it is the White Paper policy, resentful of all that smacks of the Jewish

Statehood dream, that tries to "hold the field".

It would be ridiculous Don Quixotry for the Jew, lesser partner to the truce, had there been a truce, to play the silly game of nobless oblige where it just obviously does not. War or no war, the major partner has decided that the debate on Palestine's future shall go on, and we follow suit.

CHAPTER XV

"Stealing a march on the Jews" may not be a complimentary formula, but this is the impression shared by all observers in Palestine watching the inroads of the White Paper policy on the dwindling status quo. Yet the most alarming aspect of this system of encroachment is its inevitable futility, futility even from the point of view of its authors and abettors. They produced the 1939 White Paper to placate the Palestinian Arabs; they are showing such hasty eagerness to "implement" it without even a show of legitimacy for the same purpose - that the Arab nationalist party may feel satisfied, those authors and abettors of the anti-Mandate policy try to silence the complaints by the same argument - that this method is sure to calm the Arabs and keep them from insisting on further concessions.

The optimistic outlook is an illusion. The Jews have been deeply hurt and injured by the White Paper of May 1939, but that is not enough to say that the Arabs have been "bought" by its charm and promise. Not one single Arab nationalist in Palestine, no matter whether a Husseini man or a Nashashibi man, has ever for a moment been deceived into regarding the White Paper as in any way satisfactory, except as a blow to the Zionists - never as containing one

single item of real positive value to Arab aspirations - never anything but a stepping stone for to-morrow's renewed offensive. And in this negative appreciation, moreover, these Arabs from their point of view are perfectly right: a blow to Jewish hopes - it is an equally nasty blow to Arab aspirations.

It may be useful here to reproduce a short analysis of this White Paper as seen through the eyes of a group of intelligent Palestinian Arabs. It has been conveyed to the writer, immediately after the publication of that document, by reliable friends in close touch with those circles; but its main reliability is the inner evidence of its very sound logic which cannot but commend itself to the reader.

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From the Arab point of view, the only good thing in the White Paper is that it explicitly rejects the Jewish State idea and promises to stop further immigration (or to make it dependant on the Arabs, consent, which amounts to the same) after 75,000 more Jews have been admitted in five years. Also the decision to prohibit land sales to Jews, outside of districts which already are predominantly Jewish, is a good thing - although in this respect any law can easily be evaded. No immigration is

a much more solid thing: it is actually the main point, even more essential than the rejection of the Jewish State principle. Taking all the three items together, this aspect of the White Book is excellent - provided it proves durable.

As to the durability of British White Papers on Palestine the Arabs, judging by precedent, have no especial confidence. The official attitude towards the "Jewish State" claim, for instance, has been illuminated in quite a long ~~and~~ chain of authoritative documents - in each one different from the other. In 1922 the Churchill White Paper formulated it in five pages of prose so ~~xx~~ eloquent and so involved that no one could properly make out whether the government did or did not want to preclude the transformation of Palestine into a Jewish State; but later Mr. Churchill himself confessed to the Royal Commission that there was nothing in that text to preclude such a development. Then the Royal Commission found that the only way really to fulfil the Mandate's obligation to the Jews was to give them a Jewish State somewhere in Palestine; and a 1937 White Paper, the Partition paper, was issued accordingly. A year later, the partition plan was discarded; and now, in 1939, there is a White Paper stating that the government is unequivocally against a Jewish State. Very good; but one cannot help feeling uneasy as to whether this Paper is the

last in what seems to be a world of shifting papers.

For such it seems to be. Take the Legislative Council issue. The 1922 White Paper "established" in Palestine a Legislative Council with an Arab majority; but another White Paper, published also in 1922, cancelled it. In 1930 the Passfield White Paper "established" it again. A Legislative Council with an Arab majority: and it never came into existence. In 1935, the Wauchope White Paper promised it finally and definitely - ~~xx~~ a L.C. with an Arab majority; and again nothing came of it; and then the Royal Commission's Report stated that the scheme was impracticable; and now even this new White Paper contains no elective legislature. Three White Papers wasted!

Or take Jewish immigration. The 1922 White Paper promised to tone it down; at that time there were less than 100,000 Jews in Palestine. A few years later the number was doubled. Then, in 1930, the Simpson Report showed that no further immigration was economically permissible, and the Passfield White Paper was published and we hoped that the flood would stop. At that time there were already 200,000 Jews. A few years later the number was again doubled: 400,000 in 1936, and nearly half a million now. One must really not be surprised if the Arabs sometimes think that White Paper and waste paper are synonyms. In any case, a White Paper gives no doubt a precise and genuine indication

of what a government wanted when it was published; but that is no indication of what the government may want a year later.

So, grateful as the Arabs were for all these good intentions, they would appreciate them much more if there was in the White Paper a real guarantee that those intentions would not be dropped at the next turning of the road. What constitutes a real guarantee? There is only one answer: an Arab government, and immediately. Before the road has had time to turn.

This is only one reason why the Arabs wanted "an Arab government immediately": even to "implement" the purely negative aspect of the White Paper,--the removal of the Jewish danger - it was, to them, indispensable. But the negative aspect is, of course, to them only a secondary matter. They are above all patriots, and the paramount matter to them is their positive ideal, the Arab State. This is what they had fought for during those difficult three years. They even did not put it so bluntly - "Arab government"; their official formula sounded more moderate: "a government of Palestinians on which the Jews also be invited to share while the Arabs, of course, hold the majority".. But the main point was: at once. The life of a White Paper is very short; having to deal with legislators so moody, hard cash is the thing; for pledges are music of the future with more music than future.

In this they were disappointed. The White Paper promises to grant Palestine "independence" - what it calls "independence" - only in ten years time, and that only if the Mandatory government (of 1949) will find it advisable. Listen to this: "If, at the end of ten years, it appears to H.M. Government that, contrary to their hope, circumstances require the postponement of the establishment of the independent State" - they will postpone it "with a view to achieving the desired objective at the earliest possible date". Which means, in practice, that if the Jews about that time start crying that the Arabs oppress them, and provoke riots in a couple of towns with a couple of dozen casualties on both sides, and their friends in the House of Commons make the usual kind of speeches, there will be no "independence". From the Arab point of view, all this is a Jewish victory: the Jews always insisted that Palestine should only become independent when they agree to it; and this is what the White Paper has promised them, in veiled but transparent terms.

Still worse, from the Arab point of view, is the picture of that independence itself, if they ever live to see, as defined in the White Paper. Great Britain "will require to be satisfied that adequate ~~xxx~~ provision has been made" for the following matters:

a) "The security of, and freedom of access to, the Holy Places, and the protection of the interests and property of the various religious bodies". Every Palestinian knows what it means: administration of the Walled City of Jerusalem and parts of Nazareth, Bethlehem and Hebron; control of the railways leading to these places; control of all arrangements regulating the relations between the various churches including Moslems and Jews. In particular, the Wailing Wall business will remain outside of Arabs' jurisdiction.

b) "The protection of the different communities in Palestine in accordance with the obligations of H. M. Government to both Arabs and Jews and for the special position of the Jewish National Home". This means all the legislative and administrative activity regarding education, representation on municipalities, justice in all cases where both peoples are affected, the rights of the two languages in public life, treasury grants to hospitals and innumerable other items covering practically the whole field of public life in a country like this.

c) "Such requirements to meet the strategic situation as may be regarded as necessary ...". In other words, military garrisons.

d) "The interests of certain foreign countries ...". In other words, finger in Palestine's "independent" Foreign Office.

For all this, the future constitution of Palestine will have to contain "adequate" safeguards. The Arabs think they know what it means. The British will say that, just as strategic responsibilities cannot be safeguarded by paragraphs but only by British soldiers, so all the other responsibilities can only be safeguarded by British officials. They will be probably called "advisers"; and every Arab knows what that means. They know that an adviser is a British official attached to a native minister, ~~and the minister~~ and without that adviser's signature no order of that minister is valid; so that the adviser is really the minister, and the minister not even an adviser. Judging by the number of matters which will have to be safeguarded in this way, the Arab view is that, in comparison with this kind of independence, what any provincial burgomaster enjoys

would seem unfattered autocracy.

The truth about the 1939 White Paper, from the Arab point of view, is this: it is an attempt virtually to annex Palestine to the British Empire for ever and ever, using the Jewish National Home as a justification. As it can always be claimed that the Jews are afraid of the Arabs (the Jews will claim it with pleasure, as long as they are in a minority), Great Britain's supervision shall never cease. Whatever glorified name may be given that relationship - alliance, for instance - Palestine is to remain a British colony. This is the sense of the White Paper. Palestine shall never be able to join an Arab Federation - unless that Federation, too becomes "federated" into the British Empire.

It is obvious, from the Arab point of view, that this situation is entirely unacceptable. There has never even been a question of accepting it. Its only value which the Arabs recognise is its formal repudiation of the Jewish State idea. As to the rest of the White Paper, the next step will be a concerted Arab effort to wipe out every line of it.

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The writer's interest is diametrically opposed to that of the Palestine Arab nationalists, and it is not his business to make out a case for them; moreover, as

against the Jews he thinks they have no case at all, not against a government firmly set on carrying out the Jewish National Home policy up to the end. But against a policy aiming to bribe the Arabs by harming the Jews, the Arab case just quoted is unanswerable: the bribe is not even illusory - it simply does not exist. The White Paper has not, and could not have, satisfied the Palestinian Arabs.

Which means that at the first opportunity they can be expected to push their claims farther. This does not mean that the writer accuses them of disloyalty to the Allies: he does not deal in this kind of merchandise, he prefers to assume that all the peoples in contact with Britain and France are united in one purpose, delenda est Carthago. So is India; but India presses her demands right now during the war; and the Moslems of India, being in minority, are alarmed. Doubly so the Jews in Palestine: on the one hand, the White Paper policy, illegitimate as it is, is being pushed forward day by day, and one of the symptoms is a tendency to render the Jews defenceless; at the same time, the evolution of the war is more than likely to produce a situation where every Arab hothead will feel in duty bound to exclaim "now or never", and proceed to transform Palestine into another Zone of Jewish distress.

So the controversy has been left open on the Arab side, too, and there has never been any indication that the Palestinian Arabs are prepared to call a truce on the subject. On the Mandatory Government's side, as we have seen, there is a deliberate active policy in a direction which is the opposite of a political truce.

It remains for the Jews, then, to take up their side of the uninterrupted controversy. The future of Palestine is on the war day's agenda, by the will of factors over which we have no control, and no time should be lost in pressing for the claim that Palestine, on both sides of the Jordan, is the only "suitable" site for that Jewish State which, being the only remedy against Europe's cancer, is the world's urgent need.

Chapter XXI
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THE MAX NORDAU PLAN

1.

The late Max Nordau, Herzl's collaborator in founding political Zionism, was probably the most revolutionary thinker of the fin de siècle generation. In 1919 he was old and ailing, far on the sunset way of what had once been a bitterly contested yet world-wide literary fame, but still a great intellectual force equipped by a rare wealth of erudition. That was the honeymoon period of the Balfour Declaration, and Max Nordau offered a plan how to make the best use of it once and for all. It was the immediate and simultaneous transportation to Palestine of the first half million immigrants from the East European ghettos.

The leading Jewish circles of the period did not respond, and the plan was forgotten. Now the time has arrived to revive it as the only practical and reasonable way to cope with a situation incomparably more urgent than that of 1919. Max Nordau's projects were concerned with Palestine only; so are, in ~~time~~ true intention, the suggestions of the present writer; but for the sake of formal plausibility, the following outline can be expressed in terms applicable to any "suitable area", provided the area is to become the Jewish State and to absorb the great exodus.

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Adapted to present conditions, the Max Nordau Plan can be summarised as follows:

1. All the exodus to take about 10 years.
2. The first ~~million~~ million settlers to be transferred within the first year or less.
3. All planning to be done during the war, so that work can start on the morrow of the peace conference.

Expressed in a form less abrupt, it would mean:

1. The transfer to the Settlement Country of all the Jews of East Central Europe who may voluntarily register for the purpose, shall be effected within a period not surpassing ten years.
2. The first million settlers, roughly selected as to age and health, shall be ^{simultaneously} transferred/at the very start of the migration within the minimum time indispensable for the technical operation of transport not surpassing one year.
3. All preliminary planning as to the methods of settlement, financial arrangements and any other relevant matters, should be accomplished as far as possible during the war, by the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees reinforced by the addition of Jewish representatives, or by another suitable body to be established for the purpose.

The actual transportation of the First Million to the Country of Settlement shall begin within the shortest possible interval after the close of hostilities, as soon as the necessary international loan has been raised and a rough selection of settlers completed.

It is not the author's intention here to attempt a systematic presentation of the Max Norday Plan. A good comprehensive outline, with almost more figures than text, was published by Dr. S. Klinger - "The Ten Year Plan for Palestine", New Zionist Press, London 1938. In the following paragraphs only some of the less specialised aspects of the scheme will be pointed out. They are:

the tempo;

manufacture, not agriculture, as the base of

mass-immigration economy;

the method of planning;

the financial scheme.

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21 years ago, criticism of Max Nordau's idea was based on the assumption that mass colonisation "must" be a very slow process. This assumption was then considered a "scientific" truth admitting no exception. It is hardly so considered now, after a number of experiences in quick displacement of human masses since the Great War. The Greek exodus of 700,000, so often quoted, was not the only example: between 1919 and 1924, 2,450,000 people (of 1,600,000 Greeks, 758,000 Moslems, and others) changed places between the Balkans and Asia Minor, with results which even neutral observers hold to be much more satisfactory than the position obtained before the migration. Those masses not only travelled fast - they proved also very fast in getting absorbed in the new countries' economy.

Yet, should we even accept the alleged "rule" that the economic absorption of immigrants is a slow process, their actual transfer to the Country of Settlement can obviously be accelerated at will: and this is the essence of the Max Nordau Plan.

Its advantages, outside of the Settlement Country, will be many and far-reaching. The tension in East Central Europe will immediately be reduced. Roughly, 300,000 Jews will be at once assisted to emigrate from Germany and Austria, 500,000 from Poland, 100,000 each from Hungary and Roumania. Still more efficient will be the assurance,

inherent in the very essence of a Jewish State, that the process will continue: an assurance which will go a long way to paralysing racial strife. Weighed against this, all the hardships of an overcrowded Newland are a trifling matter, especially to people who, just recently, have seen worse.

this effect of the exodus on the inter-racial atmosphere in the Zone must be further strengthened and perpetuated by the rule that the best age for the First Million pioneers is the age of intense child-bearing fertility. Among Jews in Eastern Europe it is, approximately, from 25 to 40 for men, from 23 to 37 for women. The Zionist prejudice in favour of sweet seventeen will have to be discarded: at least two thirds of the First Million will have to be young maturity rather than early youth. People of young maturity are quite adaptable for pioneer tasks in a not too exotic climate; and, as they are chiefly responsible for the nation's birth rate, it is most important that they should not be left behind to refill the gap but should do their best in the new country.

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In dealing with mass-migration of this character, one traditional premise of political economy must be disregarded: it is the axiom that the bas of society is agriculture. That may be so, but has no bearing on our mission. Here a different axiom dominates: the sinews of mass-migratic economy, in our day, is industry. It is obvious that in a colonising enterprise of such magnitude, especially when speed is imperative, agriculture as an absorber of large immigrant masses is less than secondary. For numbers, mass immigration economy leans, above all, on manufactures and house building; far behind these, on trade and transport; ver far behind these, on farming.

This has nothing to do with the future of the colony: even if it is desired that the Settlement Country should in the end become a predominantly bucolic community, precedence in the beginning will have to be given to industry, letting agriculture come last and grow slowly until it conquers - if it can.

This rule is of dominating importance to every aspect of our colonisation.

It overrides the traditional attitude to soil and water. A flourishing industrial city, feeding thousands of people, can be built on stony soil where no farmer could thrive. Water of the poorest quality, unfit for the irrigation of fields, can be used in boilers to drive steam engines. In agriculture it may not pay to carry the water in pipelines over a long distance or to sink reservoirs for

rain-water deep enough to reduce evaporation: but what is too expensive for the slow conservative profits of corn growing, might prove worth while if it helps to produce footgear and earthenware.

Geographical planning - i.e. mapping out the sites where the future dwelling centres shall be established - also becomes much easier. It need no longer, in a country with few perennial rivers, be subordinated to the results of slow and uncertain borings for underground water: the suitable sites can be chosen for reasons immediately visible - because near to the sea shore, or because convenient as a marketing centre for a number of existing villages, or because it is a cross-roads, or because there is a quarry nearby. State-planning, when approached under this angle, becomes almost akin to town-planning: future cities can be rationally marked all over the empty map of the State-area in the same way as future green squares over the empty map of a projected town, and highroads be traced with the same logical forethought as main streets.

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Basing our calculations on the supremacy of industry has also another advantage: modern society spends incomparably more on the consumption of manufactured goods than on the consumption of agricultural produce. Immigrants concentrating on industry can supply a much larger proportion of the new Settlement's needs than if they devoted themselves chiefly to agriculture.

The calculations, expressed schematically, is very simple. One million people will need a very large mass of non-agricultural and non-pastoral goods. A certain part of that mass will have to be imported, because the Settlement Country cannot supply them, (e.g. raw materials or the heavier kinds of machinery). But the balance can be provided locally, and the largest possible part of that must be provided by the First Settlement forces themselves. In other words, the scheme will be to let the First Million feed and clothe and house the First Million in the maximum measure of possibility.

This method of computing the First Settlement's economy will always largely retain the nature of an abstract ~~sketch~~ schematic framework, and will have to be readjusted to realities. Nevertheless, the framework will prove most useful in helping solve the fundamental question of all new communities - "how will they manage to live by taking each other's washing".

All humanity lives by taking each other's washing, without any outside financial help as there is no other planet able to supply it. The Jewish settlement will have the advantage of considerable outside assistance, represented by the International Loan and, subsequently, by the ~~yearly~~ yearly income of national funds raised among the Western communities. But the basis of its initial economy must be an attempt to approach a provisional "autarky" as much as possible.

This indicates the character of the enterprises which should be started at once. In a land of large agricultural possibilities, the main effort should of course be directed to agriculture. In a land where land and water are, for the moment, scarce, the chief lines of activity will have to be house building, road building, transportation, and all kinds of light industry to provide elementary consumers' goods - rough clothing, rough furniture, rough crockery and every other primary need that can be satisfied "roughly" by local effort.

A short period will in practice elapse between the conclusion of the peace conference and actual start of the transportation: probably not less than a year. This period could be utilised to give the First Settlement candidates opportunities for rough training in the rudiments of those branches of labour (mainly industrial and building) which they are likely to join after arrival on the spot. Their output will be very poor at first, and therefore uneconomical: which, weighed in the proper balance, does not matter in the least.

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c) Starting productions directly the primitive buildings for any of the planned industries are ready, machinery and raw materials will be imported, workers engaged and the production will begin.

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A very large international loan will have to be raised. It is beyond the writer's very limited erudition to guess how large it will have to be. In Dr. Klinger's outline, the total of money required for the settlement of the initial million is set at \$47,500,000, including 18,000,000 of private investment by individual capitalists: but he wrote it in January 1938 and had in mind conditions very different from those that may be expected to exist at the end of the war. Secondly, his figures cover only the actual colonising operations in the "Settlement Country", leaving out the other side of the migration process, the financing of the departure from Europe. The amount which will be needed to finance all the aspects of the Max Nordau Plan will probably be much bigger than Dr. Klinger's estimate. How large a proportion of it will come from private investments will depend on whatever may be left of the resources of the Jewish capitalist class taken as a whole throughout the non-ruined parts of the Dispersion.

The international loan will have to finance the following operations:

a) Liquidation and export of the emigrants' property. In assuming that any of that property be left at the

end of the war, East Central Europe will be so impoverished that its removal can only be envisaged as a gradual process, so slow as not to disarrange local economy. Special organs will have to be established, probably banks, for granting the emigrant advances against any kind of property he may leave in their hands for liquidation.

b) Transportation. - The only reasonable way to cope with the transportation of such masses will be for the Jews to found one or several big shipping companies of their own. The Settlement Country will need a commercial ~~fleet~~ ~~employment~~ fleet both during and after the rush; and a new field of employment - manning the ships - will be opened before thousands of young Jews.

c) The actual settlement: - house building for the initial camping and the new sites; hightoad, aqueducts, rainwater storages; all public works in general.

d) Establishment of factories not provided for by private capital (but probably - unless Western Europe and America are also ruined) the bulk of that development will be financed by private capital alone).

e) Health, schools, public security.

f) Administrative expenditure.

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The repayment of this international loan, principal and interest,, will probably be regarded even by the hard-boiledest of business men as reasonably safe. The shares will, of course, be borne entirely by Jews, mainly by the new Settlement itself. Various collaberal securities can be foreseen: the one most obviously apt to guarantee the regular service of this Public Debt will be the Custom House income of the Settlement Country (or the increase of that income due to the new immigration, so as not to encroach upon the interests of the pre-Norday Plan population).

Another source may be discovered if the enemy countries, under the future peace treaty, will have to pay indemnities. The indemnity clauses of Versailles have left a bad taste, and there is at present a strong prejudice against the usual catchword "Let the enemy pay". But this attitude mustnot necessarily be pushed too far. Mr. Norman Angell has no doubt most convincingly proved that making the enemy pay for his belligerent conquerors' damages is a transaction ruinous to those conquerors themselves. But damage done to private citizens in Poland, as well as in Germany and Austria itself, is quite a different question. It will hardly be found unfair that the perpetrator of that damage should, at least, have to accept a share of the Public Debt made to save his victims.

Yet another possible source of income for its payment would be the introduction of a special tax by the Western Jewish communities. The idea need not be taken as "terrible". The right of ~~taxation~~ compulsory self-taxation by religious communities was recognised in Germany and Austria when they were still perfectly respectable. It is a much more dignified way of raising income than its alternative which must unfortunately be applied in countries where no community tax can be imposed: this alternative consists in waiting till the non-contributing member is recalled to his Creator, and then asking an exorbitant price for his burial. Secondly, West-European and American Jews have always raised considerable funds for relief in the East and for Palestine, and will no doubt go on doing so: but when it has to be done by propaganda, a large proportion of the collected sums gets unavoidably swallowed by expenses of the campaign. It will be to everyone's advantage if all these noisy and not ~~always~~ always elegant methods are replaced by honest clean taxation. At the same time, if a part of that taxation could be earmarked for the service of the Jewish Settlement Debt, it would increase the impression of its stability and would very favourably influence the conditions of the loan.

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The technique of building a new country under such conditions is, of course, not a subject matter for a guessing layman's page. It will ~~it~~ take many months of planning by specialists: but all the framework of the plan ought to be completed, so far as possible, during the war. Only the finishing touches of the technical scheme, the actual launching of the loan, and the appointment of the people in charge of the work, should be left over till after the peace conference.

What can be foretold about the technical plan is an obvious thing: it will probably deal with the First Million only (subsequent repatriations, being slower, will be more like ordinary migration, needing perhaps no special planning at all); and there will be three stages to consider - the initial camping of the newcomers; the construction of the new centres - mostly industrial centres - on the appointed spots; and the start of good ~~ex~~ production.

The first stage would be a formidable ^{by the rough} and ready method of billeting. In our case, however, billeting will probably be an exception: as the flow of newcomers is to be a permanent feature, it will be worth while to build. They will be a fluctuating population, batch after batch going off to other places; during the First Million's repatriation, probably over one third of that number will need some kind of hutment accommodation. This gives as an outline of the first item of the scheme: to build, in the neighbourhood of the existing Jewish colonies,

Difficulty in a country where there are no Jewish colonies. In a country where there are already Jewish towns, Jewish quarters, mixed cities and about 300 Jewish villages large and small and scattered in a considerable area, the task is much simpler.

Theoretically and "schematically" speaking where half
a million people dwell (not uncomfortably) &
another half a million could at
once be provisionally accommodated -
~~by the way~~

barrack-rooms for some 300 to 400 thousand pioneers.

The second step to begin on the morrow of the first arrivals, will consist in building that country-wide chessboard of workshops which is to play a double role: to supply as much as possible of the First Million's needs, and to employ all the First Million's breadwinners, probably some 600,000 in all. Some will be dispatched to build the highroads, leading as yet from nowhere to nowhere but to-morrow chief arteries; some will be told off to lay water-pipes, dig cisterns, sink wells before there is anyone near them to drink; some will have to put up corrugated iron shanties where later on machinery will be installed; ~~many~~ some, not numerous, will be sent to plough and sow. There will be a chapter in the technical plan: a million people will need a million chairs to sit on; that means so and so many H.P. and so and so many hands; that must be so distributed as to form twelve factories, one here, one there, one tight across: the shanty you are building now is one of them, number five. There will be another chapter of the same kind for butchers, another for dentists, another for lorry-drivers, precise and complete with all the numbers and places as an army mobilisation plan. - One of the most fascinating, the most providentially clever features of human planning is that it never comes off as it was laid down: but if the plans are good, what comes off differently will always, in the end, turn out to be still better.

The third stage will be the actual start of the goods production, their delivery, their storage and sale, and the myriads of individual gestures which all this entails and which together constitutes a nation's economy: in other words, the birth of the nation.

All this is how a layman imagines a performance which experts will know how to formulate much better: but in the end it will amount to the same, a splendid reality.

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Now the pseudonym can be dropped, and we come back to Palestine as the only "area" where that performance is destined to be enacted.

Palestine is a country enjoying a bearable climate and presenting a not by any means exceptional mixture of great natural advantages and still greater natural drawbacks. The absorptive capacity of such a country depends above all, not on those natural features but on the kind of men that inhabit or desire to inhabit it; on their intelligence, skill, endurance, will power, resourcefulness, financial means, and world-connections making for assistance and trade.

One does not wish to sound disrespectful to Doctors of Colonisation, but it is a fact that the many experts who have in recent years made pronouncements on the settlement prospects of Palestine have all contradicted each other. The pronouncements somehow lack solidity, do not sound "scientific", do not look to be final. Sir John Hope Simpson, in 1930, found - in

substance - that the only really cultivable land in Western Palestine was the land actually then ~~under~~ under cultivation - 8 million dunam out of a total area of 36 million. The Royal Commission's Report (1937) ~~dismissed~~ dismissed that verdict by admitting frankly that nobody really knew anything as to whether the wasted area be cultivable or not, and that the first thing to start with ought to be a geophysical and hydrographical survey, which should also extend to Transjordan. As to Transjordan, the 1935 Report of the Mandatory to the Mandates Commission estimated that only about 5% of its area could be considered cultivable^{x)}. 5% of Transjordan's area is 1,150,000 acres, or 4,500,000 "dunams". But two years later, in August 1937, Mr. Ormsby Gore - as *Lord*

^{x)} Schechtmann, "Transjordanien", Vienna, 1937, p.171

~~also extend to Transjordan.~~ Mr. Crosby Gore ~~as Lord~~
 Harlech still was called when he was Colonial Secretary -
 went even farther and in addressing (August 1937) the
 Mandates Commission in Geneva grew recklessly optimistic
 about Transjordan, also quoting experts. "One of our most
 experienced agricultural officers", he stated, "says
 he is confident 100,000 families could be settled in
 Transjordan alone" (Minutes of the 32nd Session, p.22).
 As he spoke of settling there Arabs, not Jews, and as the
 Government's idea of an average lot viable for an Arab
 family is 140 dunams^x) that expert obviously implied that
 there are in Transjordan about 14 million cultivable
 dunams over and above any areas already exploited by the
 inhabitants on the spot. Yet the Woodhead Commission
 which studied the question in 1938 did not confirm that
 expert's finding, etc.etc.

The chief question ("chief" only from the point
 of view of agriculture, which is by no means the chief
 avenue for mass colonisation) is water for irrigation. The
 Woodhead Commission's Report devotes a painstaking
 chapter to this matter, only to show that nothing is
 really known on the subject, and next to nothing has been
 done to learn anything about it. The report says that

x) Woodhead ("The Palestine Partition Commission's") Report
 1938, p. 29: "The average for taxable crop land, 140
 dunams".

"the Beersheba sub-district has an area nearly equal to that of the whole of Palestine, and quotes Sir John Hope Simpson to the effect that "given the possibility of irrigation, there is practically an inexhaustible supply of cultivable land in the Beersheba area". Yet, to investigate so vital a matter, sixteen borings for water all told have been made in that area, at the cost of £60,000. The results have been "mostly disappointing". Perhaps: but that was no survey to speak of. A government really bent on constructive issues, especially when for years its treasury accounts show comfortable ~~excess~~ surplusses of revenue over expenditure, should spend a million pounds and make hundreds of borings in an area so vast and so important for settlement.

The question of Palestine's agricultural possibilities awaits a really serious survey: so far there has not been a single step made in that direction solid enough to justify any conclusion.

But it is a naive error to treat agriculture as the main basis of immigration economy. For a century and more, when countries grow it is no longer an account of their agriculture. Countries with the greatest density of population have the smallest percentage of people living by the plough and the pasture. Germany (density 360 per square mile), has 24%; Holland (618 per sq.m.) 20%; Belgium (702 per sq. m.) 16%; England and Wales (703 per sq.m.) 8%.

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Western Palestine's total rural population to-day is about 650,000: at Germany's model that alone, without any increase in the number of farmers, could form a sufficient agricultural "basis" for a total population of over 2,500,000; at the Dutch model, for a total of 3,250,000; at the English model, for a population of over 8,000,000 souls. These latter fancy figures lay, of course, no claim to any serious value, but they certainly are a reminder that the absorptive capacity of a country as a whole has very little to do with the absorptive capacity of its farmland.

~~The future density of Palestine, as that of any other country, depends on manufacture and trade. From this point of view, her water problems assume a different character: not the quantity available for irrigating acres but that ~~xxxxx~~ available for drinking and steam-producing is the decisive factor in immigration ~~xxxxxxxx~~ policies; and that water need not be on the spot but may be anywhere within reasonable aqueduct distance.~~

Far more important than soil and irrigation water, from the viewpoint of immigration policy, is the other "natural" advantage - the geographical position of a country. Nearly all the main sea routes between West and East cross the Suez Canal; so do the main air lines; so will the main land routes of the future, linking Capetown to Damascus and Peking. ~~xxxx~~ All that corner of the Mediterranean where Egypt and Palestine wait for their chance is the most important cross-roads of to-morrow's world. Its real hinterland is not

~~Just~~ Arabia: it is the whole of that South-Eastern corner of Asia where one half of all humanity dwell - India, ~~China~~ China, Indochina, Malaya, the Dutch Indian Islands, the Philippines - nearly one billion men and women. Their foreign trade, imports and exports together, averages to-day about £3 perhead annually. In Denmark it is £40 per head. Those countries advance, their requirements grow: some day their overseas trade will double, some remoter day it will reach the Danish level. Imagination fails to realise the monstrous avalanche of goods which will then be driven by sea, air and land to and from between the two halves of humanity: practically half of it passing over that corner of the world where Palestine and Egypt await their future. Crossroad districts are populous districts. Palestine will some day be among the most densely populated countries on earth. That is a remote future, but every decade brings it tangibly nearer.

x x x

~~The Max Nordau Plan applied to Palestine, includes inevitably Transjordan: Let us dispose of a curious widespread misconception: most people seem to think that in Arab eyes that part of Palestine is infinitely more sacred than the Western strip. People seem to think: If~~

Palestine on both sides of the Jordan has an area of about 40,000 square miles. Its total population to-day, West and East of the river, is 1,600,000, Jews and Arabs together. At the density of France it could hold over 8 million inhabitants: and France's density is one of the lowest among the industrialised countries of Europe.

x x x

But even high densities only produce big numbers if the land is big enough. To absorb the Jewish exodus Palestine must inevitably include the colonisation of Transjordan. Western Palestine contains only 10,000 square miles, Transjordan 30,000. Population west of the Jordan, 1,300,000; population east of the river, only 300,000.

We are discussing business in this book, eminently grave business, business of Europe's and all the world's health and sanity: thus, and in no other way, will the question of Palestine be discussed at the peace conference, too. The area wanted to save Europe's stepchildren must be large enough to house them. This is not a question of a spiritual centre, of a slightly enlarged and glorified varsity ~~quadrangle~~ quadrangle where the Jews could parade their cultural excellence: this is a grim matter of numbers, of hunger and need, of square inches to stand upon and cubic feet of air to breathe. A reception area covering 40,000 square miles, with an average ~~of~~ density of 40,

can be reasonably considered for the quick reception of several millions: but not an area a quarter that size, and with 130 inhabitants per square mile already on the spot.

All this is very palpably obvious, and all reticence can only lead to mutual deceit. Nor is there really any need for reticence. A curious atmosphere of taboo has been created around the name "Transjordan": a sort of myth or superstition, to the effect that just Transjordan, in Arab eyes, is an especially sacred portion of Palestine's soil, infinitely more valuable and more intangible than the Western strip; that if these Arabs so stubbornly begrudge us the acres of Sharon and Galilee,

those Arabs grudge us Sharon and Galilee, their reaction would be infinitely more violent if we touched ~~the~~ Gilead! - This is a fallacy. It is only Western Palestine that contains Moslem shrines at Jerusalem and Hebron; Transjordan has hardly any place at all on the front pages of Islam's tradition. Nor, in the history of the Arabs as ~~xxxxx~~ a nation, can Amman or Es-Salt claim the same interest as Jaffa and Acre. What is equally important is the fact that there are 900,000 Arabs (Moslem and Christian) West of Jordan as against only 320,000 on the Eastern Shore; the great feudal families, the intelligentsia, the industrial and commercial bourgeoisie of the Palestinian Arabs, whatever their number and value, dwell almost exclusively West of the river, and regard the handful of Bedouin across the street as primitives. Should any Arab Nationalist, not only at Jerusalem, be forced by some compelling power to choose which he would prefer to keep if the other must be given to the Jews, he would certainly rather give the Jews Transjordan.

It is most important to disabuse public opinion, Jewish and Christian, of this delusion as to the comparative degree of our neighbours' and cousins' jealousy with regard to the two parts of Palestine. This delusion has always affected our energy in pressing for the opening

up of Transjordan; many a Zionist who already claims the sole ownership of Dan and Beersheba shrinks even from stating his case about Rabbat-Ammon as though fearing lest he tread on too delicate ground. But the ground is much less delicate here than in the first instance. Arab opposition to Jewish claims on Transjordan - once we really start pressing that claim - will be incomparably weaker than what we have ~~exp~~ experienced in the long-drawn battle for Western Palestine.

~~As to the legal position, here again a more precise analysis of legal facts may show that the obstacles are much less formidable than people imagine. The essential legal facts about Transjordan are these:~~

~~The Palestine Mandate was formally adopted by the League of Nations on July 24th, 1922; the term "Palestine" in its ~~xxx~~ text embraced also Transjordan. Art. 25 of the Mandate provided that "in the territories lying between the Jordan and the Eastern boundary of Palestine as ultimately determined, the Mandatory shall be entitled, with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations, to postpone or withhold application of such provisions of this Mandate as he may consider inapplicable to the existing local conditions".~~

~~Two months later, on September 23rd, the Council of the League "in pursuance of the provisions of this Article", passed a "resolution" stating that certain portions of the Palestine Mandate (all the portions referring to Zionist interests) "are not applicable to the territory~~

Nor is the legal position under the Mandate so formidable as some people imagine. There are times when hardly anyone cares about the legal aspects of international issues, least of all about a Mandate which the Mandatory Government itself treated as "unworkable" in 1937 and worse than that in 1939. The author, however, is old-fashioned enough to retain some interest in the legality of treaties; and he thinks, besides, that a moment will ~~xxx~~ soon come when this old fashion will again become the only reliable thing left on earth. It is therefore worth while to remember that in the Palestine Mandate the term "Palestine" embraces also Transjordan, and that this has never been changed. One of the Mandate's articles (article 25) only provided that "in the territories lying between the Jordan and the Eastern boundary of Palestine" the Mandatory "shall be entitled to postpone or withhold application of such provisions of this Mandate as he may consider inapplicable to the existing local conditions". Two months later, the Council of the League of Nations passed a "resolution" stating that the Zionist portions of the Palestine Mandate "are not applicable to the territory known as Transjordan". There is no word in that ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ "resolution" to specify whether this means "withholding" their application or only "postponing"; and such omission in such cases always indicate that the legislator foresaw, and prepared ~~xxx~~ for

This effect of the census on the population statistics of the Zone

~~This final and radical character of the census must be~~
~~be further strengthened~~
~~further perfected~~ by the choice of rule that the "optimum"
age of for

the contingency that the measure could some day be recalled. The very title "resolution", in comparison with the title "Mandate", clearly emphasizes a lesser degree of durability. In other words, it is perfectly reasonable and lawful to assume that the intent of the resolution was just to "postpone" the application of the Mandate's Zionist clauses to Transjordan in view of "existing local conditions"; what has been postponed can now be enacted without any breach of the Mandate.^{x)}

x x x

The real difficulty, of course, is not the "resolution" but the existence of a certain dynastic fact. One would feel rather awkward in the middle of this 20th century having to discuss dynastic facts of such obviously artificial origin as if they were decisive factors in a situation involving the fate of peoples. It is perhaps merepractical to leave it undiscussed; as, for different reasons, we have left aside the question of how a Max Nordau Plan could be fitted into the framework of an existing Mandate. Where there is good will, everything can be fitted into everything. What is perfectly clear ~~is~~ to all concerned is that where serious world's business is to be done, titles cannot stand ~~in~~ in the way.

^{x)} Schechtmann, "Transjordanien", Vienne 1937, p.259

Chapter XVII

The transformation of Palestine can be carried out to the full without dislodging the Palestinian Arabs. All current affirmations to the contrary are utterly wrong. A territory of over 100,000 square kilometers, settled at the average density of France (87 inhabitants per sq. k.) would hold over 8 million inhabitants; at the density of Switzerland (104), over 10 million; at the density of Germany or Italy (140), about 14 million. It now holds, counting Arabs and Jews and Transjordanians and all, just over one million and a half. There is margin enough left for Palestine to absorb in addition, the better part of East Central Europe's ghetto - the better part of five million souls - without coming anywhere near even the moderate density of France. Unless the Arabs choose to go away themselves, there is no need for them to emigrate.

Another fallacy is the assertion that for the Arabs to be a minority in a state predominantly Jewish would mean to be persecuted and oppressed. The last people to repeat this fallacy ought to be the authors of the 1939 White Paper. Since they assure that the Jews, condemned to remain a one-to-two minority in Palestine, would not only be oppressed but can even enjoy the delights of a Jewish National Home, what ground have they to suggest that it would be a disaster for the Arabs if the positions became reversed? It would be much

more logical for the authors of the White Paper to offer the Arab minority the same safeguards they consider sufficient for the happiness of a Jewish minority.

It is absurd to assume that an ethnical minority is always and everywhere an oppressed minority. It is not true. Scots outside of Scotland and Welshmen outside of Wales live scattered all over England, yet it is not suggested that their rights are being curtailed. So is the position of the Catholic French-speaking minority in the mixed province of Ontario the opposite of oppression. Soviet Russia has many sins, but no one can deny that her ethnical minorities enjoy a very reasonable equality of ~~expression~~ status - in so far as anything can be "enjoyed" in that political climate. Czechoslovakia was a model state in this respect; so is Finland, where the Swedish minority holds a position better even, in some respects, than that of Scots in Great Britain. Nothing is of course perfect on this earth, and there is no doubt that it is much more pleasant to be a majority than a minority even under the best imaginable conditions; but that does not mean that the status of a minority is everywhere and always a tragedy. It is not. Every great nation has fragments which form minorities in some one else's land: the English in South Africa, the French in Canada, Belgium and Switzerland, the Germans all over the world. Their position depends on the regime. Under a decent regime a

minority can live in reasonable contentment. The world has no right to assume that Jewish statesmanship is unable to create as decent a regime as that created by Canadian or Swiss statesmanship. After all, it is from Jewish sources that the world has learned the wisdom about the proper treatment of the "stranger within the gates".

There is only one case where to be a minority is a tragedy and a curse: it is the case of a nation which is only a minority, everywhere a minority scattered among strange races, with no corner of the earth to call her own and no home to go to. - But the Arabs have all Arabia, Irak and Syria on the East side of the Suez Canal; West of Suez, there is Egypt, Libya, Tunis, Algiers and Morocco. Some of these countries are already independent, others not yet; but in each one of them there is no question of any but Arabian majority, each one of them is an Arab national homeland.

X

It would be an idle pastime, at this stage, seriously to offer drafts of future constitutions. But some people may be genuinely worried about what would happen to the rights of the Palestinian Arabs if the country became a Jewish State. The author can at least give them an idea of what Jews themselves intend to do

in this respect when they are in a majority and Palestine a self-governing state. It may be especially significant for these readers to learn how the "extremist" wing of Zionism visualises the constitution of the Palestine of the future. The following extracts are quoted from a draft worked out by the Revisionist Executive in 1934, so les mauvaises langues may say that this is "the worst that can happen" to the Palestinian Arabs. The draft is not an official programme, and the writer is not prepared to back it in all its aspects. Still it was the result of much careful labour; a wide range of precedents had been studied, documents and volumes renowned and respected once upon a time when all the intelligentsia of East-Central Europe - which then included Russia - was infatuated with the Austrian Socialists' Nationalitäten-Staat theories: Rudolf Springer's books, the Minutes of the Bruenn congress of Austria's Sozialdemokratische Partei, the excellent Hungarian law of 1868 on the use of minority language in civil service communications, down to the old-Turkish legislation, truly remarkable, on the autonomy of the various ethno-religious communities whose official title was Millet - "nations" - Millet-i-Roum, Millet-i-Ermeni, Millet-i-Moussévié (Greek,

Armenian, Mosaic). It will be impossible hereto display all that erudition: only a few sections are worth quoting, dealing with civic equality, languages, so-called "cultural autonomy", the Holy Places, and land laws. Only the broad issues, no details. It will perhaps be sufficient to bear out the statement made by this writer before the Palestine Royal Commission: ^{deposition of 1946} that the Jews are ready to ^{guarantee to the Arabs} in a Jewish Palestine the maximum of the rights they claimed, but never got for themselves in other countries.

In reading this draft it should be remembered that according to the principle which is the alpha and omega of Revisionism, Palestine can be promoted to independent statehood only after the formation of the Jewish majority.

I. Civic Equality

1. Provided nothing be done to hinder any Diaspora Jew from repatriating to Palestine and, by doing so, automatically becoming a Palestinian citizen, - the principle of equal rights for all citizens of any race, creed, language, or class shall be enacted without limitation throughout all sectors of the country's public life.

In every Cabinet where the prime minister is a Jew, vice-premiership shall be offered to an Arab, and vice-versa.

Proportional sharing by Jews and Arabs both in the charges and in the benefits of the State shall be the rule with regard to Parliament elections, civil and military service, and budgetary endowments.

The same rule shall apply to mixed municipalities or county councils.

2. Languages

1. The Hebrew and the Arabic languages shall enjoy equal rights and equal legal validity.

2. No State law, proclamation, or ordinance; no coin, banknote, or stamp of the State; no publication or inscription produced at the State's expense shall be valid unless executed identically in both Hebrew and Arabic.

3. Both Hebrew and Arabic shall be used with equal legal effect in Parliament, in the Courts, or before any other office or organ of the State.

4. All offices of the State shall answer any applicant, orally and in writing, in the language of his application, whether Hebrew or Arabic.

3. Cultural Autonomy

1. The Jewish and the Arab ethno-communities^{x)} shall be recognised as autonomous public bodies of equal status before the law.

x) The word used in original is the Hebrew equivalent of "nationality". As in English the term denotes state allegiance rather than ethnical allegiance, this translation had to be invented.

Should the Christian Arabs, or any other group of citizens reasonably justified in claiming autonomy, also demand a measure of independent recognition, Parliament shall be entitled to grant the request.

2. The following matters shall be delegated by the State to each ethno-community with regard to its members:

- a) religion and personal status;
- b) education in all its branches and grades, especially in the compulsory elementary stages.
- c) charity including all forms of social assistance.
- d) settlement of minor law cases arising out of the above mentioned matters.

3. Each ethno-community shall elect its national Diet with the right to issue ordinances and levy taxes within the limits of the autonomy and to appoint a national Executive responsible before the Diet.

4. A permanent Minister of cabinet rank, independent of all parties, shall represent each ethno-community in the country's Government.

IV. The Holy Places

1. The relevant areas within the Old City of Jerusalem, to be delimited under the authority of the League of Nations, shall enjoy the same measure of extraterritoriality as that universally recognised in the case of Embassies.

2. Each of these areas shall constitute a municipality under a Council appointed by agreement between the ecclesiastic authorities concerned.

3. A similar régime shall apply, ~~mutatis~~ mutatis mutandis, to other Holy sites within the country.

4. Except in war, pilgrim permits of sufficient duration shall be freely granted to nationals of any State: subject only to genuine requirements of hygiene, traffic, and public safety, and provided any paupers among the pilgrims shall be maintained and repatriated at the expense of the respective ecclesiastic authority.

5. A delegate of the League of Nations, with the status of Ambassador, shall be appointed to represent the interests concerned.

V. Land

1. A Palestine Land Court shall be formed including among other members, also judges and agricultural experts belonging to both ethno-communities.

2. All the waste lands, as well as all lands inadequately cultivated in the Court's opinion, shall be requisitioned (under fair compensation in the case of the latter) to form the State's Land Reserve.

3. After improvement at the expense of the State, reclaimed areas of the Land Reserve divided into allotments shall be granted, at fair prices and easy terms of credit, to individual applicants and groups.

4. Allotments shall be distributed under the Land Court's supervision to Jewish and Arab applicants and groups indiscriminately.

5. Each applicant shall have to satisfy the Land Court:

- a) that he owns no other land
- b) that he possesses a reasonable minimum of capital or equipment for working the land, no matter whether his own or supplied by supporters;
- c) that he will work it personally.

to stay on in a Jewish country, is another question.

If not, the author would again refuse to see a tragedy or a disaster in their willingness to emigrate. The

Palestine Royal Commission was the first, not only among the English but practically also among the Jews.

not to shrink from the suggestion. Courage is infectious. Since we have this great moral authority for

calmly envisaging the exodus of 350,000 Arabs from one corner of Palestine, & doubling the number makes

no difference. The writer, as he said above, does not see any necessity for it, nor does he think it desirable

from many points of view; but if the hypotheses be

true that this would be the Arabs' own preference, the prospect can be discussed without any pretence of shock.

Since 1923, when Greeks, within

months weremoved to Macedonia and Turks to

Anatolia, the idea became very ~~unfamiliar~~ familiar and

even a little popular. Herr Hitler, detested as he is,

has also recently been adding to its popularity. Of

course, his critics strongly disapprove his policy in

removing Germans from the Trentino and the Balticum

and planting them in fields and houses robbed from the

(Ch. XVII)

Poles: but it is mainly the robbing of the Poles, not the moving of the Germans, which really causes the censure. One cannot help feeling that in so far as only Germans on one hand and Italians and Balts on the other are concerned, the operation might prove not so bad for their common health in the end. When Mr. Roosevelt foresees up to 20 million potential refugees after the war, what he no doubt has in mind is that the position of all "minorities" may become untenable all over the place, and some radical solution may have to be found. Ruritania, which as we know is situated just between Andivia and Hedulia and populated by a pot-pourri of both races, has a ~~not~~ majority of the former, so in 1918 it was adjudged to Andivia. Result? Andivia has now 300,000 Hedulians who cause trouble. So perhaps we had better annex the province to Hedulia? But then Hedulia will have 500,000 Andivians, with the same effect. Majority rule is perhaps not such a sweet panacea even where parties are concerned, but when it is nationalities the medicine simply does not work except as an irritant; and the alternative, minority rule, would be still worse. One really radical medicine would be the Greco-Turkish precedent of 1923. The writer frankly doubts if that is feasible, and perhaps other solutions could first be tried, which it is not here the place to outline. But

theoretically, the idea of redistributing minorities en masse is getting ever more popular among what is called the best people, and there is no longer any taboo about it.

One thing seems certain: any Arab country which would find the courage and the acreage for such an operation would reap fabulous material advantages. It would probably have unlimited sums and the world's best experts at its disposal for the most ambitious schemes of land reclamation and irrigation. The Arab trekkers, on the other hand, would probably also trek with donkey-loads of pelf. All the problems connected with the evacuation of the European "Zone" would become incomparably easier. Who knows?

But this is an aside, nothing to do with war aims. Palestine astride the Jordan has room enough for that million Arabs, for another million of the eventual progeny, for several million Jews, and for peace; for so much peace that it will then be peace also in Europe.

Chapter XIXSenatus Populusque Israel

In cold justice, the first of all Jewish war demands ought to be addressed to the Jews themselves: a united front. They ought to have formed it, or at least have set about forming it, long ago; but now, since the war, the eleventh hour has really struck.

A united front means, above all, one agreed single formula of demands to be presented to the future peace conference: this is even more essential than one single national authority. In theory it might even be more impressive if a dozen different Jewish delegations, appearing one after another before the peace conference, would repeat exactly the same demands; or again it might prove, on the contrary, much less impressive, only irritant. That does not really matter as the theory is unreal: an agreed programme, provided the people be not quite insane, would mean a united representation before the peace conference.

Yet even this - a single Jewish delegation before the conference table - is by far not what we need. The historical hour demands a Jewish delegation at the table of the peace conference. In the next chapter, the last of this book, this need will be emphasized as the crucial point of all the Jewish war aims. Our claim is for the full status of an Allied nation, with a recognised national

headquarters (if the word "government" be premature) and a seat among those who will have to decide on our demands. But that cannot even be suggested unless there is, or will be formed in time for action, a single organ whose title as headquarters no one could reasonably dispute.

Without that Jews can only be heard as petitioners, not consulted as partners; and as the petitioners are many we risk a replica of what happened at Evian. Having learned that there were some eighteen Jewish delegations at Geneva waiting to be heard, the Evian Conference entrusted one of its committees to invite all the eighteen. Each one of those delegations claimed, some probably with right, a "world"-wide range of influence, beside the main claim to attention which was a point of view quite unlike that of the next embassy. Each one was impartially given five minutes to state that point of view. This is the dangerous precedent which may have to be repeated at the peace conference, unless - which would surprise no one - the conference simply refuses to hear any of the competitors.

Another thing may happen, perhaps the worst of all: (yet there is a danger that some important Jewish bodies will themselves try and make influence in that harmful direction). That would be if the peace conference chose to hear only a few more authoritative, or at least more substantial looking bodies; in that case the choice would be

likely to favour the American Joint Distribution Committee (the biggest of our relief associations), the Joint Foreign Committee (a London body with a long and not unworthy record of political interventions), the Alliance Israélite Universelle, the Jewish Colonisation Association; perhaps also the Jewish Agency. This would be, frankly, the worst thing that can happen to us. A mix-up of eighteen points of view is at least harmless in that it cannot prejudice anything. But the selection of a few privileged admissibles would be in itself a pre-judgment, an indication that the peace conference has already before listening to the Jews, made up its mind as to what it wants to hear.

x

The greatest of all would then be the threat to Zionism. Even if a Jewish Agency were invited or allowed to present its view in this selected company, that would place it into the position of a competitor - with rather inferior chances. If a peace conference after a war like this decides to grant the floor to several Jewish bodies so selected as to represent several well defined attitudes - reliance on "equal rights", relief by charity, relief by scattered infiltration, group settlement in places outside of Palestine, and also Zionism among others - it means that the mot d'ordre is to be relief by patchwork and Palestine

is to be examined simply as one of the many possible and partial palliatives.

Unfortunately there are clear signs that the present spokesmen of the Jewish Agency not only do not intend to resist such diminution of caput, but deliberately invite it. Dr. Weizmann's recent speech at New York, obviously an agreed programme speech for its essence is being echoed by other spokesmen elsewhere, is indicative. His main point was: "Conservative estimates of the number of Jews that can be absorbed annually would confine themselves to the existing opportunities: they would not take into account larger territories like the Negeb and other regions where tens of thousands will no doubt some day live and prosper, or or the new horizons that may be opened up by soil research and new discoveries of water. But even within the limits of such a purely pragmatic point of view, Palestine has the ~~opportunity~~ capacity to take to itself approximately 50,000 new immigrants a year for years to come".

This means bidding for sure failure. 50,000 a year (even to those who believe in the "pragmatic reality of this figure) is, under the present circumstances, a candid admission that Zionism raises no claim to solve the tragedy. Arithmetically, it would take 20 years at this rate to save from hell even one single million; actually, there would be hardly any evacuation at all for under the "selective"

system of the Jewish Agency, the bulk of emigrants are green youths, so that just the age classes of maximum fertility (approximately, in the "Zone", 23 to 39) are left behind to replace the losses. Before a peace conference concerned ~~e~~ if at all - only with what can be done to evacuate the ruined Zone, it is an attitude calculated to make of Palestine just one of the partial and inadequate remedies that may be proposed.

One of the weakest, in fact. Taken even as "group settlement" - in the sense of a settlement certified to become an all-Jewish territory if it succeeds at all - this programme is obviously inadequate. British Guiana or the Kimberleys are a mirage, but at least there the first five thousand settlers, if they managed to stay, would make a purely Jewish province with no neighbours to cause trouble. But it would take a longish generation to transform even Western Palestine alone into a country with a Jewish majority at the rate of 50 thousand immigrants a year; and in the meantime - every member of the peace conference will know what would have to be faced in the meantime. Taken as a patchwork remedy, admittedly one of the several on the market, Palestine is really not an attractive business proposition.

Especially as no one at the peace conference is likely to accept the figure of "50,000 a year". The statesmen around the peace table are not likely to forget that there has been prolonged and conspicuous trouble, to say nothing of a statement of policy by the Mandatory, making 50,000 the final total of all the immigrants Palestine will ever accept. To transform "50,000 in all" into "50,000 a year" all this British and especially Arab opposition would have to be beaten down; for the present, a "conservative estimate" of what Palestine can offer is small immigration and the ever present thrust of trouble. But British Guiana, San Domingo, the Kimberleys, Mindanao and all the rest, whether sure of success or doubtful, whether future "territories" or "infiltration", whether big patchwork or small patchwork - have at least this one immense advantage: the good will of the respective governments, no immediate prospect of friction with the people of the country, in some cases no such people at all ...

Palestine as one of many palliatives has no chance at all to be not only preferred but even seriously noticed at the future peace conference. Of all possible palliative propositions Palestine is, politically the most arduous, hampered by obstacles which can only be surmounted at the

cost of considerable daring. Of course it is not impossible to overcome the Arab obstruction and Great Britain's reluctances, but to do so a decisive effort will be required. Efforts are only made when it is worth while to make them: when the price is great and unique, not a pittance to which can much easier be obtained elsewhere.

Palestine as a war aims problem has no locus standi unless it can be presented as the full solution of the Jewish problem, the only practicable theatre for a Max Norday plan, the only complete medicine for Europe's cancer. Only then can the Palestine claim be defended before the councils of a world such as it will be on the morrow of a great cataclysm, facing the necessity of immense solutions, with no time nor patience for trifles and trimmings: only if put forward as a scheme unique in its material humanitarian range, exclusive and intolerant of all competition, and indeed dwarfing all competitors and making their offer valueless in comparison.

The Jewish demand at the future peace conference should be an amalgam of the two dominating ideas of our people's modern history: the Jewish State for those who want it, and real equality for those whom Eastern Europe will not release. The amalgam is indissoluble, for

without the Jewish State the second demand is unreal, it is, in fact, not an amalgam but a bi-atomic oneness. Our people's only chance of elevation out of this war depends on these two conditions: that oneness of the Jewish war demands must be recognised by all the

collective authority of world Jewry, - and it must be presented at the world's settlement board by a single Jewish embassy in the name of a single world-Jewish leadership.

The writer is not quite sure if the old debate, as to whether the Jews are a nation or just a religious community, is still going on or has been dropped. But even if there still are people who "feel" about it one way or another, that should have no bearing on the question of a headquarters. One can favour a world-organisation for all scattered Jewry without committing oneself to the view that Jewry is a nation in dispersion. There is an interesting precedent in the person of the late Nathan Birnbaum, a very fertile and penetrating mind, who - after many ideological peregrinations - finally became converted to the view that the core of Israel's individuality was not nationhood but religion: yet he fervently advocated the creation of a "world-Kehillah" - a universal congregation or synagogue democratically elected throughout all the surface of the globe and "governing" in all matters of mutual assistance and mutual

defence. The author is rather far from that conception, but it would be waste of time to argue. What is needed is the recognition of a paramount common interest and a single headquarters to defend it: "Senatus Populusque Israel".

X

hardest

This is perhaps the ~~hardest~~ of all points of resistance on the road to Jewish redemption. The last few decades have produced in our scattered people a rich growth of organised efforts for self-help, and some of them have attained really remarkable levels of moral and material power. They are vividly conscious of their excellent records of social service, justifiably proud and jealous of their individuality and independence. In addition, they mostly have an ideology of their own, or at least one whose wording is quite different from the way in which they ~~same~~ ideas are expressed next door, so that any proposal to borrow even one single phrase next door sounds like invitation to apostasy. An amalgamated programme, plus a supreme headquarters which would supersede all those sectional sovereignties, is a plan sure to be resisted tooth and nail. The writer has no illusions about it. The formula "a united front of all Jewry" is not unpopular in itself, it can even be not unfrequently heard in many of those very sovereign quarters; but somehow (the writer means no offence) it is like the outcry for a pan-Arab Federation,

to which all their kings render courteous lip-service while not one of them would even listen to a concrete scheme ~~involving~~ involving a ~~diminution~~ diminution of his prerogatives. The writer frankly doubts if a supreme headquarters of world Jewry shall ever be formed by agreement between the existing organisations, the Big Four or the Big Five. Equally doubtful it is whether the amalgamation of programmes can be accomplished by consent between the parties. Some of them (not all of them) may agree to the concoction of a joint platform by the mechanical process of reciting "plank" after "plank" until everybody's favourite planks have been recited: provided none is allowed to usurp priority, and the same weight and value is attached to, say, lifting the ban on Jewish doctors in Tristan da Cunha, and the colonisation of Palestine; and provided, of course, that no such terms are used as Jewish State or mass-exodus, nor such heresies proclaimed, or even only hinted at, as that alleged connection between the reality of equal rights in new Poland and the proportion of Jews ~~that~~ that can be assisted to depart from new Poland. In other words, old twaddle with no cure for the cancer nor a message likely to stir any fertile imagination. But a really united formula of Jewish restoration, short and sharp and clever and single-minded as Chanteclair's morning call to which sunrise is the answer, is a unlikely to arise out of the self-sacrifice of parties as a really united

leadership out of the voluntary submission of central committees.

This book is not the place to plan ways and means how the united front will have to be achieved; but as sure as our people must be saved, the united front of world Jewry will have to be achieved. Life presses in this direction; public opinion is slow, but in the end it will also press in this direction. Then it also will "discover" the ways and means - or rather realise that there is nothing to "discover" as there are hundreds of instructive precedents, sound, clean, and effective. When unity cannot be established by the abdication of sectional majesties and highnesses, democracy - if alive and resolved to live on - must intervene and set up its own authority superseding all else. A World-Jewish Elected Assembly is years overdue: it should have been called into being when Polish Jewry was still free to act. There is no reason, just as Canada holds an election in March 1940, why a Jewish referendum cannot be arranged in most countries concerned. This war time Assembly would, of course, be a truncated body, but it still would stand as an expression of some among the most powerful forces of the race; and its birth, a plebiscite of universal suffrage, could become an impressive manifestation through all the free countries of civilisation still left

on the globe.

This short paragraph is inadequate for a subject so vast. The problem will probably have to be solved by long and heated internal debate, but it is an internal problem and does not properly belong in a book which attempts to state the Jewish claim vis-a-vis the Gentile universe. We shall leave it at that, only remembering that there will be no chance even of voicing a claim unless a single WorldJewish "government" be there to voice it.

Chapter XX

The Jewish war demands are:

- a) A Jewish army on all the Allied fronts
- b) Recognition of a world-Jewish civil headquarters with a seat on any international organ dealing with migration or reconstruction problems and on the future peace conference
- c) The Jewish State as a war aim of the Allies
- d) A Covenant on civic equality, as a war aim of the Allies.

K

a) The Army

The Jewish Regiment was formed by the War Office in August 1917. It was at first officially known as the 38th to 41st Royal Fusiliers, but was afterwards granted the name of "Judeans" and a special badge (the seven-branched candlestick described under canvass familiarly as the toasting fork). Its full strength on the register at Hounslow was probably over 10,000, but only half of that number could be trained in time to reach Palestine. Of these, about 1600 came from the United Kingdom, 100 from that Southern part of Palestine which Allenby had liberated a year before the final conquest, about 2500 from the United States, the balance from Canada, the Argentine, and from among the Jewish prisoners of war at Alexandria, Egypt, who volunteered for that services

and succeeded after several War Office refusals. The commanding officers of battalions in the field were J. H. Patterson, a Protestant Irishman; Eliezer Margolin, an Australian Jew, in his early youth a Palestinian pioneer; F. Samuel, a British Jew; F. Scott, a British Christian. The officers were mostly Christian, the NCO's mostly Jewish, the rank and file all Jews. During the final offensive, in September 1918, Jewish troops in the Jordan Valley formed a "Patterson column", and had the distinction of capturing the Umm-ash-Shert ford on the Jordan, a few miles north of Jericho - a deed mentioned in Allenby's dispatches. This was the first Jordan ford taken by the Allies; a couple of hours after the capture, Anzac cavalry crossed it and invaded Transjordan. "Patterson's column" was the first British infantry force in Transjordan; Col. Margolin, at the head of his battalion, was the first British commander of captured As-Salt (to-day Jews are prohibited from even entering Transjordan). - After the Armistice, the Judeans did garrison duty in Western Palestine. In 1919, during the trouble in Egypt, when the bulk of British troops left for Cairo, all the railway line from Romani in the Sinai desert up to Haifa was under their guard. At the military cemetery on the Mount of Olives there is

a section of Jewish graves. They are not many: the Jewish battalions had not been given a real battle chance, perhaps simply because there happened to be no serious engagement where they happened to be stationed. What they were told to do they did well. There was no reason why the precedent should not have been followed when the present war broke out, and there still is none.

But this time the precedent will have to be extended both in scope and in character. It must be, formally, a Jewish army, not a regiment within the British army; it must be given a chance to grow to 100,000 men at least; and it must fight on all the Allied fronts to prove just what some people would prefer to forget - that this is a Jews' war as much as Britain's and France's, Poland's and Finland's.

The writer need not be lectured on the 1001 excellent reasons why it is both unusual and "impossible" to have a Jewish army so long as there is no Jewish state, nor a Jewish treasury to maintain it. All the reasons are valueless. Unusual; yes; "impossible", nonsense. The only question is whether an additional 100,000 men, probably many more, will be useful in the field or not, and what will be the best way, the "optimum", to get the maximum number of recruits, and out of them the maximum eagerness of effort. This also settles the treasury question. If

100,000 men, or more than that, are needed they will have to be equipped, fed and trained at the Allies expense, and it will make a very little difference in costs if they will be styled an army. It may even mean a considerable economy, as privates' and officers' pay in a Jewish army need not be on the same scale as in the British. Secondly, while it is true that there is no Jewish state as yet, it is not quite exact to say that there is no Jewish treasury. It certainly exists as a spiritual but by no means negligible power, serving myriads of people in a score of countries, feeding a rather magnificent galaxy of social, educational and colonising enterprises throughout all the continents. The formation of a Jewish army will mobilise its resources to limits never suspected before. It may yet prove very helpful in other ways of the war, too, especially if, together with the raising of the army, a civilian all-Jewish authority will be recognised.

Outside of the Allied countries, and the countries held or paralysed by the enemy (U.S.S.R. included), there are more than six million Jews to-day whose dominating pre-occupation, without any fear of overstatement, can be described as looking for some way to help in destroying the common enemy. About 1,200,000 of them are males between the ages of 18 and 35. - An especially interesting corner of

the picture is Palestine, whose male Jewish population of army age can alone provide 100,000 men, with a large proportion of them not only trained but fairly experienced in that old-fashioned kind of warfare which in the Middle East may still be not quite of fashion. - All these are potentials which it would not be wisdom to neglect, simply as numbers, even apart from their value as a factor likely to affect the other "potential" of the war, the moral one.

True, there is a wide-spread opinion (this has been written in February 1940, and may no longer fit the case when the book is printed) that man power is no use in the sort of war the Allies are facing. A joke recently overheard in very competent quarters: "If the biggest neutral offered to come in we would be terribly embarrassed, for where could one find Lebensraum for him on the western front?" But, when not joking, everyone that counts realises that, if the war is to develop in a direction leading up to victory, it will have to take a different line of development. This is not only a pragmatic but also, and even more so, a moral necessity. Neutrals (and that still means three quarters of the anti-Nazi world) begin to lose immediate interest in the paltry proceedings. The daily budget of events on the seas and in the air, epic as it is in quality, lacks that grandeur of mass-effort without which there is no "war", only a kind of highly motorised guerrilla. Since December, the only war

news that look really like war news are coming from Finland. The world feels passionate about Finland; the world feels ever more and more like just an observer regarding all other theatres of the conflict, a sympathetic, attentive, but unexcited observer. This may become embarrassing. Neutrality to-day is an expensive business, it entails considerable losses and enormous inconvenience: if counterbalanced by a passionate, breathless excitement over what is happening every minute in the great arena, all those drawbacks will be borne not only with patience but even with a sort of grim satisfaction, for at heart every neutral is a sympathiser. But no sympathy can thrive on a diet of monotony. This explains why there are such obstinate relapses into peace talk, even from those neutrals whose wish to see Nazism crushed is every bit as ardent as ours: the quantitative pusiness of the war events, so strikingly out of keeping with the monstrous powers and the almost cosmic issues involved, saps at their nerve - There are, no doubt, very serious material reasons why this form of warfare has been allowed to predominate in the first stage of the conflict, and it certainly has been a godsend for accumulating more power; but it cannot be permitted to outlast a strictly limited necessity.

These are doubtless very cruel thoughts, but they fit human nature and are probably shared, by now, in most of the relevant circles high and low. But even while the need for monotony lasts, its bromide effects on the non-belligerent nations' morale could be considerably counter-balanced if six million ^{souls} living in their midst had a concrete tangible stake in the arena, and not just in the passive sense as victims.

The writer does not by any means forget that there are the various neutrality laws. They exist, and they must be taken into account with the utmost discernment. Discernment teaches that the network of "dents" they constitute is both extremely sensitive and extremely elastic. Sweden or Italy are not belligerent, but a nucleus with an active stake on the Mannerheim line can be imagined in either without really clashing against their public sentiment. This example is of course not meant to be a full analogy of the case we are examining in the present paragraph: it is only an illustration of the feature just referred to as "elasticity". On the other hand that network is also "sensitive", very formidably sensitive: and this is one of the reasons why a "Jewish army" is a much better address ~~than~~ than a Jewish legion in someone else's army. The difference ought to be clear without further

embroidering, but may become still clearer with the help of another illustration by analogy (once again, only a very superficial analogy): "propaganda". Anti-Nazi propaganda by the Allies would be resented even in pro-Allied countries, anti-Nazi propaganda by Jews is regarded natural. An appeal to Jews to play a part in the conflict is bound to produce a magnetic beam of great power: it would be resented if its source were British or French, but coming from a purely Jewish source it would be weighed in a different balance. The tragedy of dispersion is, after all, not without some redeeming features, inadequate on the whole, but sometimes effective.

But the earnest argument in favour of a Jewish army as preferable to Jewish units under other flags is the question of numbers and the question of élan. Any child realises that there is a great scarcity of Jewish generals, staff-officers, even field officers, and especially NCO's: at the outset the Jewish army will be really Jewish only as to rank and file. But this is one of those cases when a name is more essential than material substance. The author, now for over 25 years, has been obstinately engaged in fostering what some fools were pleased to describe as Jewish militarism, and in close contact with the type of Jewish youth whose mentality responds to the appeal of the bugle (to-day this covers practically the ~~whole~~ whole young manhood of the race):

he can affirm, with the fullest assurance, that while a call to *g* join Jewish regiments under an Allied flag would attract thousands, whole streets will be emptied in the rush for a Jewish army.

x

b) The "Civil" Headquarters"

The writer avoids the term "Jewish Government" so as not to complicate his argument by giving pretext for misunderstandings; and this reticence produces the irritating need for attempts to invent some Ersatz-terminology which all sound rhetorical and artificial. As a matter of fact there should be no room for any misunderstanding. No person in his senses could really imagine that a "government" of this kind implies, or would claim to imply, the right to give compulsory orders to Jewish citizens of different countries over the heads of parliaments, cabinets and police. Least of all can such a vision be conjured when there already exists a precedent in point, the Polish Government in exile. It is not going to issue decrees for the Poles in Poland because they would be massacred if they obeyed; it does not claim any compulsory powers over Polish citizens who live outside of Poland, not even those in the Allied countries. Yet it bears the title "government", and is a government in a sense which is as important as anything in this war. If the Allies admitted that a statehood destroyed by bestial

violence de facto is non-existent in law, it would vitiate the very air we breathe. A statehood recognised by the comity of civilised nations cannot cease, it stands.

No analogy need be perfect in all details. Fortunately for the Polish nation, or for the Czech nation by the same token, their lot is immensely better than that of the Jews: they inhabit the territory for whose freedom they fight, while the Jews are in dispersion. But the root of the analogy is sound: it is the principle that a destroyed nation is still a nation.

To re-start, at a moment like this, the debate as to whether the Jews of East-Central Europe are a nation would be futile. For the last 20 years no responsible statesman, east or west or in-between, ever even thought of that section of Jews in any other terms. Whenever events forced them and their problems upon his attention, he knew that there was one official solution - they were some day to form a nation in a sort of area called a National Home; he may be sceptical himself as to wisdom of that solution, or as to chances of its success, but the official view was that they were, so to speak, stuff earmarked to form a nation when ~~for xxx~~ (or "if and when") restored. It would be useless to argue with those who deny that this was, roughly, the common

approach to the problem. Those who admit the truth cannot help admitting that, the moment a list of destroyed nations waiting for restoration has been officially drawn up, the homeless section of the Jewish people has a fair claim to a place on that list.

With regard to the Polish claim, its recognition is expressed in the title "Polish Government". With regard to Czechoslovakia - the official title is "National Committee". It does not matter what term will be selected to describe the idea of *Senatus Populusque Israel*. What matters is the fact that there is a problem of immense importance to the world's health and peace, clearly distinct from all other ~~problems~~ problems, meaning life or death to five or six million people but affecting the fate of sixteen millions; that these men and women are approximately just as willing to help in solving that problem as any normal nation can be; and they possess a total of moral and material power that can go a long way towards that solution and ought to be given a chance to do so. All this constitutes, in character and magnitude, exactly what the dictionary calls a "nation", with "national" tasks before it. If other nations want to help, they must begin by inviting that collectivity to come in and take a seat in the council chamber, to discuss aims and ways and means. This is the only meaning of "Jewish government" with which one is concerned at the moment; a "headquarters", a "leadership",

an "executive", a "presidency" entitled to negotiate and to cooperate, not as petitioners but as partners.

The writer does not loose sight of an obstacle whose obstructing force is as formidable as its moral value is negligible: its name is snobbery. There is a certain mentality sure to feel shocked and angered, as by unheard of impertinences, by the suggestion that Jews are no longer content with the rôle of petitioners and pretend to be fit for the dignity of peers. The battle against this kind of snobbery will have some day to be fought, so perhaps this will be the proper time. First of all, it is extremely unfair to forget who is the major sufferer in the whole drama. But even apart from that aspect which the mentality just mentioned may fail to see, the snobbery ~~itself~~ itself is overwhelmingly devoid of any shred of justification. There is no need to make of it a contest of abstract superiorities, to remind the opponent who wrote the Bible and be confounded by the question where is your Shakespeare. There are peoples innocent of either yet eminently fitted for partnership in statecraft: and this (referring to present fitness, not to "innocence" of past records) is exactly the Jews' unquestionable case. It would be strange for any nation to claim, on behalf of its leading strata, as compared to those of the Jewish people,

any marked superiority in brains, in learning, in statesmanship and statesmanlike experience, or in colonising genius, to say nothing of the readiness and ability to back ideas with sound finance. There is no harm in asserting superiority where it is real, and rejecting pretences that have no reasonable backgrounds: thus it would only be right to reject a claim to a "Jewish" seat on the Allies General Staff (if presented), for this is a field where we are only learners. On a plane where we have not more to learn than to teach such obstruction would be just a case of cheap and empty snobbery, and a handicap to the success of the common cause. It must be resisted with all the forces not only of reason but of scorn it deserves. When overcome, it will probably be discovered to have been the only serious obstacle to a step so obviously sensible and useful as the recognition of a supreme organ of world Jewry as a full partner in building up the world of peace.

X

c) The State

The whole book has been devoted to this subject; here it will be enough simply to recapitulate the main points of the argument.

The Jewish State is a true and proper war aim. Without it, the ulcer that breeds Europe's trouble cannot be cured: for without it there can be no adequate emigration of the millions whose old homes are irretrievably condemned by the force of reality; and without that, no equality; and without this, no peace.

There must be an organ of international authority devoting itself, from now on, to the study of this problem, and the preparation of the scheme, or the schemes, to be laid before the future peace conference. If that organ is the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees, it must be rebuilt and reinforced in agreement with Jewish authorities, and instructed to drop the patchwork business and concentrate on the Jewish State problem.

There can be no preliminary limitation as to the various projects that body shall have to examine before it makes its choice. It shall be instructed to investigate any plan presenting, *prima facie*, the essential features of earnestness: if necessary, all the corners of what we call the Fata Morgana land. But the first item on its agenda must be to investigate the Palestine plan. This is a fair proposal, excluding nothing except any attempt to steal a march either way.

It will be for the Jewish factor, in debate or in reality, to prove what is, after all, not difficult to prove: that the Palestine plan, with all its drawbacks, is the only one - apart from all other considerations - that is practicable.

d) The Covenant of Equality

Should the Jewish problem by some miracle, entirely disappear from Europe's surface, it will still probably require a couple of generations to establish real equality of rights between members of different ethnical groups sharing the same territories. There was a time when people believed that such equality can be efficiently "guaranteed" by a mention in a document. There still are statesmen who pretend to believe in it. There is no sane adult mind left on earth that really believes in such utter nonsense. Any paragraph in any constitution or international treaty, imposing on a majority the obligation to abstain from harming a minority, will not be worth the price of the printer's ink spent on its reproduction if it can be disregarded with impunity: as it can everywhere, under the international regime prevailing to-day.

The writer does not suggest that minorities are being harmed everywhere. On the contrary, he has made it very clear that he considers the condition of some minorities (the Scotch in England, the French Canadians in Ontario, etc) an entirely satisfactory condition; and that he is sure the Jews in a Jewish Palestine will be able to create as satisfactory a condition for the Arab minority if the Arabs choose to stay. To treat a minority decently is an achievement in

which some nations in some countries succeed while other nations in other countries fail. History, sociology, psychology or perhaps psychiatry will some day discover why there should be such a difference; it is enough for our to-day's purpose to remember that it exists, and that East-Central Europe, even without Jews, is not among the areas where the miracle can work unless it can be enforced by some ever-present and tangible threat of supreme compulsion.

Unlimited sovereignty of nations will have to go overboard, at least in Europe, if the world expects to live. Statesmen seem to be realising it gradually, and there is much less opposition to this theory than might have been expected; though it may all become different when it comes to the practice. Yet there still lingers in most minds a schoolboyish illusion that only in international affairs need sovereignty be qualified by certain concession: "internal" sovereignty can be left undisturbed without any danger for the neighbours. Translated into the language of experience, it means that as long as Nazism was "only" preached and practised in Germany, there was no real danger for her neighbours: a piece of nonsense. The circle of any nation's "internal" matters which really do not affect other nations is a very narrow circle, and it is getting ever more narrow day by day; perhaps there is by now nothing even left of it. Nobody suggest that the abstract logical conclusion

should be enforced to the end, so that everything in Greece should be everybody's business in Portugal and vice-versa. But the division of matters, from the point of view of mutual safety, into external and internal is a schoolboy's concept. If your neighbour's drains are bad it is your concern, and you must have the right to call in the police.

How the world will settle this delicate problem is not the subject of this book: but as the main obsession of all is, to-day, to avoid the next war, it is not unreasonable to assume that some device will be found to keep under joint neighbourly control such of the "internal" matters as have a more or less direct and tangible bearing on the danger of war. Nor is the world likely to forget that supervision without a threat of coercion does not work. There will be devices for supervision; and there will be devices for immediate, quick and probably very painful coercion in case of default. For instance: if there will be demilitarized zones, and if the owner of one of them will try to rearm it by surprise, his action will probably be treated as *casus belli* and answered by some kind of armed occupation, or worse. This is not an attempt to guess how the terms of the future Covenant will look: This is only meant to emphasize the assurance that the present storm will not be allowed to subside without having

led to the establishment of some absolutely practical, efficient, and automatic machinery for knocking out anyone who starts laying a powder trail before he has had time to carry it much farther.

And the writer thinks that among those "internal" matters that have a direct and tangible bearing on war danger, treatment of ethnical or religious minorities is in the first rank. A hundred years of European history have proved it. There can be no claim of sovereignty to cover a breach of the covenant of equality: any step in that direction is the same as starting the powder trail; the machinery must be set in motion and the culprit knocked out.

To have such great power, the covenant of equality must fulfil two conditions among others: it must be terribly solemn, and it must be fully and carefully reasonable.

"Solemn" means that there can be no equal-rights "clauses" or "paragraphs" inserted into treaties dealing with seventy seven other matters. None of those other matters can have one tenth of the monstrous poison force of the minorities matter; no chapter dealing with the former, one tenth of the colossal prophylactic importance of provisions affecting the latter. Nor is there, among all problems of international or "internal" statecraft, any so complicated.

any that requires such attention to detail and such penetration of foresight as this. There must be a special session of the peace conference entirely devoted to this problem; and a separate Covenant of Equality.

But the Covenant must also be "reasonable". A law is unreasonable if it prescribes things ordinary human nature cannot stand, or disregards conditions which, despite the best average will of the average obedient citizen, renders it exceedingly difficult for him to obey. Equality cannot be enforced where, by the nature of thing, it is bound to degenerate into its opposite. This aspect of the problem could easily be illustrated by marshalling stories taken from a dozen of countries between East Central Europe and South Africa, but in order to avoid parading real offenders it is better to stage an imaginary picture. Ruritania is inhabited by two races. The broadheads, the majority race, are decent people but slow-witted; the longheads, the 20 per cent minority, are equally decent but very quick in the uptake. The principle of equal rights is unimpeachably respected throughout the country, in every walk of public life and many walks of private life. Among its other applications, bi-lingual candidates are preferred for most government or municipal offices. The broadheads are painstaking learners but unable to talk properly anything but Broadhead; the longheads are excellent

linguists. On the strict basis of equal opportunity and the best man wins regardless of facial angles, it is invariably the longhead candidate who takes the honours. The result, after 25 years of that regime, is that 75 per cent of the best jobs in government or townhalls employ has been captured by longheads; practically the same in trade and the professions. The broadheads ask: is that fair? Should people whom God has refused the gift of tongues be penalised? Should there not be some kind of proportionality in the enjoyment of equal rights?

A ~~reasonable~~ reasonable Covenant will take this into account. "Equal opportunity and the best man wins" does not cover the whole problem of equal rights; it has perhaps even very little to do with the real essence of that problem, whose extremely complicated nature is exactly the chief reason why it is absurd - even on paper - to try and solve it by inserting a few paragraphs into an instrument dealing with something else. Jockeys, to be really equal to one another in a race, are weighed and weighed; golfers get varying ~~handicaps~~ handicaps. A covenant of equality must see to it that, while the twenty longheads get their full twenty loaves, not nineteen, the broadheads get their eighty rations and not seventy nine.

Whether such a Covenant, however perfect, can work the trick and produce a condition satisfactory enough to prevent friction, is a query which only the future can answer. Some

people doubt it, and believe that the only real solution of the minorities problem is a redistribution of the races over the surface of the earth, i.e. the mass evacuation of all scattered minorities. This may be an exaggeration. There are minorities which, though cut off from their ethnical mainland, still form mono-ethnical "islands", enclaves, at least villages of their own, so that it is, so to speak, only on the market-day that they have to rub shoulders with the majority people. Or there may be cases where both races are somehow more or less congenial, good mixers mutually, so that by leaving them alone and giving the time they might be helped to intermarry, or simply to forget all about it. The covenant must foresee all that can be foreseen, and time will show.

But the Covenant must be reasonable, and its authors cannot expect the impossible to happen: in particular, they cannot expect Jewish equality in East-Central Europe to be anything but a lie unless their colleagues, the other statesmen at the other session of the peace conference, establish the Jewish State.